The Politics of Transforming Education in Peru: 2007-2020

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Abstract

Peru is one of a relatively small number of middle-income countries whose education strategy to raise student learning has involved significant reforms of teacher policy sustained over a sufficiently long period (more than 10 years). Global experience shows that core reforms of the teaching career are both politically and technically challenging. The focus of this paper is the content and implementation of reforms to raise teacher quality in Peru in the period 2007-2020 in the hope that other countries facing the same challenges can benefit from this experience. We conclude with some reflections on how education policy and education politics have contributed to the post-pandemic landscape.
The Politics of Transforming Education in Peru: 2007-2020

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I. Overview

Entering the 21st century, education quality in Peru was low and stagnating. After reaching its lowest historic point in 1990, by the early 2000s, teacher salaries were a third of their level 40 years before. (Saavedra and Gutierrez 2020). On PISA 2000, Peru’s 15-year-olds performed almost 100 points lower than those in Chile, Argentina, and Mexico (approximately two and a half years of schooling behind), and 200 points (5 years of schooling) behind the OECD average. Peru was the only country of the 43 that participated in PISA where over half of the students (54 percent) scored below the lowest level in reading, Level 1, compared with six percent of OECD students (OECD, 2001.).

By 2020, Peru had made significant, sustained progress in expanding enrollments (Annex 10) especially in pre-primary education, reducing grade repetition and dropout, and raising learning on several key measures:

- Peru was the only country in LAC to raise PISA scores (15-year-olds) from 2015-2018. (Annex 1). Peru showed the most impressive gains in the last two decades (di Gropello et.al)
- Peru improved more than any other country (among 16 countries) from 2013 to 2019 on the Latin America regional assessment ERCE – with large gains in all domains (reading, math and science) at both the 3rd grade and 6th grade levels; progress was driven by lowering the share of students at the lowest performance level and performance is now above the regional average (Annex 2)
- Peru’s learning gains on PISA between 2009 and 2018 represent one additional year of content mastery in language and math
- National assessment data also shows steady learning gains, particularly in the early years of schooling (foundational literacy and numeracy) (Annex 3)

Peru’s learning gains and concomitant development of a high caliber technical team in the Ministry of Education over the period to 2020 make the disruption to education policy and progress since then distressing. The pandemic, coupled with political instability driving the rapid succession of four education ministers from 2020-2023, made Peru’s management
of education during the pandemic one of the most ineffective in the LAC region (Annex 4). Public schools were closed for a full two years (one of the longest periods in the region) and efforts to support distance learning were piecemeal and failed almost entirely to address the needs of rural students. While there are no data yet on Peru’s learning losses as a result of the pandemic, they are doubtlessly substantial. The election of Pedro Castillo in 2021 weakened commitment to the core education policies of the period we study that are credited with driving learning progress.

Peru’s experience is still of interest, for two main reasons. First, it is one of a relatively small number of middle-income countries whose education strategy to raise student learning in the period we study has involved significant reforms of teacher policy, with policies sustained over a sufficiently long period (more than 10 years) to show some results. Peru’s core strategy aimed at transforming the teaching profession from a low-prestige, relatively underpaid career that did not attract the country’s most academically talented students into a meritocracy with a more attractive career path, higher salaries, hiring based on academic talent and promotions based on performance. Many other countries face the same challenge.

Second, global experience shows that core reforms of the teaching career are both politically and technically challenging. Peru’s experience adds to the relatively small body of developing country experience with the design and implementation of policies to transform teaching. In Peru’s case, this transformation was pursued over several different Presidential administrations which allows for exploration of how political support for reform adoption and reform implementation can be built and sustained. Transformation of the teaching career reform takes time, so finding ways to shore up continuity across Presidents is crucial (Bruns, Macdonald, and Schneider 2019). The focus of this paper is the content and implementation of reforms to raise teacher quality in Peru in the period 2007-2020, in the hope that other
countries facing the same challenges can benefit from this experience. We conclude with some reflections on how education policy and education politics have contributed to the post-pandemic landscape.

**Learning Progress.**

Research studies have provided early validation of key elements of Peru’s strategy focused on teacher quality, by showing that the rigorous test-based selection process for new teachers can predict teacher effectiveness (Bertoni et al, 2020); that test-based selection combined with financial incentives has promoted teacher quality in the most remote and disadvantaged rural schools, producing significant learning gains (Bobba et al. 2021); and that a mentoring program for rural teachers raised their students’ learning (Rodriguez et al. 2016, Majerowicz and Montero, 2018)

The timeline of reform, however, shows that Peru’s progress with teacher reforms cannot fully explain the learning progress the country made over the 2007-2020 period. Although 100% of new civil service teachers have been recruited to high standards, their share of the overall teaching force remains small. Peru has also implemented other reforms, and while it is impossible to assign causality – or even delineate relative importance – in any serious way, a number of elements (discussed in more detail in Balarin 2021 and Saavedra and Gutierrez, 2020), clearly offered “tailwinds” to the impact of teacher policy reforms.

These include:

- “pivot to learning” - Peru began building national assessment capacity and participating in cross-national learning assessments in the mid-1990s, with the LLECE regional assessment and the 2000 PISA assessment. Although Peru dropped out of PISA after its disastrous 2000 performance, the country rejoined in 2009 and has participated ever since. More importantly, the Ministry of Education developed sample-based and then census-based
learning assessments for 2nd, 4th and 6th grades and a first-rate technical
capacity for learning assessment and transmission of results to the district and
school-level, which provided a platform for targeted incentives and supports
to schools and evaluation of the cost-effectiveness of different programs
(Annex 3). Some researchers take a more jaundiced view of the shift from
sample based to census-based assessments and the role of the World Bank in
promoting this to the Garcia administration as a strategy for holding schools
accountable for results.1 However, the development of testing capacity and
“testing culture” helped shift the system from a focus on enrollments to
learning, and cross-national learning results – particularly low PISA scores –
proved useful to policymakers to advocate for reforms and/or argue that
reforms were working. Moreover, sample-based data allows for an
understanding of a country or region performance, while census-based
assessments shift schools’ perceptions about their own role towards
improving learning, something that should be obvious, but isn’t in many
education systems.

• **Child readiness** – Peru had strong and sustained economic growth from 2000-
2020 (averaging 5% per year, compared with 2.6% for the LAC region),
producing a sharp reduction in overall poverty and a 60% reduction in
extreme poverty, one of the strongest rates of improvement in Latin America
(Annex 6). Over the same period pre-school coverage, health and nutrition
services expanded greatly, especially in rural areas. Conditional cash transfer

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1 Balarin (2021) cites several academics who believe the introduction of census-based (universal) testing led to
several outcomes inconsistent with the pursuit of education quality, including greater Ministry of Finance
involvement in education spending through “results-based budgeting” and a narrowing of the curriculum. We
discuss this issue in section VI.
programs such as Juntos, which was continued across several government administrations, created incentives for parental uptake of services; the share of undernourished children under age 5 nationally fell from 33% in 2000 to 12% in 2019 (Balarin 2021), with the largest improvements for rural children. Stunting among rural children fell by 40%, twice the rate of improvement nationally (Annex 5). Better-nourished children who have benefitted from early stimulation enter primary school more able to learn.

- **Increased Education Spending.** Economic growth increased overall fiscal resources, and this was amplified after 2012 by Saavedra and subsequent ministers’ success in raising the budget share for education from 2.7% of GDP in 2010 to 4.2% in 2020. This, combined with no growth in the size of the school-aged population, due to demographic change, allowed for significant increases in spending per student in public schools over the period. Spending per student in primary education almost doubled in real terms from 2008 to 2021 and at the pre-primary and secondary levels it more than doubled (Annex 7). Much of this funding went to increase teacher salaries, but also financed significant infrastructure improvements and learning materials\(^2\). It also allowed for a decline in the pupil teacher ratio (PTR) between 2007 and 2020, from 20 to 14 in public primary schools and 14 to 12 in secondary schools. Public schools now have the same PTR as private schools, which maintained a stable PTR of about 15 over the period (Annex 11). Although teacher allocation across schools and regions remains a challenge – particularly for the most remote rural areas and for bilingual

\(^2\) However, some of this spending, such as significant investments in ICT over the period, including a One Laptop per Child program, were evaluated to have had no impact on student learning (Cristia et al 2015).
education—the increasing number of teachers likely reflects expanded schooling access for rural populations. Perhaps the most important quality-enhancing factor in Peru’s case has been the conscious targeting of increased funding to rural areas, driving relative improvements in public education outcomes in regions outside Lima. Annex 8 shows that, while not perfectly progressive, education spending per primary student has tended to be higher in regions with high poverty rates, many of which are in rural mountain areas.

- **Better management** - Technical strengthening of core Ministry capacity as well as depoliticized selection of school directors and regional officials since 2014 produced better program implementation (more timely delivery of books and materials to schools, management information fed back to schools, improvement in regional management capacity and effective implementation of school-level performance incentives such as the *Bono Escolar*, and regional level performance based budget supplements such as the *Convenios de Gestion*). Another innovation of the Saavedra administration was a partnership with MIT’s Joint Poverty Action Lab to conduct rigorous evaluations of Ministry programs.

- **Supports for teacher practice.** Ancillary reforms and programs that were important complements to the core teacher policy reforms included a reform of the basic education curriculum, focused on the definition of competencies; supporting materials, including “road maps” and lesson plans for teachers plus new learning materials; shifts in the design of in-service teacher training, from large-scale conferences to school-level mentoring; and two higher education reforms designed to raise the quality of post-secondary institutes and universities.
Peru is part of an Andean wave of system-wide reforms aimed at raising teacher quality, with major reforms in Colombia 2002, Ecuador in 2009, Mexico in 2013, and Chile beginning in 2004 and culminating in a comprehensive reform in 2016. All these systems, except Mexico (where reforms were reversed) have seen improvements in learning, and while Peru stands out for having achieved the largest learning gains through the 2019 Latin America regional test (ERCE), we compare differences in reform design and implementation across these countries.

Reform Politics

Key factors making reform adoption possible and promoting its continuity include, in rough descending order: a strong technocracy developed in the Ministry of Education enabled by political commitment and fiscal support from several successive presidents (Alan Garcia, Ollanta Humala, and Pedro Kuczynski); a splintered teacher union that initially accepted the career reform; effective communication strategies of several ministers; support in media and public opinion; and less intervention and predation by clientelist politicians than seen in other Latin American countries, notably Mexico, Colombia historically, and some parts of Brazil. Even if these factors did not operate equally across all administrations, there were many elements of continuity that have not been observed in other cases.

Stakeholders posing political threats to reform continuity have included the Congress, segments of the for-profit higher education sector and single-issue interest groups, such as conservative Christians (see section III). After 2017, political maneuvering among Congressional parties led to multiple Presidential successions and a sharp increase in turnover of government ministers, with four Presidents and six ministers of education in the four years to 2019. However, while most of this congressional opposition focused on curriculum and university reforms, continuous political upheaval deterred ministers from pushing more aggressively with the most contentious reform elements – evaluating teachers and potentially
dismissing low-performers—and undermined communications strategies to “sell” the reforms and improved learning results.

II. Teacher Policy Reforms (2007-20)

Peru has close to 400,000 public school teachers (about 68% of total basic education teachers) serving close to 7 million students in over 50,000 public schools. The teaching force is relatively old, with an average age of 46, and it is 63% female.

Two laws are at the core of Peru’s teacher reforms. The first, the Ley de la Carrera Publica Magisterial (CRM) in 2007, was passed by Congress during President Alan Garcia’s second administration. Early in his term, Garcia used his electoral mandate to enact the first significant reform of teachers’ status since the 1984 Ley del Profesorado. The 2007 CPM (Carrera Publica Magisterial) broadly paralleled reforms in Colombia (2002) and Ecuador (2009) to establish “meritocracy” in the teaching profession, with three key changes from the 1984 law: i) test-based hiring of new teachers, ii) elimination of automatic promotion based on seniority; and iii) introduction of periodic performance evaluation for teachers in service.

Under the first provision, all new teacher candidates had to pass an entrance test of content mastery, designed to eliminate politicians’ and unions’ interference in teacher hiring and to ensure that all teachers met an adequate standard of competency. Second, promotions were no longer automatic with years of service but would be based on evaluations of teachers’ skills and performance evaluation. Third, the performance of all teachers in service would be evaluated at regular intervals, with explicit provision for dismissal of teachers who failed three successive evaluations.
The teacher union, SUTEP (*Sindicato Unitario de Trabajadores en la Educación del Perú*), opposed these changes, with nation-wide strikes and a challenge in the courts. The courts upheld the law, but to ease opposition, the Garcia administration offered a compromise; existing teachers would be “grandfathered” and continue to be governed by the 1984 law, and only newly hired teachers entered the new Carrera. Existing teachers could “opt in” to the new career path, as under Colombia’s 2002 reform and Ecuador’s 2009 reform. The government believed that the CPM’s higher salaries would attract teachers. But over the final three years of the Garcia administration only 10% of existing teachers submitted to the competency tests required to enter the CPM career path, and the Ministry was left managing a dual career structure with, by 2012, only about 25% of total teachers (new hires plus those who opted in) covered by the reform and 75% of teachers maintaining the traditional career path, with no performance evaluation, complete job stability, and automatic promotions (Bruns and Luque, 2015).

The second key reform, the Ley de Reforma Magisterial (LRM), was adopted in 2012, under President Ollanta Humala and Minister Patricia Salas. The LRM built upon the same principles of the meritocratic reform of Garcia but made the new career path mandatory for all teachers. The LRM also made a point of greatly increasing the salary incentives that accompanied increased hiring standards and accountability pressures. The LRM increased not only the base salary for teachers (almost 3 times the minimum wage) but also introduced a new career trajectory with eight different levels and significant increases in salary at each stage.

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3 The same issues were faced in Colombia and Ecuador. In Colombia’s case, the government decided to maintain the “opt-in” policy and manage two streams, despite some evaluation evidence that test-hired teachers under the 2004 reform produced higher value-added learning outcomes (Ome, 2012) and that the pace of integration remained slow; by 2020, still only about half of teachers were in the new system. In Ecuador, the government passed a 2011 Education Law which eliminated the grandfathering of existing teachers permitted in the 2009 Ley de Carrera Docente and merged all teachers into the new system (Schneider 2022).
stage, designed to stimulate teachers’ professionalism and motivation across a long career.\textsuperscript{4}

Under the LRM, the salary at the top grade was more than seven times the minimum wage, such that the ratio of top to entry-level salaries and promotions to each grade beyond grade 5 were rewarded with salary increases of 70-160\% (Annex 9) The minimum required time at each level was also shortened, so that a new teacher could potentially attain the highest level of the career within twenty years. The salary policy also included attractive bonus payments for teachers who score highly on the entrance test or take positions in prioritized areas (remote rural zones, border areas, and conflict areas). Underlying the LRM was an explicit vision of what constituted good teaching practice, developed through significant consultation with teachers and experts, the Marco del Buen Desempeno Docente, similar to the framework anchoring Chile’s teacher reforms.

The 2012 LRM also established meritocratic standards and improved career incentives for managers and technical staff in the public education system, including school directors and administrators for 52,000 public schools, 220 managers of district education offices (Unidades de Gestion Local, UGEL) and 25 superintendents of education at the regional level (Direcciones Regionales de Educacion, DRE). The implementation of the law started in 2014, and by 2016 eleven different evaluation processes were implemented, both for initial teacher hiring and teacher promotions. For the first time in 2015, 15,000 school principals (about one-third of positions) were assigned through a meritocratic selection process and principals received specialized training and control over a greater share of school-level spending.

\textsuperscript{4} This compares with the salary scale under the 1984 law that set the base salary for teachers at the level of the minimum wage and provided for only 3 professional levels, with the highest salary three times the minimum wage.
In parallel to giving directors greater school level autonomy, the Ministry expanded the provision of school-level performance information, including an innovative “traffic light” (semaforo escuela) tool to provide monthly comparative data for each UGEL on basic school-level performance indicators, such as teacher and student attendance, availability of learning materials, and access to basic support services. A school bonus (bono escolar) for improved test scores, attendance and pass rates was also introduced. The Ministry also institutionalized the MINEDULab partnership established with MIT’s J-PAL to foster process evaluations and in-house evaluation of policy design options as well as rigorous impact evaluations (J-PAL, 2018).

Other legislation over the 2010-2020 period with important implications for teacher policy includes the new National Curriculum passed in 2016 and major changes in the approach to teacher professional development. Higher education reforms included a reform of the university system (Ley de Reforma Universitaria) adopted in 2014 and a reform of technical institutes (Ley de Institutos) governing non-university training courses, including pre-service teacher preparation, adopted in 2016.

Teacher Professional Development. In an effort to move away from the ineffective, usually theoretical, hall/auditorium style of teacher training, there was a shift towards more practical approaches and more individualized support. A program of pedagogical support (Soporte Pedagógico) to teachers, including sample lesson plans, coaching and mentoring, and delivery of new instructional materials was rolled out, initially in rural areas. The Ministry in 2016 also implemented for the first time an induction program to provide mentoring support, online materials and remote guidance for newly hired teachers during their critical first two years of teaching. Finally, the Ministry delivered extra assistance to teachers managing single teacher/multigrade schools and community-based ECD centers. An
early rigorous impact evaluation found that these targeted teacher mentoring produced learning gains (Majerowicz and Montero, 2018).

Curriculum reform. The curriculum reform is regarded as an important achievement under Minister Saavedra that consolidated and clarified various earlier curriculum reforms into a more coherent structure. It was underpinned by a four-year, nationwide consultation process to gain ideas and support from civil society groups, teachers and national and international experts. The curriculum is organized around clearly defined learning outcomes students are expected to achieve by the end of pre-school, primary and secondary education. It also identifies important transversal competencies to be developed, such as inclusion, respect for cultural diversity, environmental protection, and gender equality. The last topic was not really an innovative feature of the curriculum, as it had been introduced in the early 2000s, but it nonetheless generated opposition from religious groups and forced some moderating of language around gender identity, and sexual and reproductive health education.

Pre-service Teacher Education. As in Chile and Ecuador, reformers in Peru were concerned that the proliferation of low-quality teacher training schools was a structural constraint to the quality of the teaching force, leading to overproduction of new teacher candidates with weak academic skills and inadequate classroom preparation. In Ecuador in 2012 and Chile in 2016, new laws greatly expanded government oversight of teacher training, allowing for closure of institutions deemed low quality. In Ecuador, 23 pedagogical institutes were closed after 2012 and a new National University for Teacher education modeled after Singapore’s National Institute for Education was created. In Chile after 2016, the government closed numerous, mainly privately owned, teacher education programs, and eliminated all low-cost, online-only and night school programs for teacher preparation. The new Chilean law also moved to raise the academic quality of candidates for teacher training, by mandating
that no student could be accepted into teacher training programs without having scored in the top 50% of the distribution on national Chile’s college entrance exam, the PSU. New research by Neilson on the impact of this reform is discussed later.

Peru’s *Ley de los Institutos Tecnológicos y Pedagógicos* approved in 2016, aimed at the same goals, trying to raise the quality of *Institutos de Educación Superior Pedagógica*, which confer a degree allowing certification as a teacher. The diagnosis was that there was an excessive number of Institutes, more than 150 in the public sector, many very small. The reform called for consolidating and closing many of these public establishments, to keep the total at most 50, and to improve the regulatory framework for private teacher training institutions. However, implementation of this law has been slow and Peru has not been able to raise the quality of initial teacher preparation – or the entry standards for teacher training candidates -- as much as its neighboring countries.

Another major law, Peru’s 2014 *Higher Education Law (Ley Universitaria No. 30220)* gave the government stronger oversight tools for a higher education sector with burgeoning enrollments in privately owned universities with low or null academic requirements for entry and low-cost, low-quality programs. There also existed entrenched vested interests in many public universities. This was the first serious attempt at government oversight of private providers in a sector largely unregulated since the Fujimori era. The Law created a higher education quality assurance office, SUNEDU (*Superintendencia Nacional de Educación Superior Universitaria*) responsible for granting universities license to operate, establishing standards for institutional quality and academic degree requirements, auditing institutions’ performance and finances, with power to sanction institutions that fail to meet standards, and reporting annually on the performance of the sector.
As discussed later, implementation of this expanded mandate has been a challenge, given powerful business interests and politicians directly involved in the for-profit higher education sector in Peru. The Law was contested several times in the courts, as well as in legislative proposals in Congress aimed at weakening the SUNEDU but in all instances upheld at least until 2022.

III. Stakeholders in Teacher Policy Reforms

Recent scholarship on education politics in developing countries often emphasizes “political settlements” or elite pacts that favor certain education outcomes (Hickey and Hossain 2018; Pritchett, Sen, and Werker 2017) (Balarin 2021, Gershberg 2020). In Peru, it is difficult to identify a political settlement focused just on teacher policy. However, a range of elites in Peru – business, media, civil society organizations, and the middle class – favor a technocratic executive – across a range of policy areas -- and share widespread disdain for politicians. In his book length analysis, Dargent (2015) emphasizes the lasting power and influence of technocracy in Peru and Colombia, especially in economic and health care policies and agencies. However, for Dargent the power of technocracy derives mostly from their expertise, not as part of a political settlement.

We focus first on stakeholders who – short of a political settlement -- had important influence on the design and implementation of teacher policy reforms: the teachers union SUTEP, technocracy, the media, and multilateral organizations. Congress also had decisive power, first passing the CPM and LRM and then later removing ministers and presidents. The

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5 At least some factions of the political elite share this preference for technocracy, but in Peru’s turbulent electoral politics it is harder to identify lasting political elites, outside the Fujimori clan and their party Fuerza Popular. However, in practice, after 2015, Congress regularly attacked technocratic ministers and sometimes ousted them (through a constitutional provision that grants congress this power).
section then turns to stakeholders with less influence, including teachers (as distinct from their unions), parents, business, clientelist political parties, and others.

**Teachers’ unions.** In 2007, SUTEP was the dominant union with roughly 160,000 members (around 40% of public sector teachers) (Bruns and Luque 2015, 241) and the only national union recognized by the Ministry of Labor. SUTEP had disruptive power and organized nation-wide strikes and took to the courts to block the 2007 CPM, and also organized strikes against the 2012 LRM. However, SUTEP was less powerful in electoral politics than many other teacher unions because the leadership was dominated by a fringe left party *Patria Roja*, while teachers voted mostly center and right in the 2000s (Schneider 2021). After initial opposition in 2012, SUTEP accepted the career reforms. Given the power of unions elsewhere to slow (Colombia) or help rollback career reforms (Mexico), SUTEP’s political weakness and acceptance of the 2012 Law helped reforms survive.

SUTEP has long been weakened by dissident factions. An important one was CONARE (*Comité Nacional de Reorientación del SUTEP*) but CONARE was never recognized by the government as a valid interlocutor, given its apparent links to MOVADEF, a faction of Peru’s Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) terrorists.

First as a regional union leader and then as president, Pedro Castillo succeeded finally in fracturing SUTEP. In 2017, against SUTEP leaders, Castillo and other regional activists led a wild-cat 75-day strike with 63% of teachers participating at its peak. The strike started in just one region, Cusco in June 2017 with 14 demands, mostly salary and related items but among them a call for more training before teachers underwent performance evaluations (Leon 2017 provides a complete history of the strike). As the strike spread – still against the

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6 63% was the ministry count, *El Comercio*, 16 August 2017, https://elcomercio.pe/peru/minedu-50-profesores-acudieron-dictar-clases-18-regiones-noticia-noticia-450536-noticia/ 1. Other estimates put the share of striking teachers higher, around 71% (250,000 of a total of 340,000 teachers (Mendoza 2021).
position of SUTEP’s’s national leaders – evaluations and the possibility of getting fired became more central and the core issues that united all the striking factions. The Ministry reached various agreements with separate groups but refused to budge on evaluations.

**Media and opinion leaders.** The major media groups consistently devoted favorable coverage to teacher reforms. Former minister Ricardo Cuenca said media were “great ally of reformers” (interview 6 January 2022). President Alan Garcia, who launched the Carrera Publica Magisterial reform in 2007 and Minister Jaime Saavedra (who led implementation of the 2012 teacher reform as well as a broad program of ancillary quality-enhancing policies), were particularly active in communications with media and opinion leaders. However, Garcia’s media strategy was to attack teachers, which, while broadening public support for teacher reforms to improve quality of education, alienated teachers. Aware that teacher buy-in is essential for reform implementation, given the “opacity of the classroom” (Bruns and Schneider, 2018), Saavedra and his successors took the opposite strategy and consistently conveyed positive messages to teachers, calling them the essential partners in improving Peruvian education and framing the Ministry’s core role as providing support to teachers.

**Technocracy.** Peru is famous, along with Chile and Colombia, for a long standing technocracy in economic and health policy (Dargent 2015). Peru also has had more technocratic ministers of education than other countries of the region; technocrats were in office 67% of the time between 2000 and 2020 (Schneider 2022). Unlike economic technocrats, education ministers do not derive their power from expertise. Rather, education technocrats occupy positions of executive power largely because contenders like clientelistic

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7 Of six countries in Latin America, only Colombia had a higher percent (76%). Percentages for other countries were: 65% in Brazil, 60% in Ecuador, 48% in Mexico, and 32% in Chile.
political parties, discussed later, are weaker and ephemeral (Muñoz and Baraybar 2021) and allow presidents more leeway to appoint technocrats.

**Congress.** Congress was key in passing the 2012 LRM but was afterward mercurial and only sporadically central to basic education politics and not focused on teacher reforms.\(^8\) Congress was though very active in higher education reform, with reports of significant lobbying against proposed reforms by private universities, leading to regular conflicts with the Ministry of Education. Unlike most legislatures, the Peruvian Congress has sweeping powers to censure and impeach presidents and ministers. Congress exercised these powers frequently after 2016, including censuring Saavedra and his immediate successor, Marilu Martens. This high turnover complicated the steady implementation of teacher policy reforms, yet the continuity of key technical teams in the Ministry assured the implementation of the teacher entrance exam (PUN, *Prueba Unica Nacional*), student assessments and other key processes.

**International influences and multilateral agencies.** Balarin (2021) points to the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank as major influences on government policy in the 1990s and 2000s, by inaugurating “an era of learning-focused policies and reforms” and supporting the development of a technocracy in education, most notably the learning assessment unit (UMC) in the Ministry. She also documents World Bank “pressure” on the Garcia administration to introduce census-based learning assessments which allow the performance of individual schools, teachers, and school districts to be compared, and

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\(^8\) With the Congressional election in mid-2016 which for the first time registered notable political engagement from evangelical groups, Congress took a sudden interest in basic education, criticizing the curriculum regarding the use of the word “gender” and the inclusion of sexual education. This triggered a relentless political use of this issue and all subsequent ministers were paraded in front of investigative commissions. While the congressional commissions claimed their purpose for censuring successive ministers was to investigate “possible” corruption in textbooks, consulting contracts, etc., no allegations were ever proven.
increasing involvement of the Ministry of Finance in education reform priorities. Although Garcia’s 2007 CPM reform was developed by the Ministry without direct input from multilateral agencies, the thrust of the law did match multilateral consensus on best practice.

The World Bank supported the 2012 LRM directly through a loan (SWAP) that financed trips and technical collaboration with Chile to design teacher standards and evaluation processes, plus exchanges with Colombia (escuela nueva) to improve rural education, and it provided substantial support for teacher professional development. The IDB and a consortium of Peruvian researcher institutions funded by Canada (FORGE) were also active in research collaboration with the Ministry, especially under Saavedra.

The OECD played a role in exposing low learning levels in Peru on the PISA exam in 2000 and stimulating the design of the 2007 CPM reform. Ministry staff report that Minister Chang was heavily influenced by the McKinsey and Co. (2007) analysis of the highest performing countries in PISA, which emphasized the importance of recruiting high-quality. Ministry staff credit this with stimulating the design of the CPM (Bruns, Akmal and Birdsall, 2019). When Peru’s 2012 PISA results were disclosed in 2013, despite some improvement in Peru’s scores from 2009, the country ranked last among the countries tested. Minister Saavedra was outspoken in using this fact as an argument supporting the implementation of the more ambitious 2012 teacher policy reform and an expansion of the education public budget. The public visibility of Peru being literally last in an international ranking, made this Peru’s “PISA shock”.

Less influential groups

Teachers. The Ministry under Salas and Saavedra sought ways to communicate directly with teachers, without union mediation. Under Saavedra, the Ministry was especially active in teacher consultation and created a human resources department in charge of all
aspects of teacher policies: recruitment, promotion, training, assessment, and teachers’ welfare. The Ministry created a virtual platform for teachers to raise questions or complaints about the reforms and make suggestions. It also engaged 2,500 teacher networks “to plan activities and produce and exchange teaching materials. The Government further invested in conferences, exhibitions, and information sessions in remote regions to create space for clarification and debate. This open communication and consultation directly contributed to teacher buy-in to the reforms (Tournier and Chimier, p. 103).

Text messages were used frequently to establish one-to-one direct communication between teachers and the Ministry and the Minister, including a personal email message sent by Minister Saavedra to all public schoolteachers on the first day of school, emphasizing his appreciation for their work. Subsequent ministers broadly followed this line of separating support for teachers from support for their union, SUTEP, and later, FENATE. The wildcat strike in 2017 and a 2018 ENDO survey (Encuesta Nacional a Docentes) paint a more negative picture of individual teachers’ support for the reforms, with over 40% of civil service teachers stating they believed that the 2012 law had a negative impact on them and three-quarters of all teachers reported being dissatisfied with their salaries.

However, the survey revealed significant differences in the opinions of younger civil service teachers -- hired since the law was implemented, contract teachers who could not achieve civil service status, and older teachers, who were migrated into the new regime and suffered the loss of job stability (GRADE, Puch Herrera and Zeta, 2020). Former minister Ricardo Cuenca observed that teachers might say they did not support the reform overall, but they supported most of its components. (interview January 2022)

Administrators (UGELs) and local politicians. The CPM and LRM also introduced standards and meritocratic selection for school directors and regional administrators. Prior to
the these reform positions were controlled and reportedly sold by the regional governments. In particular, regional governors were used to appointing a Director General in each sector, which would constitute their Cabinet. They in turn would appoint UGEL directors. Despite this, there was relatively little push back to the CPM and LRM from decentralized education administrators, unlike the strong control politicians have over education positions in Mexico and Brazil. In 2015, for the first time, directors of regional governments and UGELs were selected meritocratically.

Parents and students. Parents and students were dispersed and mostly not involved in the career reforms (though their views show up in public opinion polls discussed below). As elsewhere, dispersed and busy parents face constraints to collective action. An additional issue in Peru is the large number of middle-class families who have exited public education, especially in Lima, where by 2012 fifty percent of enrollments were in private schools. One notable exception to the general absence of parents and students’ voice in the reform process was a large public march in support of Minister Saavedra in December 2016 when he was under the threat of being censured by congress (El Comercio, 2016).

Political parties and clientelist politicians. As noted, Congress had only sporadic intervention in teacher policy. However, Congress was a political battleground in higher education reforms and curriculum issues. It is notable that in Peru political parties and clientelist politicians did not have major control over teacher and administrator hiring, in contrast to much of the rest of Latin America in the 20th century. Peru famously has a “no party system” where parties form around particular candidates and dissipate quickly after

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9 A World Bank team preparing a 2008 study in Junin noted anecdotal reports of UGEL positions and school director positions being sold. A contemporaneous report by the National Ombudsman’s office (Defensoría del Pueblo) documented corrupt practices and irregularities in teacher and director hiring and assignments, as well as teachers and directors illegally charging parents for grades and materials. (Aportes de la Defensoría del Pueblo para una Educación sin Corrupción, 2009.)
elections (Muñoz 2019). In one calculation of party system institutionalization across all 18 countries in Latin America, Peru ranked 17th, second to last (Mainwaring 2018, 58). The absence of strong parties lessens one source of clientelist predation on the education system (Muñoz and Baraybar 2021), and high turnover in Congress further restricts clientelist demands for education resources.\textsuperscript{10}

Interventions by Congress however did make life difficult for ministers of education and regularly tried to block executive initiatives. Congressional opposition was strongest in areas of curriculum (from conservative right groups in congress) and higher education reform. The 2016 higher education reform was designed to weed out low quality private universities, and provoked owners to lobby congress to oppose the reform. Congress interfered less in teacher career reforms, except to propose laws to reinstate several thousand interim teachers dismissed in 2015-16\textsuperscript{11}

Public opinion. Public opinion gave additional encouragement to reformers. In 2007, 53 percent of respondents who knew about the Carrera Publica Magisterial law (CPM) approved of it. By a similar margin, 60% of respondents disapproved of SUTEP’s strike (and disapproved of the strike more than four other contemporary protests in other sectors) (Ipsos 2007)). In other polls, 37% thought education quality was poor, 43% thought the poor quality of teachers was among the main problems in education, and 74% felt the 2007 career law would be good for students and teachers (Fernandez,2012, 52).

\textsuperscript{10} The partial exception, noted earlier, was regional presidents who can use some appointments to regional administrative positions for clientelist purposes. However, local politicians appear to have less influence over teacher hiring than elsewhere in Latin America, notably Mexico and Brazil.

\textsuperscript{11} The 2012 Law allowed teachers previously admitted into the civil service without a tertiary level degree two years to get a degree or pass the PUN hiring test (under the LRM, the only way to get admitted). About 11,000 teachers were either unable to get a degree or pass the examination.
In a 2012 national poll, 71% of respondents thought the new teacher law would improve quality and 62% believed that the low quality of teachers was among the main threats to education in Peru. A majority (65%) agreed that teachers failing three successive evaluations should be fired and 51% considered SUTEP to be harmful for education (El Comercio, 2012). Later, a 2017 survey did not ask about the career law overall, but did find that 84% of respondents thought teachers should pass exams to enter teaching and to be promoted.

Business in general. Business was supportive, but not very active in pushing for reform. The Peruvian Institute for Business Administration (IPAE, Instituto Peruano de Administración de Empresas) started organizing events in the 1950s, the centerpiece of which is an annual business convention, CADE (Conferencia Annual de Empresarios) at which the president of Peru usually gives the closing address (https://www.ipae.pe/historia/). In general, in many of these meetings, the thrust of the education discussion was in connection with corporate social responsibility (CSR) and private solutions to get around public regulations and the “un-reformable” public system. After 2014, Cade organizers invited Saavedra and other ministers to present and discuss reforms.

Confiep (Confederación Nacional de Instituciones Empresariales Privadas – the national confederation of 22 business associations -- was also publicly supportive. The

12 Another poll showed more divisions. On the SUTEP strike in 2012, 54% disapproved of the union’s actions. However, only 45% thought the government should proceed with the new career law of 2012, and 42% thought the president should not keep his education minister, Patricia Salas (who in fact did not stay much longer in the government) (Ipsos 2012).
14 Saavedra’s 2015 speech prompted a standing ovation from business attendees (RPP, 2016). IPAE also started organizing in 2000s separate smaller conferences dedicated to education, but it is not clear how widely these resonate in business generally, the media, or policy circles.
business sector, however, has not been an active demander of investments and improvements in public education. As observed in many countries, the business elite’s own education demand is covered by private schools, and this escape from the public system reduces their commitment to public education.

Private education providers. Over the 2000-20 period, private provision of basic education expanded to almost 30% in Peru, compared with the 20% regional average (Elacqua, 2018) especially in cities, with 50% of enrollments in Lima in private schools. Although private school teachers are not directly affected by the reforms, school owners worried about public sector teacher salary increases as public salaries define the floor which anchors their own salary structure (Cuenca interview, January 2022).

Private-school owners also expected that Saavedra would be a boon to their sector by introducing publicly-funded private education vouchers, as in Chile, and were disappointed when he made it clear his priority was raising the quality of public education. This was clear during the government of President Humala, as well as his successor President Kuczynski, who had Saavedra as his first education minister. Much of private education is low quality, with lower teacher salaries, and many of those signing up to take PUN are private sector teachers. Despite a stronger narrative about the need to ensure minimum quality in private education, the only attempts to regulate were to expose and close unregistered small private schools and enforce admission of children with disabilities into private schools. Beyond lobbying the Ministry on voucher policy and some criticism of any type of regulation, the private education sector was not active as an interest group on the public teacher career reforms.15

15 Indirectly, a large non-unionized private sector increases incentives in public sector unions not to strike, because strikes can encourage parents to shift to private schools.
Other civil society and NGOs. Overall, civil society and philanthropic groups broadly supported the reforms, but these groups were smaller, less-well-funded, and less influential than in countries like Chile, Mexico or Brazil (Schneider, 2023).  

A new and notable force over the end of this period were conservative religious groups, such as “Con Mis Hijos no te metas”, a growing presence in several Latin American countries. These groups are highly mobilized on narrow issues of curriculum reform and in Peru they acted to block efforts to promote gender equality and no discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, and well as sexual and reproductive health education in the curriculum. These groups also directly intervene in education politics, often providing significant financial support to various right-wing candidates (Corrales, 2018). This religious right mobilization is a stark example of how single-issue civil society groups can have strong impact, but in this case their demands did not touch on teacher policy reforms, and no comparable group in civil society pressed for, or against, teacher policy reforms.

Policy Networks. The Consejo Nacional de Educación (National Council on Education), made up of leading education experts, ex-Ministers, and civil society leaders has been influential throughout the period in advising the government on reform priorities, and its members often work through the media to inform and shape public opinion. Education think-tanks, such as GRADE and the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos contributed influential analytical work, and they have also been the source of several ministers of education. But compared to Chile, Colombia and Brazil where civil society, academic centers, and policy networks are well funded and sometimes take the lead on key areas of policy (such as the secondary education curriculum in Brazil), Peru’s civil society engagement is relatively small. The business sector through its corporate social responsibility arms was active with

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16 Minister Patricia Salas, who did the heavy lifting in 2012 defending the LRM was from the NGO community and founder of Grupo Impulsor Inversión en la Infancia.
specific interventions, but at a smaller scale than other countries. Saavedra and Martens tried to mobilize more direct support from the business sector to help in scaling up pilot programs, with some success.

In sum, the top protagonists in the process of reforming teacher careers were technocrats in the Ministry of Education (with strong presidential backing), leaders of the teacher union SUTEP and splinter unions, Congress, and multilateral agencies. The next sections follow these protagonists over the course of reform adoption and implementation.

**IV. Politics of Reform Adoption and Implementation**

In 2006, education was not a big theme in Alan Garcia’s campaign, but he used his electoral mandate in 2007 to push the passage of the *Carrera Pública Magisterial* (CPM) in Congress (Chiroque Chunga 2008). In response, SUTEP organized strikes across the country. Garcia’s political strategy was to court public opinion while publicly denigrating teachers: “I govern for 28 million Peruvians, not for a group. You can keep your union, but let us change education.”

Public opinion polls show this strategy had some success, with 74 percent of Lima residents in 2007 believing the law would be good for students and teachers, and 46 percent believing the union’s behavior was negative for education. But Garcia’s aggressiveness tainted the relationship with teachers for years to come. The union turned to

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the courts to challenge the new law and succeeded in delaying implementation of the first round of teacher evaluations.

The accumulated legal and political issues persuaded Garcia’s government to make a major concession to the union: the law would be mandatory only for new teachers and existing teachers could opt in. The government believed that the CPM’s higher salaries would attract existing teachers into the new regime, but – as in Ecuador and Colombia – the higher salaries were not sufficient to compensate for the risk that low performance on evaluations could trigger dismissal. Over the final three years of the Garcia administration, only 10% of existing teachers opted in, which – combined with 15% of the teaching force newly hired – still left 75% of teachers with the traditional career path of no performance evaluation, complete job stability and automatic promotion with years of service.

In 2012, Ollanta Humala campaigned against the CPM and, with support from SUTEP, won the presidency. But once in office Humala appointed pro-reform ministers in finance, Luis Miguel Castilla, and in education, Patricia Salas, from the NGO community. These and other cabinet picks and initial policies signaled a decisive shift from left to center. Humala and Salas responded to low voluntary opt-in to the CPM by pressing congress to enact the LRM in 2012, making the new career path mandatory for existing teachers (as in Ecuador). SUTEP initially opposed the LRM and organized sporadic teachers’ strikes. But the legislation was supported by a sufficient coalition in Congress to pass.

Humala appointed Saavedra minister in 2013. Saavedra proceeded to further strengthen the technocratic team in the Ministry to cope with the administrative challenges of implementing the LRM, including crucial transition measures for screening and placing school directors and existing teachers into the new, 8-grade, career structure (interview maltratado por mí o por mis palabras, como nieto y como hijo de maestras les pido perdón y les ofrezco mis disculpas.”
Giuliana Espinosa, 29 December 2021). The Ministry designed a test for school principals based largely on what directors need to know for their jobs. Of 14,000 directors, only 8,000 showed up for the test and of those less than half, around 3,000, passed. The 11,000 who did not pass tried legal maneuvers to stay in their jobs, but the Ministry was able to go ahead hiring their replacements. Replaced directors were not though put out on the street: since they were tenured teachers, the Ministry reassigned them back to classrooms. The ministry also devised a test for interim teachers. Only 500 of 11,000 passed.

Saavedra was active in public outreach and communications. As noted earlier, he focused on ways to communicate directly with teachers, without having to go through SUTEP. He also maintained contact with opinion leaders in the media. Within a few years, polls ranked him as most popular minister in the government, and the term “presidenciable” started showing up in the media. This support in public opinion helped with relations in the government, and negotiations over budget allocation, especially as finance ministers Luis Castilla and Alonso Segura and President Humala himself were supportive of increasing spending on education (interview Castilla, 17 October 2017).

In 2016, center-right candidate Kuczynski won the presidency and made the unprecedented move of asking Saavedra to stay on as Minister. It was the first time a minister in Peru continued in the same post from one government to the next, and the move signaled that education policy should be national policy, not a policy of individual governments.\(^{20}\) Saavedra accepted, with assurance from Kuczynski that there would be continuity in the teacher reforms and the university reform, among others. In his three years

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\(^{20}\) Kuczynski’s move was bold not only because there was no precedent but also because, with his own private sector banking background, many of his political and financial backers were related to private universities and not sympathetic to the higher education reform and its tighter regulatory framework or were private providers in basic education not sympathetic to the emphasis on strengthening public education quality, which was Saavedra’s and Kuczynski’s priority.
in office, Saavedra was able to make substantial progress in implementing the complex LRM, achieve major curriculum and higher education reforms, and implement a wide range of ancillary policies to support schools and teachers.

However, in late 2016, Keiko Fujimori’s Fuerza Popular party launched Congressional motions to censure Saavedra and, in 2017, his successor, Marilu Martens.21 The political dynamics were driven by Fuerza Popular’s desire to flex political muscle, by providers of higher education from the new regulations and right-wing politicians lobbied by religious groups that wanted greater control over curriculum, especially as related to gender and sexual and reproductive health education.

While the Ministry had been concerned about the quality of teacher preparation and teacher candidates, the 2012 LRM did not include reforms of initial teacher education. A 2009 effort under Garcia to regulate entry to public teacher training schools (ISPs, Institutos Superiores Pedagogicos) with a single national entrance exam produced a sharp drop in enrollments in ISPs in rural provinces, as students in these areas could not meet the test score threshold. The government, under political pressure, reversed the policy two years later. Minister Salas believed that adding reform of pre-service teacher education to the 2012 reform agenda would make the package impossible to pass (interview, June 2021). Therefore, the LRM focused on trying to raise teacher quality through hiring standards, performance evaluation, and salary incentives.

After launching the administration of the teacher hiring test, Minister Saavedra spent significant political capital making the case for stronger oversight of higher education, with the 2014 Higher Education law. Private providers reacted especially to the new SUNEDU reporting requirements, which included transparent audited data on institutions’ enrollments, financing, cost structure and degrees granted, in a context where numerous institutions were profitable diploma mills. These forces were among the most powerful to challenge Minister Saavedra’s tenure, leading to both his censure and that of successor minister Martens.

After Saavedra’s departure in late 2016, increasing political turbulence affected the two main actors in education: technocracy and SUTEP. On the union side, dissident factions Conare and regional groups assumed a higher political profile after launching the wild-cat strike in 2017 that achieved high adherence from teachers (two thirds at its peak). It was the first important strike since 2012, after almost 5 years of relative labor peace. Even though the strike had little popular support, it lasted for three months and imposed political costs on the Government; PPK’s approval ratings plummeted by nearly half from 39 to 22 percent, though other factors likely also contributed to the decline (Schneider 2021, 8).

Government administration became even more chaotic after Kuczynski resigned in 2018, and 5 different presidents followed during the next four years, 2018-2021. The constitution grants Congress broad powers to remove ministers and presidents, which it did multiple times in this period. The constitution also allows the president to dissolve Congress and call new elections, which President Martin Vizcarra did in 2019. The newly elected Congress then a year later impeached Vizcarra in 2020. Three additional presidents and five ministers of education followed in rapid succession. (Annex 4)

The main consequence for education was turnover in the Ministry though initially without much weakening of the technocracy. Sequential governments (under Presidents Vizcarra, Merino, and Sagasti) appointed a succession of non-political, technocratic ministers
of education who continued to implement the reforms, with the PUN successfully administered in 2016, 2017, 2018, and 2019. But the 2017 strikes produced an important government action to appease contract teachers by raising their salaries significantly, as well as an increase in base salaries for permanent teachers (*nombrados*), which affected the large number of teachers clustered on the lowest rungs of the career ladder. Minister Flor Pablo, following an earlier postponement by Minister Saavedra, also decided to delay the most controversial element of the career reforms, the performance evaluation for teachers in service, one of the most significant tools for upgrading the teaching force.

V. Reform Impacts

The success of teacher policy reform comes through change in the caliber, motivation and practice of teachers at the classroom level. We review available evidence on the implementation of three key elements of Peru’s career path reforms: i) who becomes a teacher; ii) teachers’ capacity to perform; and iii) teachers’ incentives and motivation.

*Who becomes a teacher.* Cross-country studies by Hanushek et al. (2019) Bold et al, (2018) and recent research from Chile (Nielsen et al, 2022) establish the importance of higher caliber professionals as teachers for improvements in student learning. Nielsen shows that Chile’s 2016/7 reform to restrict entry into teacher training schools to students in the top half of the academic distribution effectively identifies candidates who subsequently become higher-performing teachers (rating above average on Chile’s teacher evaluation system) and remain in the profession longer than lower-scoring candidates. Notably, the “screened in” candidates become more effective teachers irrespective of where they pursue their teacher training, pointing to the importance of the core academic skills measured on Chile’s PSU (college entrance exams) and selectivity into teacher education. Peru has no comparable centralized entrance examination for tertiary education, or exit exams at the end of teacher
training, so the core strategy to raise teacher quality embedded in the 2012 Peruvian reform had to be achieved by screening candidates more effectively at the point of teacher hiring.

The first order implementation challenge was developing a national teacher hiring exam, the PUN (*Prueba Unica Nacional*). Designing the exam was complex, because it was in effect a set of exams which had to establish the standards for initial entry into the career as well as for each of the 8 different levels of the career path for every discipline, including bilingual education (covering 14 different indigenous languages). A clear objective of the reform was to raise the academic caliber of the teaching force and ensure that civil service status was reserved for high-talent individuals who would remain in service for many years. MINEDU decided to set a high bar on the entry test (60% correct in 3 domains – reading comprehension, logical reasoning, and teaching knowledge in the teacher’s area of specialization). An innovation was to establish a two-stage process, with the first stage selection based on the national test and the second “decentralized” phase carried out in the regions and districts where teachers would be assigned. The second phase includes interviews and observation of the teacher’s classroom practice. This combination of academic and “practice” evaluation is considered global best practice.Als the number of candidates was expected to be very large, a written examination was needed as an efficient first filter.

In the first evaluation to select teacher for the public career, there were 220,000 candidates: 30,000 passed the first stage, but only 8,000 the second. The overall passing rate of less than 3% made entering the career much more competitive and meritocratic. The most recent analysis (*Bertoni et al, 2020*) correlating teachers’ PUN scores with their subsequent performance in raising student learning in their assigned schools appears to validate the design of the test and its emphasis on rigor. Bertoni et al find the strongest correlations between the curricular and pedagogical knowledge subtest and teachers’ subsequent effectiveness, proxied by a teacher value added measure using student learning changes in
achievement between 2nd and 4th grade. The researchers also concluded that substantial variation in the administration of the decentralized phase made it less reliable in predicting teachers’ performance.

Another recent study, by Bobba et al (2021), similarly found that the Ministry’s centralized system of teacher assignment based on candidates’ rank order performance on the PUN (even for those who do not achieve the threshold score for civil service status) has increased student learning. In 2015, the Ministry began offering a 30-40% wage bonus for these higher-scoring teachers to take positions in extremely rural schools. The program led to a large increase in supply for these positions and schools were able to fill these positions with teachers who, on average, were significantly more likely than previously to be in the top 25% of the quality distribution on the PUN. Three years later, students in schools that received one or more of these new teachers scored .4 SD higher on the 2018 fourth grade national assessment, a dramatic increase in a short period.

The academic rigor of the PUN in a context where many teacher candidates are prepared at low quality tertiary education institutes led to a second outcome: very low pass rates. Since 2015, the Ministry has administered the PUN to approximately 200,000 teacher candidates annually (2015, 2017, 2018 and 2019 and 2021), with a pass rate never exceeding 13%. (Espinoza and Miranda, 2022). A minority of these candidates are new graduates from teacher training; the majority are already working as teachers in private schools or as public sector contract teachers. Public sector teachers who do not pass typically remain on temporary contracts, which means annual renegotiation and placement at district levels and

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22 Extremely rural was defined by the Ministry as “localities with less than 500 inhabitants and more than 120 minutes distance by car from the provincial capital”. Prior to the bonus, about 70% of all vacant positions in these schools had only one candidate and only 35% could be filled each year. There are approximately 17,000 such schools in Peru.
lower salaries, leading to churn and transaction costs in teacher management and
dissatisfaction among contract teachers.

A comprehensive Ministry of Education assessment in 2021 of the new teacher career
commissioned by Minister Cuenca highlighted three main issues. First, despite a 50%
increase in the base salary since 2014, teaching remains a “last resort” university degree, as
noted by an earlier IDB study (Elacqua et al. 2018, 24). In the 2015 PISA survey, only 3% of
high school students reported being interested in a teaching career, compared to 32%
interested in engineering (although this probably does not reflect the new incentives).
Comparing scores on Peru’s secondary school assessment, students in teacher education
programs score sixty points (.7 SD) lower than engineering students on math. The Ministry
developed an attractive bonus program for secondary graduates with strong academic profiles
to study teacher education at the top-quality institutions, but the overall numbers have been
small and the vast majority of teacher candidates in Peru graduate from lower quality teacher
education schools.

Second, even after more than five years, low pass rates on the PUN mean that only
about 15% of total teachers have been hired under the new meritocratic standards (30,000
hired since 2012 through the PUN and 30,000 previously hired under the CPM) while another
50,000 teachers hired before 2007 have been streamed into the new career structure through
specialized subject matter placement tests. A further 120,000 teachers have not met the
standards for entry into the new career ladder but cannot be dismissed because their contracts
are governed by the 1984 law.

Finally, and most problematic, while almost 30% of public teachers have now been
hired or streamed into the higher standards of the LRM and CPM (on top of the 30%

grandfathered in the system), close to 40% of teachers have either not taken or failed the PUN one or more times and remain on temporary contracts. Added to this, although the 2012 reform established a very attractive salary scale over an 8 rung career ladder, 57% of civil service teachers (and all contract teachers) in 2021 remained clustered on the lowest two rungs. Finally, the Ministry continues to have a hard time attracting teachers to teach in schools with difficult conditions, such as remote rural, multigrade, and bilingual schools, and the country faces an absolute shortage of skilled bilingual teachers.

Nonetheless, the assessment also had some positive findings. First, recent, younger cohorts of candidates (average age 36) have scored better on the PUN and become nombrados earlier in their careers, thus with more chances to rise to higher rungs on the career ladder. Second, given that the overall teacher corps is old (average age 46) an estimated 10% will retire by 2026, making possible a natural upgrading of quality. The Ministry has also considered possible financial incentives for early retirement, which could speed turnover to younger, better prepared teachers, as happened in Ecuador (Schneider, Cevallos Estarellas, and Bruns 2019).

*Teachers’ Capacity to Perform.* Low pass rates on the PUN led Saavedra and successors to realize that transformation of the teaching force would be a long-term process and complementary actions to improve the practice of the existing stock of teachers were a high priority. Expanded in-service training, the first ever induction program for new teachers, a teacher mentoring program, major investments in expanded learning materials to support bilingual education and pedagogical supports for teachers, including sample lesson plans, were elements of active ministry efforts to make teachers’ work easier and make the quality of teaching across different schools and regions more consistent and equitable. The Ministry’s open door to program impact evaluations through its innovative MINEDULab established in partnership with MIT’s highly respected JPAL (Joint Poverty Action Lab).
This data, monitoring and evaluation initiative began to generate early evidence of programs’ positive impacts on student learning (Majerowicz and Montero 2018, Aguero 2016, Castro et al. 2021, Saavedra and Gutierrez, 2020).

*Teachers’ Incentives and Motivation.* The vision behind the 2012 LRM was a high-standards, high-accountability, professionalized teaching force with significantly higher career-long remuneration for excellent teachers. The law significantly increased the starting salary for teachers who passed the PUN and entered the new career, with additional bonuses for those who scored highly. The Ministry also recognized that how teachers are managed and encouraged at the school level is key for creating a sense of collaboration and a “professional learning community,” in the words of Michael Fullan, in each school. For the first time in 2015, school director positions in about one-third of schools were assigned on the basis of meritocratic evaluations, including an innovative test of decision making and interviews.

Increased comparative school performance information was collected and disseminated back to schools (in the “traffic light” format mentioned earlier). A school bonus program offered 1-2 months of additional salary for schools (compared to other schools in the same district with comparable enrollments) in the top 30% of the annual school performance distribution, on learning and grade progression.

But an important element of the overall direction was the respect for teachers that Minister Salas and her successors communicated, in contrast to the adversarial stance taken by the Garcia administration. Minister Saavedra made numerous, highly visible overtures to teachers, starting with a direct text message to every Peruvian teacher on the first day of school. Substantial teacher consultation preceded the 2016 curriculum reform and successive ministers have consistently communicated that teachers were the most important actors in Peru’s education progress. As former Minister Cuenca commented, “From 2012 through my
term in 2021, there was no question that despite turnover, successive ministers were all advancing in the same direction” (interview January 2022).

VI. Comparisons and Conclusions

Peru has been part of an Andean wave of teacher policy reforms, along with Colombia, Ecuador, Chile, Mexico and some states in Brazil which have also enacted significant teacher reforms. Comparing Peru to some of these other cases can help highlight what has been more, and less, successful in Peru’s process of reform.

In terms of the political context, the design and adoption of major teacher policy reforms in Peru benefitted from a relatively weak (and splintered) teacher union and weak political parties. In fact, Peru probably had a weaker unions and parties compared to the other reform cases, even if SUTEP was the most powerful union in Peru. It is noteworthy that the CPM and LRM’s actions to eliminate the influence of local and regional officials in teacher hiring went largely unchallenged while similar reform efforts in Brazil (Rio state) and Mexico have been toppled by legislators whose power over teacher assignments was an important political asset. Peru also benefitted from a series of technocratic ministers (similar to Colombia and Ecuador) and government communications strategies which succeeded in building a broad public perception that reform was need in education to increase quality.

As in Colombia in 2002 and Ecuador in 2009, reformers in Peru opted first in 2007 to establish a new career track that was mandatory for new, entering teachers but voluntary for the rest of the teacher corps. This strategy eased confrontation with the teacher union, but at the expense of very gradual movement into the new career as few existing teachers opted in. In contrast to Colombia where the two-track system continued for two decades, the Humala
government decided in 2012 to make the new meritocratic career mandatory for all teachers, as did Ecuador in 2011.

Our analysis points to five observations about Peru’s reform experience. The first two we perceive as important areas of progress; the final three are key remaining challenges.

**Helping teachers and schools focus on learning outcomes.** Like many other developing countries, Peru for many years made progress on schooling, but not learning. The incentives for teachers are usually to cover the curriculum, whether or not students are understanding; the focus of school management is to try to assure that textbooks and other inputs are produced and delivered; the focus of principals is to comply with paperwork. In a setting where no one is focused on learning, the use of standardized tests as an easy-to-understand signal of learning shortcomings can be critical, and a practical way to remind a low-performing system that the outcome is learning.

Peru has been increasingly effective at measuring and monitoring foundational skills, using both census-based and sample-based national standardized assessments (the ECE, *Evaluación Censal de Aprendizajes*) implemented by one of the most respected learning measurement units in Latin America, *the Unidad de Medición de la Calidad* (UMC), and participating in major cross-national assessments such as ERCE and PISA. Data on learning was available to bureaucrats, regional authorities, principals, schools and parents. It became a key resource for research and program impact evaluations and made it easier to build a system-wide understanding that the key outcome of schooling is learning.

**Importance of complementary policies.** Peru’s progress prior to the pandemic in improving basic education outcomes (expanding enrollments, increasing graduation rates and significantly higher learning outcomes on national and transnational tests) suggest a payoff to almost fifteen years of quality-oriented education reforms. But actual turnover in the teaching force is still at an early stage, with only about 30% of the current public sector basic
education teachers and 30% of school directors hired through the new (post-2007) selection processes. The comprehensive system of teacher performance evaluation envisaged under the law has only been implemented at the pre-school level and no teachers as yet dismissed for poor performance.

The fact that actual turnover in the teaching force is still relatively limited suggests that the 2012 Law’s main impacts to date on education progress are through the possible effects on teacher motivation and longer-term selection into teaching stemming from the more attractive career structure. It also suggests that the many other quality-enhancing policies successive administrations have introduced both before and during this period (learning measurement, expansion of pre-school and ECD access, curriculum reform, infrastructure investment, different mechanisms to recognize performance and supports for teachers in-service) have played an equally important role in raising learning.

A third potential driver – better school management through the merit-based selection of school principals – is a plausible hypothesis, given that at least one-third of principals have changed since 2014, but the limited evaluation evidence to date shows no clear impacts on learning from cases where principals failed the selection exam and were replaced (Lemos, 2020 and Lemos and Piza, 2020). However, this overall result was driven by the data from rural schools, where the supply of skilled replacement managers was highly constrained. These initial results also stimulated some policy changes (higher incentives and expanded mentoring support) that may improve impacts of the meritocratic management selection process over time (Lemos, 2020 and Lemos and Piza, 2020).

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24 This contrasts with Washington DC where a comprehensive (and costly) system of teacher observation was the pillar for actions to dismiss teachers with successive low performance ratings, leading to over 30% of teachers retrenched or retiring voluntarily within the first five years of the reform.
**Slow teacher turnover.** Renovating an entire teacher corps can take three decades or more (Tournier and Chimier 2019), so reform impact depends on two things i) selection processes that successfully screen for new teachers who are more skilled and motivated than those they replace; and ii) accelerated exit of weaker teachers. The evidence to date validates Peru’s test-based selection process as a screen for more capable teachers, but Peru has not been able to implement yet either of the two levers that can accelerate the exit of weaker teachers – incentives for early retirement or a system of teacher performance evaluation leading to dismissals of low performers. The Correa government in Ecuador in 2011 adopted generous financial incentives for early retirement which led to turnover of around a quarter of teachers over five years (Schneider, Cevallos Estarellas, and Bruns 2019). Peru’s Ministry was not able to offer anything comparable, so turnover has been slower, however not as slow as in Colombia.25

Although both the 2007 CPM and 2012 LRM explicitly provide for comprehensive evaluations of individual teachers’ performance at regular intervals with the possibility of dismissal, the Ministry has not been able to implement such a system yet. Chile is the most advanced of the Andean countries in this dimension, but even there, performance-based dismissals have been low. The combination of job stability, low salaries, lack of accountability and no performance incentives creates a teacher profile whose incentives are simply to stay in the career. The Peruvian reforms have made progress on the last three elements but not the first.

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25 Colombia’s career benefits under the old system allow teachers to begin receiving pensions at age 50 while continuing to teach and receiving regular salaries as well, a disincentive to retirement (Cuenca, Garcia, and Schneider 2022). By 2020, still only about half of Colombia’s teachers had been hired under the reform law.
Low selectivity into teacher preparation. Peru has been hampered in raising the quality of pre-service teacher education, and especially the selectivity of entry into teacher training programs. Aggressive action to raise entry standards to government-run teacher training institutes (IESPs) in 2009 drove down enrollments dramatically and had to be reversed on the grounds that it hampered access to higher education for Peru’s rural regions. This continues to be an issue, as most of the expansion in teacher training over the past decade has been in public, non-university, teacher education schools, which are the only higher education institutions present in many parts of Peru.

As in other countries in the Latin America, secondary education enrollment and completion progress has swollen the number of graduates seeking access to tertiary education. In Peru’s urban areas, the for-profit private sector has expanded aggressively to meet this demand, in many cases offering programs of low quality that the higher education law seeks to regulate. However, the government has found it equally difficult to raise the admission standards and institutional quality of the pedagogical institutes that it controls. Enrollments in Peru’s public teacher training institutes doubled from 2010-2020, from 16,000 to more than 33,000/year (Annex 13). The combination of expanded public and private options for teacher education and increased supply of teacher graduates has increased the availability of teachers on contract status and lowered the pupil-teacher ratio but has led to a large supply of teachers who cannot meet the LRM standards working as contract teachers.

In contrast, reformers in both Chile and Ecuador managed to shut down many low-quality training institutions which reduced the overall number of teacher graduates and shifted their distribution to students of higher academic quality. Correa’s actions in Ecuador reflected his authoritarian style; Chile did so only in 2016 after years of steady progress in raising teacher quality and clear electoral support for education reform. Ecuador’s success in reducing the number of low-quality teacher training sources and promoting a rejuvenation of
the teaching force by incentivizing early retirement has also produced a rising pupil-teacher ratio of 22 to 24 in primary education. Research indicates that higher PTRs in the range below 25:1 can have positive effects on student learning, by freeing up resources for higher salaries and non-salary inputs. Peru’s 2016 Ley de Institutos began making progress in this area, by defining quality standards for a new model of teacher training institution—EESPs—and closing several institutions, but implementation in general has been slow.

While the government can directly regulate the curriculum content and standards of public non-university institutions, it cannot do so for universities, which are protected, as in most of Latin America, by “autonomia universitaria”. However, Ministry officials have had dialogue with universities to try encourage better program alignment with the “Marco del Buen Desempeno Docente” and the characteristics of the PUN, with the goal of producing more successful graduates.

An alternative that might have resulted in a smaller block of contract teachers relative to civil service teachers could have been to lower enrollments in IESPs by instituting some filters such as entry exams or exit exams, such as Chile’s Inicia, which measures the capacities of teachers graduating from teacher training in relation to Chile’s teaching standards and serves as a flag both to candidates and their institutions when scores are low. In Peru, when the Ministry tested teachers who were specialized in “English”, only a third had even a basic knowledge of English. More filters for candidate quality in pre-service teacher education would have reduced the pressure on the PUN to be the only screen for candidate quality – and might have reduced the political visibility of the high number of failures on the PUN.

**Politics of high hiring standards.** Excess production of academically weak graduates from teacher training institutions puts pressure on the education system at the point of hiring. In Peru, the decision to make the PUN teacher hiring exam as robust as possible as a screen
for teachers’ academic ability and motivation led to consequences of very low pass rates on the exam, open civil service positions that could not be filled, and large numbers of public sector teachers whose only option was to seek contract positions. The analysis of Bertoni et al 2020 suggests that the PUN has also served as a valid way of ranking teachers below the PUN thresholds for open positions and the Ministry’s own 2021 analysis as well as teacher surveys and the 2017 strike point to frustration among contract teachers as a political issue. In addition to trying to strengthen “upstream” filters at the level of pre-service teacher education, there are other strategies that could have been considered, such as shifting to a ranking model – offering the highest-scoring candidates positions until all open civil service posts are filled, or softening the PUN’s rigor very slightly and gradually over time. Whether these strategies to produce increases in pass rates and civil service access would have perceptibly affected the politics without damaging the goal of teacher effectiveness is an open question.

**Importance of reform ownership.** Amid Peru’s political turmoil over the 2016-2020 period, a series of technocratic ministers maintained commitment to the 2012 teacher policy reform and its implementation, plus most of the allied, quality-enhancing policies mentioned earlier. Ministers also maintained the high technical caliber and de-politicized functioning of the education ministry’s core teams, although turnover increased. It was notable that Peru’s impressive learning progress on the 2018 PISA and 2019 ERCE tests – the kinds of results that most ministers of education would widely trumpet – went almost unreported in Peru.

Since 2020, on top of the challenge of school closures during the pandemic, education management during Pedro Castillo’s tenure in office was chaotic, as an example, leading to the first-ever unsuccessful administration of the PUN (because of leaked tests). His ultimate impeachment produced nation-wide political convulsions.
In the turbulent political climate of the early 2020s, the threats to Peru’s political stability and social progress transcend education quality. These do not change the fact that over the 2007-2020 period, both education investments in rural areas and rural education gains, in terms of education access, quality and learning were the strongest in Peru’s history. Nor does not obviate policy lessons from more than a decade of teacher policy reforms whose design and implementation offer useful guidance for the many other countries pursuing the same goal of higher teacher quality. However, it does mean that important reforms that were both technically and politically challenging to implement have not yet produced their full long-term impacts.

Interviews
Ciro Avitabile, Senior Economist, World Bank office, Lima
Martin Benavides, former Minister of Education
Ricardo Cuenca, former Minister of Education, member of CNE, head of IEP
Gregory Elaqua, Lead education economist IADB and co-author of research papers on Peruvian education
Giuliana Espinosa, former director of Teacher Evaluation, MINEDU (interviewed in 2021 and 2023)
Ines Kudo, member, Peru National Education Council, and former WB staff member responsible for World Bank SWAP which supported the 2012 teacher reform
Carolina Mendez, IDB lead education specialist in Peru
Patricia Salas O’Brien, former Minister of Education who led adoption of the 2012 teacher reform law
Liliana Miranda, Former Vice-Minister of Pedagogical Management and Head of Quality Measurement Unit, Ministry of Education (2023)
References


Cuenca, Ricardo. 2020. La evaluacion docente en el Peru. IIIEP.


Education Reform in Latin America.” *Politics and Society.*


Annex 1: PISA results in Language, Math and Science 2009-2018

Source: OECD
Annex 2: Evolution of ERCE (Latin American Regional Test) Scores for Peru vs the regional average

a. Reading

b. Mathematics

c. Science

Source: ERCE, 2020
Annex 3: Evaluacion Censal, Peru, 2005-2019 (latest year)
(percent of students with satisfactory performance, overall and by geographic area)

a. Grade 2

b. Grade 4

c. Grade 8

Source: Ministerio de Educación del Peru (2019)
https://umc.minedu.gob.pe/resultadosnacionales2019/
### Annexe 4: Ministers of Education of Peru (2000 – 2023)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minister</th>
<th>President</th>
<th>Entry</th>
<th>End</th>
<th>Months</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marcial Rubio</td>
<td>Valentín Paniagua</td>
<td>Nov. 2000</td>
<td>July 2001</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicolás Lynch</td>
<td>Alejandro Toledo</td>
<td>July 2001</td>
<td>July 2002</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerardo Ayzanoa</td>
<td>Alejandro Toledo</td>
<td>July 2002</td>
<td>June 2003</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carlos Malpica</td>
<td>Alejandro Toledo</td>
<td>June 2003</td>
<td>Feb. 2004</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Javier Sota Nadal</td>
<td>Alejandro Toledo</td>
<td>Feb. 2004</td>
<td>July 2006</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jose Antonio Chang</td>
<td></td>
<td>July 2006</td>
<td>March 2011</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Víctor Chavez</td>
<td>Alan García</td>
<td>March 2011</td>
<td>July 2011</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patricia Salas</td>
<td>Ollanta Humala</td>
<td>July 2011</td>
<td>Oct. 2013</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaime Saavedra</td>
<td>Pedro Pablo Kuczynski</td>
<td>July 2016</td>
<td>Dec. 2016</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marilú Martens</td>
<td>Pedro Pablo Kuczynski</td>
<td>Dec. 2016</td>
<td>Sept. 2017</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idel Vexler</td>
<td>Pedro Pablo Kuczynski</td>
<td>Sept. 2017</td>
<td>April 2018</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daniel Alfaro</td>
<td>Martín Vizcarra</td>
<td>April 2018</td>
<td>March 2019</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flor Pablo</td>
<td>Martín Vizcarra</td>
<td>March 2019</td>
<td>Feb. 2020</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martín Benavides</td>
<td>Martín Vizcarra</td>
<td>Feb. 2020</td>
<td>Nov. 2020</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fernando D’Alessio</td>
<td>Manuel Merino</td>
<td>Nov 11 2020</td>
<td>Nov 17 2020</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ricardo Cuenca</td>
<td>Francisco Sagasti</td>
<td>Nov. 2020</td>
<td>July 2021</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juan Cadillo</td>
<td>Pedro Castillo</td>
<td>July 2021</td>
<td>Oct. 2021</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carlos Gallardo</td>
<td>Pedro Castillo</td>
<td>Oct. 2021</td>
<td>Dec 2021</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rosendo Serna</td>
<td>Pedro Castillo</td>
<td>Jan. 2022</td>
<td>Dec. 2022</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>55%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Patricia Correa</td>
<td>Dina Boluarte</td>
<td>Dec. 2022</td>
<td>Dec. 2022</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Óscar Becerra</td>
<td>Dina Boluarte</td>
<td>Dec. 2022</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Ricardo Cuenca*
Annex 5: Prevalence of stunting, height for age (% of children under 5) by area

Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática (2023)
https://www.inei.gob.pe/estadisticas/indice-tematico/sociales/
Annex 6: Poverty Rate for children and adolescents (0-19 years old) from 2004-2020

Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática (2023)
https://www.inei.gob.pe/estadisticas/indice-tematico/sociales/
Annex 7: Spending per student by level 2008-2021 (constant 2021 soles)

Note: Prepared using current prices and adjusted with the average monthly CPI for each year and using 2021 as the base year.

Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática (2023); Instituto Nacional de Estadística (2023); Ministerio de Educación del Peru (2023)

https://www.inei.gob.pe/estadisticas/indice-tematico/sociales/
https://m.inei.gob.pe/biblioteca-virtual/boletines/informe-de-precios/1/#lista
https://escale.minedu.gob.pe/indicadores;jsessionid=cb2281ea0962dc69451f7e85ca30
Annex 8: Spending per student in primary school and poverty levels (2007 vs. 2021) (current prices in soles) –

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Spending 2007</th>
<th>Poverty 2007</th>
<th>Spending 2021</th>
<th>Poverty 2021</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Puno</td>
<td>S/ 1157.49</td>
<td>59.9%</td>
<td>S/ 4480.90</td>
<td>42.6%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pasco</td>
<td>S/ 1151.55</td>
<td>59.6%</td>
<td>S/ 3564.20</td>
<td>42.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huancavelica</td>
<td>S/ 995.99</td>
<td>85.0%</td>
<td>S/ 5275.08</td>
<td>41.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cajamarca</td>
<td>S/ 983.76</td>
<td>68.4%</td>
<td>S/ 4058.33</td>
<td>39.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayacucho</td>
<td>S/ 1132.53</td>
<td>67.6%</td>
<td>S/ 4562.72</td>
<td>36.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huánuco</td>
<td>S/ 798.83</td>
<td>66.4%</td>
<td>S/ 3268.68</td>
<td>35.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loreto</td>
<td>S/ 846.11</td>
<td>57.5%</td>
<td>S/ 2649.08</td>
<td>34.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amazonas</td>
<td>S/ 1043.75</td>
<td>58.1%</td>
<td>S/ 3945.39</td>
<td>30.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Callao</td>
<td>S/ 903.20</td>
<td>28.0%</td>
<td>S/ 1882.26</td>
<td>28.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apurímac</td>
<td>S/ 1049.93</td>
<td>71.4%</td>
<td>S/ 5016.80</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Libertad</td>
<td>S/ 924.59</td>
<td>39.1%</td>
<td>S/ 4038.48</td>
<td>26.8%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Junín</td>
<td>S/ 928.90</td>
<td>44.4%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lima Provincias</td>
<td>S/ 1199.09</td>
<td>32.3%</td>
<td>S/ 2909.05</td>
<td>26.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piura</td>
<td>S/ 839.51</td>
<td>54.2%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lima Metropolitana</td>
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<td>24.8%</td>
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<td>24.4%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cusco</td>
<td>S/ 907.35</td>
<td>54.4%</td>
<td>S/ 4023.42</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ancash</td>
<td>S/ 1233.35</td>
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<td>21.9%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tacna</td>
<td>S/ 1487.32</td>
<td>26.6%</td>
<td>S/ 3156.01</td>
<td>21.8%</td>
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<tr>
<td>San Martín</td>
<td>S/ 944.14</td>
<td>56.1%</td>
<td>S/ 2779.44</td>
<td>20.3%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tumbes</td>
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<td>22.5%</td>
<td>S/ 4309.95</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ucayali</td>
<td>S/ 836.36</td>
<td>47.0%</td>
<td>S/ 2210.02</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lambayeque</td>
<td>S/ 876.87</td>
<td>49.9%</td>
<td>S/ 3632.63</td>
<td>14.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arequipa</td>
<td>S/ 1192.71</td>
<td>22.9%</td>
<td>S/ 3207.66</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Moquegua</td>
<td>S/ 1994.07</td>
<td>29.7%</td>
<td>S/ 5339.18</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madre de Dios</td>
<td>S/ 1071.42</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
<td>S/ 3466.13</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ica</td>
<td>S/ 1105.06</td>
<td>23.3%</td>
<td>S/ 2408.55</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
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</table>

Note: Poverty is calculated using the definition of the Peruvian Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática. Total poverty includes people whose households have per capita income or consumption below the cost of a total basket of minimum essential goods and services. This minimum basket is prepared with data from the ENAHO (National Household Survey) and is determined for each natural region and ensures the consumption of 2,318 kilocalories per capita per day.

Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática (2023); Instituto Peruano de Economía (2023); Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática (2000)

https://www.inei.gob.pe/estadisticas/indice-tematico/sociales/
https://www.inei.gob.pe/media/MenuRecursivo/metodologias/pobreza01.pdf

Sources: LEY Nº 29944 – Ley de Reforma Magisterial (2013); LEY Nº 30541 – Ley que modifica la Ley 29944 (2017); DECRETO SUPREMO Nº 107-87-PCM (1987); Banco Central de Reserva del Perú (2023)

https://estadisticas.bcrp.gob.pe/estadisticas/series/mensuales/resultado/PN02124PM/html


Annex 10: Education enrollments by sector (public/private)

Source: Ministerio de Educación del Peru (2023)
https://escale.minedu.gob.pe/indicadores;jsessionid=cb2281ea0962dc69451f7e85ca30
Annex 11: Pupil Teacher Ratio in pre-primary, primary and secondary, by area

(a) Pre-primary

(b) Primary

(c) Secondary

Source: Ministerio de Educación del Peru (2023)
https://escale.minedu.gob.pe/indicadores;jsessionid=cb2281ea0962dc69451f7e85ca30
Annex 12: Enrollments in public and private universities 2007 – 2020

Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática (2023)
https://m.inei.gob.pe/estadisticas/indice-tematico/education/
Annex 13 – Teacher preparation enrollments, public vs private sector 2007-2020

Number of teachers in the education system, by sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Private</th>
<th>Public</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>156,175</td>
<td>316,784</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>164,831</td>
<td>318,690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>171,200</td>
<td>324,995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>153,886</td>
<td>335,114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>167,525</td>
<td>324,461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>204,632</td>
<td>342,949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>171,954</td>
<td>344,675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>177,322</td>
<td>351,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>171,954</td>
<td>371,299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>177,322</td>
<td>381,853</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>171,954</td>
<td>388,993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>177,322</td>
<td>393,490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>171,954</td>
<td>402,439</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Enrollment in Teacher Training Institutes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Public</th>
<th>Private</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>16,775</td>
<td>15,482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>14,264</td>
<td>7,979.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>10,146</td>
<td>3,689.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>14,544</td>
<td>2,946.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>16,636</td>
<td>5,428.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>17,945</td>
<td>5,376.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>18,032</td>
<td>7,761.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>9,793.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>25,566</td>
<td>11,626</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
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<tr>
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<td>17,288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>31,147</td>
<td>14,062</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática (2023)

https://m.inei.gob.pe/estadisticas/indice-tematico/education/
Annex 14 – Territorial distribution of Institutos de Educación Superior Pedagógica (IESP) / Teacher Training Institutes in 2019

Note: After the Ley de Institutos was approved in 2016, the Ministry of Education started the reform of the Teacher Training Institutes (IESP) that would go through and accreditation process to become Escuelas de Educación Superior (EESP). In 2019, there were 207 IESP that would go through the reform.

Source: Ministry of Education (2019)