



Shaping policy
for development

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*How are education systems,
reforms and learning
outcomes shaped by
political context?*

Joseph Wales, Overseas Development Institute

Conceptual framework – political settlements


DFID (2010: 22): the *‘expression of a common understanding, usually forged between elites, about how power is organised and exercised’*.

They place a set of drivers of, or contextual constraints around, such things as:

- Political stability
- Relations among elites and between elites and non-elites
- The culture and orientation of the bureaucracy


Affects: (i) what you can hope to achieve and (ii) how you achieve it.

Meso-level construct



Key political settlement variables

- Degree of elite inclusion (inclusive-exclusive)
- Means of elite inclusion (purposive coordination-spoils)
- Bureaucratic culture (personal-impersonal)



Source: Kelsall (2016).

Common or ideal types of political settlement


Three ideal types of political settlement:

- Developmental settlements (e.g. Chile, Rwanda)
- Predatory settlements (e.g. South Sudan, DRC)
- Hybrid settlements (e.g. Kenya, Tanzania)

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
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
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Mapping case studies by settlements, outcomes and incentives

Political settlement	Case studies	Nature of Progress	Incentives observed
Developmental	Chile Ethiopia	Quality Access	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Long term economic development (skilled workforce)• State legitimation• Electoral incentives (largely programmatic)
Mixed Hybrid	Cambodia Ghana Indonesia	Quality Access	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Long term economic development (skilled workforce)• Electoral incentives (programmatic & patron-client)• Historic perception of education provision as duty of state• Building and maintenance of patron-client networks
Spoils-driven Hybrid	Benin Kenya Mongolia	Access	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Electoral incentives (programmatic & patron-client)• Building and maintenance of patron-client networks• Access to development financing

How does this matter for education systems?

Thesis – Political settlements

impact on coherence:

- Across relationships
- Between functions
- Within their intersection


Table 3: Four by four diagnostic for systems of basic education				
Four design elements of each relationship of accountability (Principal (P) to Agent (A))	Principal-agent relationships			
	<i>Politics:</i> Citizens to “the state”/politicians (many P to one A)	<i>Compact:</i> “The state” to organizations (one P to one A or one P to many A with non-state providers)	<i>Management:</i> Organizations to front-line providers (one P to many A)	<i>Voice/ Client power:</i> Service recipients (parents/children) direct to FLP/Organizations (many P to one A)
<i>Delegation:</i> Specification of what P wants from A				
<i>Finance:</i> Resources that P provides to A (either in advance or contingent)				
<i>Information:</i> P collects information on performance of A				
<i>Motivation:</i> How is A’s well-being contingent on performance? Change to motivation? - Intrinsic - Extrinsic - Exit (force out)				
Performance of agent (endogenous)				

Contrasting examples – Reforms in Chile and Indonesia (I)


Chile	Indonesia
Developmental	Mixed Hybrid
1990-2010	2000-2010
Rising investment	Rising investment
Curriculum reform	Curriculum reform
Increased teacher salaries	Increased teacher salaries
Raising teacher standards, certification and incentives	Raising teacher standards, certification and incentives

Contrasting examples – Reforms in Chile and Indonesia (II)

Chile



Indonesia



Contrasting examples – Reforms in Chile and Indonesia (III)

Chile – Developmental Settlement

- Coherence in system and long term focus
- Successful implementation of education reforms
- State-led process, but with citizen pressure
- Strong and sustained impact on learning outcomes

Main challenge – Building and maintaining political consensus for reform



Contrasting examples – Reforms in Chile and Indonesia (IV)

Indonesia – Mixed Hybrid Settlement

- Incoherence and resistance to reforms
- Range of actors with conflicting aims at different levels
- Consensus on increasing financing, but conflict on teacher accountability
- Mixed and fluctuating impact on learning outcomes

Main challenge – Developing a reform coalition that integrates or outmanoeuvres teachers' unions and elites focused on short term rents



Mapping onto the 4x4 matrix

Chile – Strong coherence across relationships & functions

Indonesia – Power of principals

bleeds across relationships;

incoherence across functions; and

multiple principals & agents within

intersections.

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Conclusion

Potential for political settlements analysis to inform systems thinking in education in terms of:

- Extent of coherence across relationships and functions
- The causes of incoherence and coherence
- The potential routes and mechanisms for achieving reform



Questions and comments