Ideas, Policies, and Practices: Tracing the Evolution of the Politics of Elementary Education Reform in India from 1975

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About this country brief

The RISE Programme is a seven-year research effort that seeks to understand what features make education systems coherent and effective in their context and how the complex dynamics within a system allow policies to be successful. RISE had research teams in seven countries: Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Tanzania, and Vietnam. It also commissioned research by education specialists in Chile, Egypt, Kenya, Peru, and South Africa.

Those researchers tested ideas about how the determinants of learning lie more in the realm of politics and particularly in the interests of elites. They focused on how the political conditions have (or have not) put learning at the center of education systems while understanding the challenges of doing so.

Each country team produced a detailed study pursuing answers to two central research questions:

• Did the country prioritise learning over access, and if so, during what periods?

• What role did politics play in the key decisions and how?

The full studies detail their analytical frameworks, their data, and sources (generally interviews, government internal documents and reports, and other local and international publications), and the power of their assessments, given their caveats and limitations. Country briefs extract from the full studies how leadership, governance, teaching, and societal engagement are pertinent to student outcomes.
Introduction

The Covid-19 pandemic and the New Education Policy (NEP) launched in 2020 created a unique constellation of contexts, challenges, and policy frameworks to reinvigorate the long-stalled reforms of Indian elementary education system. Schools were closed for two years, and children across social strata suffered prominent learning losses. First-generation learners at government schools have been affected the most, since online classes and digital tools were not accessible to most of them.

Alongside this unprecedented situation, active state and district engagement has been under way to implement the NEP’s most distinctive objectives—foundational literacy and numeracy by grade 3. This involves reorienting the teacher training model, strengthening state academic and curriculum development bodies, and integrating an effective monitoring system among other interventions. The NEP 2020 brings with it much promise for elementary education reform in India which has been in the limelight more for its failures that its successes.

While there have been improvements in infrastructure and enrollment rates over the years, but those on equity, learning, and uptake of public schools are a different story. According to government data, the total number of schools increased from 971,000 (2000–01) to 1.5 million (2015–16), and gross enrollment levels for elementary education increased from 78.6 percent (1990-91) to 96.9 percent (2015–16).1

But the expansion in enrollments has raised several issues. Large disparities in access remain, particularly for disadvantaged groups, and families in disadvantaged regions. Much of the national progress, particularly in enrollment in government schools, was concentrated in a small number of states. In other states, despite increased federal funding and initiatives, enrollment in government schools fell in absolute terms. Student achievement and learning outcomes have remained worryingly and persistently low. In 2018, only 73 percent of children enrolled in grade 8 were able to read grade 2 level text while only 44 percent of them could solve a 3-digit by 1-digit numerical division.2

Four reform milestones

Four national reform milestones during 1990–2020 covered the national policy context, legislative framework, and centrally implemented programs on school education across India.

- **District Primary Education Project (DPEP) 1994.** Implemented in 42 districts in seven states, the project was funded by a consortium of international donors led by the World Bank. It was the first national, donor-funded project for education, and it covered only primary classes (grades I–V) during its first phase. The project was eventually scaled to 240 districts at the time of its completion in 2003.

- **Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA) 2000.** It was the first national program covering all districts in India and was implemented in two parts. From 2010 to 2014, it became the project vehicle for implementing the Right to Education Act. SSA norms and implementation structure were aligned with those detailed in the act. In 2014, SSA was merged with the Samagra Shiksha Abhiyan, an umbrella program encompassing all national projects and
programs from elementary to higher secondary, with no substantive changes in the interventions.

- **Right to Education Act (RTE) 2009.** This is the first and only legislative framework governing the elementary education system across the country. Under the act, the state must provide free and compulsory education to all children aged 6–14 years. After the right to life, this is the only other right that has been added to the Indian constitution.
- **National Education Policy (NEP) 2020.** This is the third national education policy in India, formulated 36 years after the second NEP (1986). It proposed changes to the school education structure from the 10+2 grade system proposed in the NEP 1986 to 5+3+3+4 grades.

Despite their differing scopes, these milestones introduced some of the most prominent ideas and contestations in the school education reform space. Their implementation strategies and governance systems transformed the state education bureaucracy, which manages the bulk of the public-school architecture in India.

To assess the ideas and actors of the first three milestones (the fourth was still being implemented), the study used Peter Hall’s framework of three types of change: routine adjustments to existing policies, changes in policy instruments to achieve shared goals, and shifts in the goals themselves. Three indicators were used to operationalize the framework:

- Technical impact—Did the reform actually solve a clear problem?
- Administrative—Can the reforms be implemented within the given administrative structure or does it propose new administrative structures that can be set up?
- Political feasibility—Is the political leadership committed to implementing the idea?

**The District Primary Education Program: Small and selective**

The DPEP, though small and selective, laid the administrative framework and thinking for elementary education initiatives later implemented. Yet it failed to fundamentally transform elementary education. Many of the reform ideas were technically weak because they were not aligned with the on-the-ground realities of the elementary education system. For example, district functionaries had limited experience in undertaking evidence-based planning, and district plans came to follow a standard format.

For student learning, frontline functionaries were unclear about how textbook revision, activity-based learning, and improved infrastructure would actually translate into learning improvements. Supportive teacher monitoring began as dynamic initiatives with active teacher participation but lacked adequate staffing in quality and numbers. States didn’t want to take on the financial liability of adequately staffing the positions of the frontline bureaucracy after the DPEP ended. Training supervision was inadequate both in frequency and depth. Eventually, the focus shifted on data collection and monitoring. Many policy recommendations were not implemented across all the states.

The DPEP’s most significant impact was on the state administrative system. It created a parallel administrative structure that had weak links with the mainstream education bureaucracy. The reform ideas and the administrative systems of implementation remained within the DPEP
universe. The large funding was tightly controlled by the funders and the government of India and it stood in stark contrast with that of the finance-strapped state education departments. There was a limited incentive for collaboration and cross-learning between education secretaries and district officers or between DPEP project heads and district functionaries. Its key implementation strategy of decentralization also remained administratively ineffective.

Implemented only in select districts, DPEP decentralization interventions didn’t change the overall administrative structure of the state and the elementary education administration remained centralized at the state level. Due to the parallel structure, the project interventions were not owned by the state-level political leadership. Project funds were tightly monitored by the funders and the government of India, and this created mistrust between the DPEP and the state’s political and bureaucratic leadership. There was limited incentive to implement DPEP interventions across the entire DPEP state (and not just the select project districts) or to reorient the education system based on DPEP learning. In the end, DPEP failed to make elementary education a priority of state political leadership.

**Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan 2001: Toward consolidation and standardization**

As the new century rolled in and the DPEP completed a five-year period, new national and international developments led to a rethinking of the DPEP approach. SSA was launched in 2001 as an all-encompassing program that covered all districts in India as well as elementary education sector as whole subsuming existing programs. Like the DPEP, it also aimed to universalize elementary education in access, retention, equity, and quality. It was distinctive in that it took a targets and norms-based approach. For example, one SSA objective was that by 2010, all children were to be in school, regardless of their social or gender identities, and receiving an education of satisfactory quality.

SSA’s most significant departure from the DPEP and that of national policy thinking at the time of its launch was around student learning. The DPEP learning-related objectives for all primary school students were to raise average achievements by at least 25 percent over measured baselines, to achieve basic literacy and numeracy competencies, and to achieve a minimum of 40 percent in other competencies. In the SSA program guidelines, achieving learning outcomes was no longer the explicit focus of reform interventions. SSA focused on providing a vaguely defined “education of satisfactory quality with an emphasis on quality of life.”

SSA also laid the foundation for national learning assessment through the National Achievement Survey (NAS) in 2001. The NAS evolved from DPEP’s student learning assessments (BAS, MAS, TAS). It’s noteworthy that in both DPEP and SSA, the program design and its implementation didn’t include provisions for redirecting interventions based on the findings of achievement survey. NAS was unique, however, as the first national student learning assessment that was not specific to a project or designed around donor requirements. While the audience of the first few rounds of NAS assessments was the education bureaucracy, it affected the elementary education sector as a whole as it established a system of routinely tracking the status of learning achievement. It was also under SSA that the elementary education statistical system was re-examined to ensure better implementation of program objectives.
Continuing with DPEP ideas and systems, SSA also had its limitations. Frontline bureaucracies had limited training and expertise in developing district plans, much less for the long-term perspective plans that the SSA framework called for. Community mobilization through village education committees was also limited. And other innovative ideas such as the National Achievement Survey were limited in improving reform outcomes. NAS findings were not designed in a way that teachers, parents, civil society leaders, and researchers could engage to demand better learning for students. The engagement of state political leaders was also limited and there was weak commitment to implement the findings. The parallel administrative structures also continued and the split in the education bureaucracy at the state level was further reinforced.

**Right to Education 2009: Old solutions to old problems**

The inclusion of the Right to Education (RTE) as a fundamental right in the constitution had been recommended in many government reports since the 1960s. From the constitutional amendment in 2002 to the actual enactment of the legislation in 2009, the key ideas in the RTE draft were a patchwork drawn from existing state legislation and national documents. State governments didn’t support central legislation on grounds that most of the provision of elementary education infrastructure and financing was already being undertaken by the state government—and that many states had legislation in place for free and compulsory elementary education.

The 2003 draft legislation reignited many ongoing debates. Some had begun during the RTE movement, especially about whether the focus should be on addressing enrollments or poor learning. A prominent section of the movement held that poor learning was due mainly to weak enrollment and retention in the school system.

It standardized the range of educational establishments that were categorized as a school but often with minimal infrastructure and staffing. It defined the standards for what is a “school.” Private organizations were required to obtain a license to run a school and meet minimal standards. Similarly, “free education” was also clearly defined to address the hidden costs of elementary education, such as capitation fees. To ensure equitable access, provisions were added for children with a varied range of disabilities and bureaucratic hurdles to getting admission—such as transfer certificates and proof of age—were removed.

Despite the transformative potential of having education as a constitutionally guaranteed right, the RTE act’s impact was significantly diluted. The absence of an enforceable legal framework weakened its implementation. The lack of penal provisions for violating the law, particularly at the frontline, rendered it even more toothless. Due to its focus on schooling, to the extent that the act was reviewed judicially, the focus remained on enrollments.

Many other RTE ideas faced administrative challenges. Implementation of continuous comprehensive education (CCE) became administratively challenging at the state level partly because classroom practices had to be reoriented. It required an overhaul of the administrative system and time-intensive classroom practices. This was not possible in the timeframe within which the CCE approach was implemented. The harmonization of the SSA project structure within the education bureaucracy also remained limited given that both the administrative challenges and weak political will to undertake it at the state level.
Perhaps the biggest challenge that the RTE faced was the 25 percent reservation of students from economically weaker sections (EWSs) in private unaided schools. This occupied a prominent space in public discourse around the act, and discussions over the implications of other provisions remained largely ignored. At the state level, political ownership of the act dwindled once it became clear that the financial costs of implementing the act were to be borne by the states. The act was passed in parliament without an accompanying money bill. In effect, the central government took no financial responsibility for the act. Previously, reports by multiple national level committees since 1997 had brought to light the financial costs of the act, and the RTE act draft version of 2005 was rejected by the finance ministry due to a lack of funds. This knowledge about the financial implications was not used by the central government to create buy-in from the state governments or by the state governments to explore financing options.

To reorient the focus of the RTE act toward learning and address findings about poor SSA learning levels, the NCERT developed another framework on learning outcomes for elementary stages. The framework was to be implemented through teacher training programs, classroom practices, and the 2017 National Assessment Survey. From 2017 on, the NAS was also restructured to include survey findings for individual states and districts to make them accessible to teachers, frontline administrators, parents, and researchers. Post-NAS activities were also conducted to undertake appropriate interventions for addressing learning gaps. But both the 2017 learning outcomes framework and the NAS 2017 were criticized widely by educationists, academics, and civil society leaders. The learning outcomes framework was seen as prescriptive and minutely detailed, contrary to the way learning takes place in elementary grades. The 2017 NAS 2017 was seen as methodologically unclear and not comparable with other similar learning-related datasets.

Run up to the 2020 NEP

NGO Pratham, which had begun its work in the early 2000s, continued to gain prominence for its work on learning outcomes through ASER surveys. It highlighted that, despite near universal enrollment in public schools, learning was poor. Questions about the efficacy of providing additional inputs even in the “soft” areas of teacher training, improved pedagogy, and reduced curriculum began to gain prominence. New ideas on reform called for moving away from the age-grade structure of elementary education to progressions defined by learning levels. The underlying rationale was that the age-grade structure does not support the diversity of learning levels of students in the public school system.

In the Teaching at the Right Level (TaRL) program of Pratham, students in grades 3–5 are grouped according to their learning level to provide tailored instruction to ensure the achievement of learning outcomes. This was implemented across multiple states such as Uttarakhand, Maharashtra, Gujarat, Bihar, and Delhi. In Delhi, the approach was met with significant resistance by teachers and by educationists and academics involved in teacher education in mainstream universities. They argued that the TaRL program closely parallels ability-based segregation. The argument went that the learning gains from this approach are marginal and often not sustained in the long run—and that it has lasting negative impacts on the psychological well-being of students. Students also lose the benefits of learning in mixed-ability classrooms, such as
motivation and peer learning through interactions between students of low and high learning ability.

The final 2020 NEP made three distinctive reforms for elementary education under the overall policy focus on learning. First is the inclusion of Early Childhood Care and Education in the formal education system to ensure that children are ‘school ready.’ This was supported by a new school structure which consisted of 5 years (preschool and primary) +3 years (upper primary) +3 years (secondary) +4 years (high school). Second is a clear and defined focus on foundational literacy and numeracy in primary grades. Third is consolidating poorly attended primary schools into school complexes where child creches, primary, upper primary and secondary schools are housed together. The aim was to gain from efficiencies in infrastructure and teacher deployment.

Teacher cadre reform remains one of the weakest components of elementary education reform in India, possibly because teacher cadre management is a state subject. While projects such as the DPEP and SSA addressed teacher training, the decisions for deployment, transfers, and career progression cannot be addressed through national programs.

Unpacking the political settlement

The political settlement around elementary education reform at the national level is defined by a narrow national-level elite. The reform is itself tenuous, with multiple, conflicting ideas co-existing both within the policy and implementation spaces. Ideas become dominant not because there is a settlement between opposing groups through co-option or consensus. It is merely that one set of actors can capture some policy and implementation space.

Actors have used a range of methods to do this, such as engaging with the political leadership, participating in national government constituted committees, and involving civil society players with overlapping ideas. Some ideas were sidelined, sometimes only temporarily, such as contract teachers. Others remain unimplemented despite having some support among a section of key actors, such as continuous and comprehensive evaluation of both scholastic and nonscholastic attributes throughout the year through a range of assessments techniques, rather than just annual exams.

Most reform ideas have surprisingly long roots and gestation periods. Within the same actors—such as civil society and the national bureaucracy—the support for the same set of ideas oscillates to varying degrees, as with learning outcomes and their measurement. Some ideas are acceptable but unimplementable, such as a common school system. Others are implementable but deeply discomforting—such as examination in elementary grades to ensure that the school system remains accountable and streamlined. But barring some ideas, there is marked consistency in the range of policy options across decades.

Reform impetus

The impetus for reform has come from the larger political dynamics with the external players and the national governance system. The resultant political settlement around these reforms—disagreements over ideas and approaches and, more importantly, the manner of their resolution—sheds light on which reform ideas became dominant and why, as well as the challenges in their implementation.
Reform initiation

Reform was largely led by interested bureaucrats engaging with selected national civil society leaders. Individuals in both categories had significant experience at the state level. But these leaders influenced national reform efforts only because their professional positions allowed them a national scope. The national political leadership has largely played a “supporting” role toward reform. Trusted members of the bureaucracy were given the space to think about, design, and implement the reform initiatives. The political leadership was not initiating the reform or playing the lead in its development. And except in some cases, education has not been a centerpiece in election campaigns.

Reform ideation

Actors involved in developing ideas such as district-based planning, community monitoring, and learning outcomes and their measurements, have been bureaucrats, educationists, academics, and civil society leaders at the national level with occasional inputs from the judiciary. The broad categories of actors have remained the same, but the nature of organizations and individuals within these categories have changed over the decades. Reform debates on formal versus non-formal education, common school versus segregated school systems, learning outcomes versus inputs during these years unfolded with this cohort of reform actors. In the government, the Department of Education, headed by the Education Secretary, and the Ministry of Human Resource Development were key actors. Other government bodies engaged included the planning commission in which leading academics, researchers and civil society leaders were represented. Also closely involved in reform ideas was The National Council of Educational Research and Training (NCERT), which looks at curriculum development, and the National Institute of Educational Planning and Administration (NIEPA), which leads training and capacity development among teachers and administrators.

Reform implementation

The national bureaucracy has remained at the heart of reform initiation and ideation across the decades while the role of state and below-state actors has been marginal. The Indian polity is a federal one, and school education is part of the concurrent list that allows different tiers of government to be involved in providing and managing education. Both national and state government can legislate on it, but the delivery of school education is undertaken by the state. That is, setting up and managing the schools, hiring the teachers and school staff, conducting exams (most exams are conducted by state boards, with a smaller percentage of schools affiliated with central government boards), and administrative monitoring infrastructure are under the states.

The limited involvement of states in reform initiation and thinking says much about the nature and process of school reforms. But states are not entirely absent from the reform story. Many of the most innovative projects and ideas were tested in states such as Rajasthan (para-teachers), Tamil Nadu (activity-based learning), and Madhya Pradesh (education guarantee through minimal school facilities). And these ideas have informed national programs and been mainstreamed across the country. But while the national bureaucracy has picked up these ideas
from the states, the states themselves have not led the momentum demanding more enabling national reforms.

State secretaries of education departments and heads of training institutions participate in national committees, such as the state education ministers’ conference—or the specialist committees constituted by the government, such as the Bordia committee at the invitation of the national government. Other actors from the frontline bureaucracy are rarely involved in reform initiation or in ideas. States rarely have their own policy on education reform, and the role of most state organizations—such as textbook boards and state exam boards, state public service commissions, teacher recruitment boards, and state-level Panchayati raj departments—is very limited. The involvement of other state and national actors, such as teachers’ unions or private school associations, remains peripheral, episodic, and reactionary, largely limited to issues pertaining to their specific area of focus. The dual structure at the state level—with the national reform project administrated through an institutional set-up separate from the state education bureaucracy—reduced the political ownership, policy visioning, and implementation capacity of the states.

Consistent across the decades are the mechanisms for decisionmaking and consensus. Civil society leaders or educationists or academics are selected by the government in power to a formal national platform to initiate and formulate reforms. The overall process of reform initiation, ideation, and implementation remained nonpartisan, though it had the support of the national leadership. The reform ideas were not developed in response to a grassroots movement led by parents or teachers. Nor were they catering to the challenges of ground level implementation, except for those in the aftermath of the RTE, such as no-detention policy or continuous and comprehensive evaluation. Both the process and ideas remained technical, instrumental, and institutional. The translation of the reform program into political priorities—particularly at the state level, as indicated by a financial commitment and political oversight over the state administrative architecture for implementation—did not happen through the chosen cohort of actors or the chosen reform process.

**Broad trends**

Reform ideas in India have a surprising level of continuity and repetition. Across the decades and the five analytical categories of reform—the origin of intent; the purpose of the school system and the objectives of reform; the school system; teachers, classroom systems, and learning; and governance and implementation—the range of ideas has remained largely same since 1975.

The schooling system has focused on national integration, human resource development, and economic development. Reform objectives have revolved around the three pillars of access, equity, and quality (at times defined in terms of learning). But access and equity have remained the most consistent focus areas. The focus is on quality, particularly as learning has fluctuated across the decades.

Ideas for teacher cadre reform have also had surprising continuity, oscillating between efficiency-related and quality-related reforms. For efficiency, ideas have been around hiring contract or para teachers and using internet technology to deliver training programs. For quality, reforms have focused on strengthening the cadre through merit-based hiring, improving teacher pay
scales, cadre management and training activities and providing supportive supervision. Reforms have not gone beyond this to change the role of teachers as a stakeholder category in reform thinking or implementation or streamlining a clear career path.

Reform ideas around classroom systems have largely remained the same and within the overall structure of the 10+2 age-grade system. Classroom systems include curriculum, pedagogy, and pupil-teacher ratios. Learning basic reading, writing, and math was recognized as early as the mid-1970s, and the problems of low learning were raised in the Indian parliament as part of the discussion on the Challenges of Education document in 1985.

Two broad clusters of ideas around learning have been dominant to varying degrees in the national policy arena. First is that of child-led, locally contextualized, activity-based learning that engages with the innate curiosity, learning, and knowledge-creating potential of the child irrespective of social and economic location. In this idea set, the emphasis is on the process of learning takes and the engagement of the child. Learning goals are not the prominent focus and are open-ended, but the capacity of the child to construct knowledge is considered a priority. Second is that of minimum levels of learning and standardized learning outcomes. In this idea set, the emphasis is on predefined cognitive and noncognitive learning that children must achieve and on strategies to enable it. Both idea sets are very much opposite to the learning forms largely practiced in Indian schools, based on rote memorization.

The exam system tests the capacity of students to mechanically reproduce subject knowledge rather than learning, which is particularly important in elementary grades. The key difference between the two is the extent to which learning outcomes are standardized. Both idea sets have overlapped and coexisted in the policy terrain since the 1970s, with specific periods where one set has been become dominant. Student assessments have been a key area of reform thinking from the first education commission and again, a broad set of related ideas has emerged repeatedly across the years.

For elementary grades, comprehensive and continuous evaluations, no-detention policy, and no board exams have been recommended across the decades. The underlying rationale is to create an environment free of fear and social stigma associated with failing in exams. No-detention was specifically added to prevent dropouts and to retain students in school and prevent their entry into the work force or child marriage.

In implementation strategies and governance, three broad categories of ideas have been proposed: community ownership, decentralization, and separate bureaucratic structures. Across the decades, these ideas have animated all reform milestones. Politics around improving student learning have gone through many phases, but in the end, they remain beset within structural impediments. As with other overarching reform ideas and reform objectives, learning is one among many, and fostering it needs an enabling political settlement and administrative architecture.

So...

There is a disconnect between actors involved in initiating and thinking about reform and those implementing it. The federal structure in which both the center and the states are involved in
delivering school education is a defining context, with implementation primarily at the state and below-state level. Neither the institutional processes set-up to include the state level nor the culture of reform generation and policymaking have been able to overcome this divide. Reform thinkers and reform doers operate in different orbits. India has a long tradition of commissions, and, in a sense, education has not really been forgotten. But the disjuncture between reform ideas and implementation reality has not been bridged.

Consensus around the reform objectives and the key ideas for quality, learning, and governance has been lacking. Important actors are missing from the reform settlement process, and the ideas emerge from a narrow set of actors and from external pressures. The failings of reform implementation did not generate a constituency either for better implementation or for new ideas. Different actors attempt to influence different bodies within the national and the state governments to implement their ideas, and conflicting ideas and approaches remain in the fray. So, the reform system lacks coherence and focus.

The administrative structures at the state and below-state level have not been designed around reform. New ideas are outfitted on old structures with small tweaks made occasionally to align it with the overall system. This perhaps is the strongest indicator of the weak political engagement and commitment to implement reforms. Administrative architectures at the state level require significant political support to be realigned. But neither in the reform design nor in the process of developing the reform ideas have the structural foundations been laid out. The case of decentralization is instructive. The local administrative bodies (the panchayats) were increasingly involved in implementing new reform ideas, but they were not supported with finance, personnel, and training, greatly curtailing their capacity to implement reforms.
Annex 1 Indicators of learning for RISE countries

A country’s learning adjusted years of school combines the quantity and quality of schooling into a single indicator by multiplying the estimated years of schooling by the ratio of the country’s score on the most recent test scores harmonized to 625 (World Bank data for latest year of assessment).

Learning poverty, a combined measure of schooling and learning, is the proportion of children unable to read and understand a simple text by age 10 (World Bank data for 2019).

The Human Capital Index is the amount of human capital that children born today can expect to acquire by the age of 18 given the prevailing risks of poor health and poor education. It combines the likelihood of surviving to school age, the amount of school they will complete and the learning they’ll acquire, and whether they leave school ready for further learning and work. For example, a score of 0.5 means that they will be only 50 percent as productive as they might be with complete education and full health—and that their future earning potentials will be 50 percent below what they might have been.8

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<th>Learning poverty (%)</th>
<th>Human Capital Index (0–1)</th>
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</table>

Note: — = not available.

3 Hall 1993.
4 The impact of decentralization on school reform has been extensively studied. See the Leclercq (2002) analysis of Village Education Committees in Madhya Pradesh’s Education Guarantee Scheme (EGS), the Wankhede and Sengupta (2005) study of such committees in West Bengal, and the Corbridge et al. (2005) study of them in Bihar.
5 For a detailed study of the systems and processes for decentralization in DPEP, see Vargheses (1996).
8 World Bank Human Capital Index for September 2020.
References


