

Impacts of Political Breaks on Education Policies, Access and Quality in Nigeria (1970 – 2003)

PE 08

Chidi Ezegwu, Dozie Okoye, Leonard Wantchekon

Abstract

This study examines how the political interruptions in Nigeria between 1970 to about 2003 altered policies, institutional norms, governance structures, and attitudes in the education sector. Particular attention is given from 1973 to 2003, a period after the civil war, when the Federal Government became fully involved in managing primary and secondary schools (taking over schools from missions and private owners) up to 2003 when the first successful democratic transition took place. Further disruptions to the country's democracy have been experienced since then, and have continued to inform the political economy of education sector development.

Impacts of Political Breaks on Education Policies, Access and Quality in Nigeria (1970 – 2003)

Chidi Ezegwu

Centre for Social Justice and Well-being in Education, Lancaster University, UK

Dozie Okoye

Dalhousie University, Canada

Leonard Wantchekon

Princeton University and African School of Economics

Acknowledgements:

This report was written as part of the Research for Improving Systems of Education (RISE) Political Economy project. We acknowledge funding from RISE, and are grateful for feedback from members of the RISE team. All errors are ours. Please address correspondence to Chidi Ezegwu: chidi.ezegwu@yahoo.com or Dozie Okoye: cokoye@dal.ca.

This is one of a series of political economy papers from “RISE”—the large-scale education systems research programme supported by funding from the United Kingdom’s Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), the Australian Government’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. The Programme is managed and implemented through a partnership between Oxford Policy Management and the Blavatnik School of Government at the University of Oxford. The paper was produced under the direction of Alec Gershberg, the PET-A research lead.

Please cite this paper as:

Ezegwu, C., Okoye, D. and Wantchekonpalo, L. 2023. Impacts of Political Breaks on Education Policies, Access and Quality in Nigeria (1970 – 2003). Research on Improving Systems of Education. PE08. <https://doi.org/10.35489/BSG-RISE-2023/PE08>

Use and dissemination of this working paper is encouraged; however, reproduced copies may not be used for commercial purposes. Further usage is permitted under the terms of the Creative Commons License.

The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in RISE Political Economy papers are entirely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the RISE Programme, our funders, or the authors’ respective organisations. Copyright for RISE Political Economy papers remains with the author(s).

Table of contents

Table of contents	1
List of Abbreviations	3
List of Tables	3
List of Figures	4
Acknowledgements	5
1. Executive Summary.....	6
2. Introduction	11
2.1 Background to the Study	11
2.2 Research Objectives and Key Questions.....	13
2.3 The Antecedents and backgrounds to the political interruptions.....	13
3. Methodology	16
3.1 The Study Location	16
3.2 The Research Setting - Nigeria.....	16
3.3 The Approach.....	18
3.4 Instruments.....	20
3.5 Training of the Research Assistants	20
3.6 Pilot	21
3.6 Data collection	21
3.7 Research Respondents.....	22
3.8 Data Analysis.....	23
3.9 Study Limitations, Field Experiences and Challenges	24
4. Analytical Framework	25
5. Political and Policy Intermissions (1960 and 2000)	27
5.1 Independent and First Republic (1960 - 1966)	28
5.2 The First Era of Military Rule (1966 - 1979).....	29
5.3 The Second Republic (1979–1983)	48
5.4 The Second Era of Military Rule (1983–1993)	50
5.5 The Interim National Government and Third Era of Military Rule (1993-1999)	61
5.6 The Fourth Republic (1999–present).....	61
6. The Rise of Private Schools	66
6.1 Failure of the public education system and the rise of private schools.....	67
6.2 Ethnic Dimensions of the Private School Development	71

6.3 Private Schools: For Whom?	72
6.4 Private education and Malpractices	74
7. The Nature of Military Education Policies and Programmes	75
7.1 Policy Motivations	75
7.2 The pattern of appointment in the military	78
7.3 Unplanned Reforms informed by a Search for Political Legitimacy	80
7.4 Poor planning	85
7.5 Inadequate preparation for new policies due to frequent changes in government and education ministers	87
7.6 Policy Somersault	88
7.7 Centralisation of Education Structure and Management	91
8. Political Bargaining and Settlement through Education Interventions	93
8.1 Political Investors and Political Changes	93
8.2 National Bourgeoisie and International Interests' Settlement	94
8.3 Economic Meltdown and Corruption	96
8.4 Ethno-cultural Interests and Centralization	96
8.5 The Roles of Bureaucracy	101
9. The Positive Impacts of the Military Disruption of Political Processes on Education?	103
9.1 The explosion of School Enrolment	103
9.2 Teacher Policy and Management: Issues and Reactions	106
10. Negative Impacts of the Military Disruptions of Political Processes on Education	109
10.1 Disruption of democratic policy-making processes	109
10.2 The Impact on the Curriculum	111
10.3 Financial Irresponsibility and Introduction of Patronage and Rent-Seeking Tradition	112
10.4 Alteration of teacher training and recruitment norms	113
10.5 Inspections, Monitoring and Evaluation of Basic Education	115
10.6 Assessment and Quality of Education	118
11. Conclusion	121
12. Implications of the Study	126
References	130
Annexes	146
Annex 1: Secondary Schools Enrolment – 1960 -2003	146

List of Abbreviations

CRF	-	Consolidated Revenue Fund
ESSPIN	-	Education Support Programme in Nigeria
FME	-	Federal Ministry of Education
LGA	-	Local Government Areas
LGEA	-	Local Government Education Authority
NCE	-	National Certificate in Education
NPEC	-	National Primary Education Commission
NUT	-	Nigerian Union of Teachers
OAU	-	Organization of Africa Unity
OPEC	-	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
PSA	-	Political Settlement Analysis
PTF	-	Petroleum Trust Fund
SMC	-	Supreme Military Council
SPEC	-	State Primary Education Commission
SUBEB	-	State Universal Basic Education Board
TRCN	-	Teachers Registration Council of Nigeria
UBE	-	Universal Basic Education
UBEC	-	Universal Basic Education Commission
UPE	-	Universal Primary Education

List of Tables

Table 1: Precolonial antecedents	12
Table 2: Study timeline	14
Table 3: Qualitative respondents by location	21
Table 5: Levy (2014) classification of four ideal types of political settlement	24
Table 6: Highlights of political and policy intermissions (1960 and 2000)	25
Table 7: Impact of schools takeover on pupils learning and performances (parents and former students views by state)	32
Table 8: Parents response to schools' takeover by the government by positions held between 1973 and 2004 (parents and students – by state)	37
Table 9: Missions and schools' owners response to the takeover (parents and former students – by state)	38
Table 10: Influence of UPE introduction on schools' enrolment by states (parents and former students)	42
Table 11: How did SAP impact primary and secondary school enrolment (education workers by state)	50
Table 12: Impact of SAP on pupils' learning and performances (former education workers)	51
Table 13: Impact of SAP on pupils' learning and performances (parents and former students)	51
Table 14: Impact of the establishment of NPEC and SPEC on the quality of learning and performance of pupils	57
Table 15: Influenced parents' decision to enroll their children in school	60
Table 16: Primary and secondary Schools Enrolment – 1960 -2003	102
Table 17: Summary analysis of the impacts of the political disruptions using Levy's (2014) Classification of four ideal types of political settlement	119

List of Figures

Figure 1: Map of Nigeria showing states and geopolitical zones	15
Figure 2: States of the respondents Category of respondents	22
Figure 3: Impact of the private schools' takeover on school enrolment (parents and former students – by state)	31
Figure 4: Impact of the takeover on teachers' recruitment and promotion standards and norms (former education sector workers)	34
Figure 5: Teachers' response to schools' takeover by the government by positions held between 1973 and 2004 (former education sector workers - by state)	37
Figure 6: Impact of UPE on pupil learning and performance in primary and secondary schools	43
Figure 7: Impact of UPE on teachers' salaries and overall remuneration	45
Figure 8: SAP impact on primary and secondary schools' enrolment (parents and former students by state)	50
Figure 9: SAP impact on teachers' recruitment and retention norm and standards (former education sector workers)	55
Figure 10: Impact of the establishment of NPEC and SPEC on the amount and payment of teacher salary and overall remuneration (former education sector staff)	57
Figure 11: Influence of UBE on learning and performance	61
Figure 12: Overpopulated public schools and the rise in private schools (former education workers, by state)	66
Figure 13: Reasons governments promoted policy and curriculum changes	75
Figure 14: Primary education enrolment (in millions)	100
Figure 15: Secondary education enrolment (in millions)	101

Acknowledgements

Field Team Leads and Research Assistants

Adamawa	Anambra	Delta/Edo	Kano	Oyo	Federal and Monitoring team
Jiddere Kaibo Musa (Team Lead)	Ijeoma Chiebo Ireh (Team Lead)	Godswill Egede (Team Lead)	Mulika Dodo (Team Lead)	Oluwafemi Adewusi (Team Lead)	Grace Nweke-Ilori
Ashatu Hussaini Usman	Udeze Amaka Vivian	Vaikosen Juliet Oghenekevwe	Mustapha Ibrahim Ahmed	Omilodi Adegoke	Chioma Ezegwu
Aboki Mustapha Bello	Precious Chidimma Grace Elechi	Blessings Buzugbe	Rakiya Ibrahim Ahmad	Mark Odock	Nwanturu Adaeze Chizaramekpere
Dlama Jonathan Kwaya	Mbakwe Afomah	Nuwhele ThankGod Jesumevwaroso	Abdullahi Yusuf	Oluwatosin Adewusi	
Ismaila Mohammed Jimeta	Ubah Faith Amarachi	Ogbein Gracious Ifechukwude	Sulaiman Shehu Magashi	Busayo Olowu	

Volunteers: Ikegwuonu Uche and Mbakwe Chinazo Ursula

1. Executive Summary

1.1 Background

Nigeria's first forty years of independence (between 1960, when it gained independence and 1999 when it finally returned to democracy) were dominated by military rule. It experienced seven military rulers, six changes in government that were inspired by the military (including five successful military coups), three unsuccessful coups and one civil war. It also had four constitutional drafting experiments and four different constitutions (one was never used), four transitions to civil rule programmes and two civilian regimes (Odinkalu, 2001; Odukpya, 2012). The high levels of government turnover also produced multiplicities of and frequent changes in policies and development programmes of the education sector. From 1991 to 1999 alone, there were eight federal ministers of education across five regimes, with a further 11 ministers between the transition to democracy in 1999 and 2015 (Gershberg et al. 2015). The legacies of this level of government turnover remain a feature of the current political landscape and political settlement. This study examines how the political interruptions in Nigeria between 1970 to about 2003 altered policies, institutional norms, governance structures, and attitudes in the education sector. Particular attention is given from 1973 to 2003, a period after the civil war, when the Federal Government became fully involved in the management of primary and secondary schools (taking over schools from missions and private owners) up to 2003 when the first successful democratic transition took place. Further disruptions to the country's democracy have been experienced since then. This study gives particular attention to the impact of political interruptions and breaks on the development of the basic education sector, which in the Nigerian context refers to primary and junior secondary education.

1.2 Methodology

This study employs a sequential mixed method that combined qualitative review of the literature, primary qualitative data and primary quantitative data. The study begins with a desk-based review that explored how political breaks, particularly coups, in Nigeria from the 1960s to the early 2000s contributed to altering policies, institutional norms, governance structures, and attitudes in the education sector. It then examines the antecedents and the context around some of these policy changes to provide background to the discussion and enhance understanding of factors that contributed to the shaping of the politics, policies and programmes at different times.

The qualitative data were collected through a total of 119 key informant interviews (KII) with parents and former education sector workers, including former teachers, head-teachers, principals, administrators and staff of ministries of education. With few exceptions in Kano, all KII respondents were 60 years and above and (apart from those interviewed as parents) worked in the education sector between 1970 and 2003.

The quantitative survey data were collected from a total of 2617 individuals who were 60 years and above and were parents, students in upper primary and junior secondary schools, teachers, head-teachers, principals and/or administrators in the education sector between 1973 and 2003.

Data was collected using a pre-designed instrument that was deployed online via Kobo Collect Toolbox.

Both qualitative interviews and the survey were conducted in five states: Adamawa, Anambra, Delta (old Bendel²), Jigawa, Kano and Oyo. Additional national-level qualitative interviews were also conducted focusing on individuals who worked at the Federal Ministry of Education or the National Union of Teachers during this period. Efforts were also made to collect data on learning outcomes and students' performances as well as teacher recruitment within the study period, but these efforts proved unsuccessful. This increased the difficulty of analyzing learning outcomes and understanding the possible impact of disruptions.

1.3 Key Findings

- a. **Polarised perspectives:** The literature and the qualitative data create an impression of a unified perspective on the impact of military interruptions on access and quality of education. However, the survey data reveals that the military governments' education policies generated different responses and possibly different support from northern and southern states, and from states with dominant Muslim and Christian populations. In this way, education policies may have exacerbated divides rather than uniting the country. Northern populations were more likely to project favourable views of military governments' actions and programs.
- b. **Promotion of enrolment without quality:** Survey data suggests that government programs may have been more focused on enrolling students rather than improving the quality of education. This may be a sign that the government used education policy as a tool to build a wider support base and was not focused on maximizing educational outcomes.
- c. **Centralisation:** The military used its command structure to centralize control of education. While this appears to have been remedied in the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, centralized resource mobilization and allocation frameworks remain a critical means of control over other tiers of government. Federal ascendancy is evident in the dominant roles the Federal Government plays in fund mobilization and allocation (to other dependent tiers of government).
- d. **Opaque financial framework:** The military largely created and operated the federal education structures for many years before handing them over to civilians in 1999. The

² Former Bendel state was in the Mid-western region and consisted of what are currently known as Edo and Delta states in the south-south region of Nigeria. Reference is made to the state here because education administrations in the current Delta state (including data and documents) from 1963 to 1991 were under Bendel state.

operating system these structures have become used to during the military era were the opaque financial framework it learnt from the military. Accountability that ought to have been gained through democratic accountabilities and checks was lacking. The opaque system was also inherited by the Universal Basic Education (UBE) structure in which existing information in the literature shows that financial transparency was lacking.

- e. **Prebendal tendency and erosion of accountability:** The military was committed to the political settlement of its cronies and allies and advancement of ethnic politics. These contributed to eroding accountability and a lack of collective and individual responsibility of office-holders to the people. They were neither responsible to anyone nor accountable to any laydown processes.
- f. **Instability in education policies and processes:** Leadership changes produced changes and shifts in policy and programme focuses. Different regimes had different interests, challenges and political approaches. Military-led political changes did not evolve but were imposed and lacking in responsibility and accountability. Such changes contributed to eroding the structure, processes and quality of education. Thus, it may be concluded that political instability also produced instability in education policies, approaches, management, processes and outcomes. Frequent changes and hastily introduced regimes, programmes and political appointments did not give room for in-depth programme planning, execution and learning.
- g. **Structural and Functional Confusion:** The military set a precedent that confused the constitutional roles of various tiers of government, and created institutional, structural and functional mix-ups within the Ministry of Education. The military regime operated a kind of unitary system in which authority flowed from the head of state. Different tiers of government, ministries, departments and agencies funneled their loyalty to the head of state. When the binding authority gave way for each level to operate according to its constitutional authority, issues arose in the education sector such as complicated and duplicative, but less effective, school supervisions and monitoring systems that currently bedraggle the system. Frequent changes in government also produced crises in Nigeria's education system, as well as inconsistencies and contradictory educational policies and practices.
- h. **Duplication of efforts and negligence on some essential quality markers:** The constitution puts education in the concurrent list that allows different tiers of government to be involved in the provision and management of education. However, in practice, both federal and state governments have worked against this and failed to work in line with the spirit of the provisions of the constitution. Along with the local governments, they established and

operated education at all levels from pre-primary to tertiary education. They made their own laws and policies, some of which failed to recognize that education is a shared responsibility or considered other levels of the government that were doing the same thing. This led to an overconcentration of efforts in some areas like school monitoring and inspection, and a neglect toward other areas like staff development and training.

i. **A political settlement perspective on impacts of the political disruptions:** In addition to the above findings, there are various observations and findings in the study data which speak to our analytical framework – political bargaining. These findings are summarized as follows:

i. **Elite cohesion is high, power is exercised top-down by the leadership, limited constraints exist on political actors:** This is exemplified by most military regimes (where there were differences among the elite and the military constituted a political block that decreed laws and policies with some degree of consultation with the non-military elites and almost no consultation with the masses). The **impact on education** is that parents did not have an alternative but to yield to the government policies, but when quality began to wane the wealthy ones withdrew their children from public schools. Religious groups and private school owners were restrained from going to court and courts were barred from hearing about school takeovers; these groups and owners accepted whatever the government gave as compensation and continued to complain to whoever cared to listen. Some devised a means of partitioning their lands, giving a portion to the government while retaining another portion on which they had their own schools.

ii. **Elite cohesion is low, settlement demands that power changes hands on an electoral competitive basis, but "rules of the game" are personalized (this is also called "competitive clientelism"):** This was Nigeria's case in the Second Republic where regionalism and party interests polarized the elites; the regime was marked by corruption and elite rivalries. The **impact on education** was that it was not given much attention. Dwindling funds and corruption weakened state capacity to support education. The state could not manage the UPE leading to its collapse (the government finally ceded the program to states when the military overthrew the government). There were incessant strike actions owing to the government's failure to provide social services.

iii. **Elite cohesion is high, power is top-down, but actions are anchored in rules which institutionalize how power is to be exercised:** In the Fourth Republic, although there were regional and party differences, politicians were united by concerns of whether the military would hand over power (before the handover) or intervene if politicians misbehaved (after the handover). Hence, there were minimal elite rivalries. A second

factor was the heavy presence of ex-military men in the government of Obasanjo in the early days of the Fourth Republic; their presence was seen as necessary for guarding the young democracy (this perhaps contributed to work against the self-perpetuation attempt by Obasanjo in his third term agenda). Their inclusion was also a way to pay off some military elites as their part in the political settlement. Within months of his inauguration, President Olusegun Obasanjo introduced the Universal Basic Education as an updated version of the Universal Primary Education that sought to ensure that children of school-going ages were enrolled in school. The **impact on education** was that the self-styled military system was still evident in the way UBE was introduced without due consultation. A high level of corruption and embezzlement of the UBE fund was observed.

2. Introduction

2.1 Background to the Study

Despite the continuous increase in school enrollment in Nigeria since the 1970s, and a national push to expand access, learning gains have been limited. This necessitates a rigorous inquiry into how the politics of education affects learning. Nigeria presents an important case study with approximately 60 million primary and secondary school-aged children (UIS 2020). Both access to and quality of basic education have continued to present significant challenges. An estimated 13.2 million children between the ages of 6 and 14 years old were out of school before the outbreak of COVID-19; the number has only further increased since then. This constituted the highest number of out-of-school children in the world. An estimated 12.6 million children of the total were located in the northern parts of the country, which points to an obvious north/south divide in basic education access in Nigeria (Save the Children 2016; Ezegwu, 2020). On the learning front, fewer than 50% of primary 6th grade students demonstrated competency in mathematics and English on learning assessments conducted as part of a dedicated education survey (Okoye and Adeniran, 2020).

The need to interrogate the nature and impact of Nigerian politics on the development of various sectors is emphasized in the literature. In the past four decades, Richard Joseph (1987, 1998; 2013) has attempted to make sense of the development in Nigeria and concluded that prebendalism is a fundamental problem. Joseph's perspective of prebendal politics highlights how Nigeria's ethnic groups have become bases for mobilizing, organizing and legitimizing ethnic-based clientele networks of patronage, rent-seeking activities and corruption (Joseph, 1983, 1987, 1998; Suberu, 2013). In like manner, politics and policies of various political administrations have been implicated in the ills in the education sector (Obanya, 2011; Oyedemi, 2015; Elechi, 2016; Babalola, 2018). Nigeria's first forty years of independence (between 1960, when it gained independence, and 1999, when it finally returned to democracy) were dominated by military rule. It experienced seven military rulers, six changes of government that were inspired by the military (including five successful military coups), three unsuccessful coups and one civil war. It also had four constitutional drafting experiments, four different constitutions (one was never used), four transitions to civil rule programmes and two civilian regimes (Odinkalu, 2001; Odukpya, 2012).

Meanwhile, some of the most popular definitions of 'politics' describe the concept as processes involving the struggle for and actual distribution of power, either as a means or an end (Dyke, 1960; Mitchell, 1961; Fadakinte, 2019). These views of politics tend to emphasise power and authority (Mitchell, 1961). David Easton (1953, p. 129) defines politics as "the authoritative allocation of values" while Harold Laswell (1936, p.264) defined it as relating to the struggle for "Who Gets What, When, How". From this perspective, we may view the role of politics in education as an authoritative distribution of responsibilities, opportunities and benefits of and in education. This embodies a position of power in the decision about who gets what in education, when and how they get it. As Olusola, Ayodele and Osiki (2011, p.19) observe, "the political

environment has a strong influence on educational policy planning and implementation in any nation. Successive governments, both during the military and civilian regimes, tend to pursue educational programmes in line with their respective ideologies and priorities”.

High levels of government turnover have pervaded the education sector in Nigeria as well. From 1991 to 1999 alone, there were eight federal ministers of education across five regimes, with a further 11 ministers between the transition to democracy in 1999 and 2015 (Gershberg et al. 2015). In total, 51 persons have either been ministers or ministers of state for education between 1960 and 2020, excluding state-level turnover of commissioners of education. The current experiment with democracy, which is the longest thus far, began on 29th May 1999. The legacies of this level of government turnover remain a feature of the current political landscape and political settlement.

This study examines how the political interruptions in Nigeria from 1973 to about 2003 altered policies, institutional norms, governance structures, and attitudes, in the education sector. Particular attention is given to 1973 – 2003, a period after the civil war, when the Federal Government became fully involved in the management of primary and secondary schools (taking over schools from missions and private owners), up to 2003, when the first successful democratic transition took place. No further disruptions to the democracy have been experienced since then. This study also gives particular attention to the impact of political interruptions and breaks on the development of the basic education sector (primary and junior secondary education). It is noteworthy that until 1981, when the National Policy on Education (NPE) provided for the 6-3-3-4 system, secondary education was largely non-segmented and was taught at a single level. Hence, scholarly discussions around secondary education before this time did not really distinguish between the junior secondary and senior secondary levels.

While there exist some scholarly literatures that point to the connection between education and politics in Nigeria, existing information is quite limited. This study also adds to the literature on the politics of education and learning. Emerging evidence from Brazil shows that regular political turnover at the municipal level has significant impacts on learning (Paglayan (2014; Akhtari et al. 2017; Guevara et. Al., 2018). Muyiwa (2015) explains that the connection between politics and education is deeply embedded in society's development. The politics within the education system, and the politics of education provision, including its structures, processes and access are largely influenced by the government in power. Educational policies are products of political bargains and authoritative decisions over who gets what, how, when and to what extent (Ijov and Sar, 2015). Since the colonial era, "politics has exerted, implied or expressed influence on education policies and their implementations. Successive regimes and administrations in Nigeria have seen education, through their manifestoes and actions, as a political tool" (Muyiwa, 2015, p. 40). While scholars of the relationship between politics and education have emphasized a positive relationship, a significant gap in their studies relates to the depth of their discussion and their concentration on secondary evidence, which have been largely drawn from history literature (see Amadioha, 2008; Ijoduola, Odunaike, and Ajayi, 2012; Ijov and Sar, 2015; Muyiwa,

2015). A literature search revealed the scarcity of scholarship that drew from primary sources, especially those that generated information from key actors and those individuals that experienced the politics of education and the impact of political changes on education. This study makes an important contribution towards closing this gap. It also highlights factors surrounding the rise in private schools and the rise in private schools’ implications for quality assessment.

2.2 Research Objectives and Key Questions

This study seeks to understand how political breaks and interruptions such as the repeated coups and other government transitions contributed to altering existing administrative norms in the education sector, and the relation of these interruptions and their effects to access and quality of education. It also seeks to understand the place of education in political settlements during political intermissions as well as responses of various education sector stakeholders to these political breaks and their associated education policies.

The study investigates the following questions:

1. How have repeated coups and other government transitions altered administrative norms in the education sector, specifically with regards to teacher recruitment, retention, and promotion?
2. How have these changes in norms affected the teacher career paths, including to private schools and out of teaching?² What roles did the National Union of Teachers play in these transitions, within military and democratic governments?
3. How have these changes affected the development of national exams, and learning outcomes as proxied by those national examination systems? How did parents react to a decline in funding for public education?
4. How have these changes influenced the flow of students out of the public school system, and the related impacts on learning inequities?
5. How did coups affect the level of political patronage and demands for loyalty by stakeholders in the education sector? This includes the loyalty of ministers, permanent secretaries in the education sector, leaders of the National Teachers Union, and local school administrators, including mission schools and Islamic schools.
6. How did political turnovers affect the content of education, for example through curricular reforms and revisions? How did the stakeholders mentioned above react to these changes, and in whose interests?

2.3 The Antecedents and backgrounds to the political interruptions

Table 1: Precolonial Antecedents

Key Dates	Events
1842	Formal Western education was established in Nigeria by Christian missionaries.
1872	Missionary schools began receiving grant aid from the colonial government.

1882	The colonial government introduced the first ordinance that regularized the education system (many other ordinances were subsequently issued)
1951	The Constitution approved the power of each region to make laws on education and other sectors.
1955	The western regional government introduced the Universal Primary Education (UPE). The eastern region also introduced its version in 1957.
1960	Nigeria got its independence

The various reform efforts in Nigeria’s education sector between 1970 and 2003 were influenced by the foundation laid by the missionaries who brought education to Nigeria and the colonial system under which the education system expanded. During an interview, Theo (federal)³, who was a retired school principal and deputy director at the Ministry of Education, explained that Nigerians inherited a colonial education that focused on creating clerks and administrative officers. He also noted that "the federal civil service was tilted around administration; the administrative officer was the core officer so technically that was the training given." Theo further argued that "if this, therefore, was the target of education, to produce people to help administer the colonial government, it then means that from primary to university, that is the kind of products you would have." Various scholars note how the inherited colonial education system failed to support the comprehensive development of the Nigerian educational system (Afigbo, 1991; Sanderson, 1975; Fabunmi, 2005; Woolman, 2011; Imam, 2012; Azuma, 2014).

Education was introduced in Nigeria in 1842 by Christian missionaries (a non-state actor) as a means of evangelizing and converting the natives to Christianity (Fafunwa, 1974; Akani, 1990; Nzekwe, 2007; Sulaiman, 2012; Adejare, 2018). Colonial administrations became directly involved in education in 1872 when the colonial government gave 30 Pounds, as grants in aid, to each of the education providers in Nigeria. These included the Church Missionary Society, the Roman Catholic Church and the Wesleyan Methodist Church. The annual grant to each of these missionaries was later increased to 200 pounds in 1877. This necessitated further involvement of the colonial government in education. In 1882, the colonial government introduced an ordinance for regularizing the education system and creating conditions for the grants. This was the beginning of government involvement and control of schools in Nigeria (Adejare, 2018).

The regularization of the colonial education system did not eliminate differential access and quality of education in Nigeria. The colonial administrations advanced policies that created differential access to education, which entrenched gender and regional imbalances (Afigbo, 1991; Sanderson, 1975; Ezegwu, 2020). In northern Nigeria, access to formal education was largely given to male children from elite households. Colonial administrations favoured the

³ Interviewees’ names used in this report are not their real names; they are pseudonyms. In addition to the pseudonyms, the use of federal or name of a state (in parenthesis) indicate the state of the respondents. The federal level interviews were conducted among persons who worked in federal institutions

limitation of the spread of education in the northern parts of the country to prevent a radical transformation of the society that might have challenged the Islamic principles and dominant positions enjoyed by the elite, which were useful to colonial administrations. This helped to preserve the indirect rule policy that was in place in the region, but limited the spread of education in the north, and marked the beginning of the historical educational imbalance between the north and the south in Nigeria (Afigbo, 1991; Fabunmi, 2005; Azuma, 2014; Ezegwu, 2020).

Conscious efforts to address the differential educational access between northern and southern Nigeria as well as the government's direct involvement in the establishment and management of schools did not happen at the federal level until the 1970s, about two decades after independence (Afigbo, 1991; Maigida, 2018). According to Maigida (2018), direct involvement in schools' control and administration began in the East-Central State with the enactment of an edict for taking over primary and secondary schools from private owners. These schools were largely owned by missionaries and charitable organisations. The eastern takeover of schools was subsequently replicated in other regions. In 1975, the Federal Military Government promulgated its nationwide schools' take-over law (Maigida, 2018).

Even before the promulgation of the 1975 take-over policy, education was a regional affair (Maigida, 2018). While the colonial education ordinances continually increased government oversight, the creation of regional governance structures by the Richard Constitution in 1946 (under Governor Richard) laid the foundation for direct regional involvement in education (Maigida, 2018; Afigbo, 1991). Governor Richard declared that "Nigeria falls naturally into three regions, the North, the West and the East" (Munoz, 1987, p.323). The following Macpherson Constitution in 1951 specifically approved the power of each region to make laws on education, agriculture, health and local government, and this created a responsibility for regional control of education (Abdulkareem and Muraina, 2015).

The Western Region launched a Universal Primary Education (UPE) programme in 1955, which continued into the 1970s. The Eastern Region also introduced its version of the UPE in 1957, while there was a free education programme in the north that was not formally launched as UPE (FME, 2003; Gershberg et al., 2016). The regional UPE continued with varying degrees of success and failure until 1976, when the Federal Government rolled out its own nationwide Universal Free Primary Education (UFPE). This marked the beginning of the Federal Government's direct involvement in the operation and management of primary education (Amaele, 2006; Oni 2008; Gershberg et al., 2016). Immediate triggers and roles of different political administrations on the launching and management of the UPE are further discussed in Section Five, which examines political and policy intermissions. The following section summarises the study methodology.

3. Methodology

Table 2: Study Timeline

Key Dates	Key Study Activities
February 2021	Qualitative review of the literature
March – April 2021	<ul style="list-style-type: none">● Qualitative instrument development and fieldwork● Qualitative analysis and report writing
May – June 2021	<ul style="list-style-type: none">● Quantitative instrument development and fieldwork● Search and review of archival quantitative data● Quantitative analysis and report writing
July-August 2021	<ul style="list-style-type: none">● Production of synthesis report, which incorporates qualitative and quantitative findings of the study

3.1 The Study Location


Both qualitative interviews and the survey were conducted in five states: Adamawa, Anambra, Delta (old Bendel), Jigawa, Kano and Oyo. Additional national-level qualitative interviews were also conducted, which focused on individuals who worked at the Federal Ministry of Education during this period. Former officials of the National Union of Teachers were also interviewed.

3.2 The Research Setting - Nigeria

Nigeria is a federation of 36 states and a Federal Capital Territory (FCT) in Abuja. Located in West Africa and with an estimated population of 201 million, Nigeria is the most populated country in Africa. Its 36 states and FCT are also clustered into six geopolitical zones that largely reflect the dominant ethnic identities. The zones are northeast, northwest, north-central, southeast, south-south and southwest. The states are further divided into 774 administrative units called Local Government Areas (LGAs). Nigeria has over 250 ethnic groups and 519 languages (Dooga, 2012; Morakinyo, 2015; United Nations Population Fund, 2019). The three dominant ethnic groups are Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and Igbo. Other relatively large groups include Ijaw, Kanuri, Ibibio, Tiv, and Edo/Bini. These ethnic groups were amalgamated by the British colonial administrations, which was completed in 1914 under Lord Fredrick Lugard. Nigeria got its independence from Britain in 1960. The dominant languages spoken in Nigeria are English, pidgin English, Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo, Ijaw and Fulani. Hausa-Fulani is located in the north, while Yoruba and Igbo are located in the southwest and southeast, respectively. Christianity and Islam are the two dominant religions in the country. The southern geopolitical zones have a predominantly Christian population, while Islam is the dominant religion in the northern zones. Figure 1 shows the map of Nigeria with states and regions.

The southern zones are more educationally advantaged than the northern zones. The differential development in education between the north and the south is largely related to their respective histories and sociocultural (including tradition, culture and religious) backgrounds (Usman, 2006, 2008; Humphreys and Crawford, 2014; Gershberg et al., 2016; Ezegwu, 2020).

Figure 1: Map of Nigeria showing States and Geopolitical Zones



Source: Gayawan (2014)

3.2.1 Adamawa

Adamawa is located in northeast Nigeria. It was carved out of the defunct Gongola State. Adamawa has 21 Local Government Areas. Hausa/Fulani is the dominant population of the state. The population of the state is 4,502,132 (Male- 2,296,087 and Female- 2,206,044)⁴. Islam is the predominant religion but there are also Christian communities in the state. Adamawa is one of the states categorized as Educationally Disadvantaged States (EDS) in Nigeria due to the relatively low participation in education by the people of the state (National Population Commission and

⁴ The population estimate for Adamawa and other states below are based on the population estimate on the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission website: <https://nipc.gov.ng/nigeria-states>

RTI International, 2011). Adamawa is one of the northeast states that were significantly affected by the Boko Haram insurgency.

3.2.2 Anambra

Anambra is one of the five southeast states and has a total population of 5,846,198 (2,981,561 males and 2,864,637 females). The population is mostly Christian Igbos. The state has 21 Local Government Areas (LGAs). The state has one of the peculiar education records in the country: it is usually among the top five states with the best records in Senior Secondary School Certificate Examination (SSCE) results (National Bureau of Statistics, 2019) but it has an extant history of low male secondary school enrolment (Ezegwu, 2020).

3.2.3 Delta State

Delta is located in the south-south zone. It was carved out of the defunct Bendel State. Major ethnic groups in the state are Igbo, Ukwani, Itsekiri, Ika, Aniocha, Urhobo, Olukimi, Isoko, and Ijaw. It has 25 Local Government Areas. The population of the state is estimated at 6,037,667 (Male- 3,079,210 and Female- 2,958,457). The state is the largest producer of petroleum products in Nigeria. Delta is one of the educationally advantaged states and is considered to be one of the top ten performing states in the Senior Schools Certificate Examination (National Bureau of Statistics, 2019).

3.2.4 Kano

Kano is located in northwest Nigeria. The predominant populations of the state are Hausa and Fulani. Islam is the dominant religion in the state. It has 44 Local Government Areas and an estimated population of 13,969,085 (Male- 7,124,234 and Female- 6,844,852). Kano has previously experienced the Boko Haram insurgency and inter-religious violence. School attendance in Kano is relatively low. Information from the State Education Sector Plan (2009 – 2018) reveals that less than half of primary-school-age children were attending school in Kano (Ministry of Education Kano State, 2008).

3.2.5 Oyo

Oyo is one of the six southwestern states, with a dominant Yoruba population. Oyo has 33 Local Government Areas. It has a total population of 8,392,588 (Male- 4,280,220 and Female- 4,112,368). The state has a sizable population of both Christians and Muslims. Ibadan, which is the capital of Oyo state, was the capital city of the old western region where the first free Universal Primary Education (UPE) was introduced in Nigeria for the people of the region.

3.3 The Approach

The study employed a sequential mixed method that combined an in-depth review of the literature and primary qualitative and quantitative data.

3.3.1 Desk-based Review

The desk-based review explores how political breaks, particularly coups, in Nigeria from the 1960s to the early 2000s, contributed to altering policies, institutional norms, governance

structures, and attitudes in the education sector. It also examines the antecedents and the context around some of these policy changes to provide background to the discussion and explain some factors that contributed to the shaping of politics, policies and programmes at different times. It particularly examines existing research literature, policy documents, opinion papers, government reports and reports of international organisations working on education issues in Nigeria. The review initially focused on publications on different aspects of education in Nigeria and observed that while much literature is available in the field of education, the literature focused on influences of political breaks on education policy development comprises a narrow range of inquiries. The research was therefore extended to other fields, including politics, economics, history, public administration, and archival materials on laws, decrees and edicts of Nigeria.

At the end of the review, it was observed that the literature on political interference in education is quite limited in number, scope and focus. Few studies give attention to relevant themes of education from historical perspectives. These include the history of Nigerian education (Fafunwa, 1974), Nigeria education sector analyses and diagnoses (Moja, 2000; Federal Ministry of Education, 2005), reviews of the Universal Basic Education (UBE) programme (Orbach, 2004; Humphreys and Crawford, 2014), and a comparative study of basic education reforms (Gershberg, et al., 2016). Other brief papers include historical discussion of education policy formation in Nigeria (Fabunmi, 2005; Obanya, 2008; Duze, 2012; Imam, 2012; Odukoya, 2012), history of military control of schools (Ahanotu, 1983), economic factors and the cost of education (Callaway and Musone, 1968; Longe, 1982; Momoh, 1996; Nwagwu, 2000), and political disruption and interruptions in public administration and governance (Odinkalu, 2001; Ogbaji, 2013; Muhammad and Liman, 2018). While these studies are useful, they do not deeply examine the historical impacts of political interruptions on education and their implications for policy and programmes' effectiveness and sustainability.

3.3.2 Qualitative Data Collection

The existing gaps observed in the literature, together with some of the overriding questions of the study around the political blocks, settlements and social foundations, informed further qualitative investigation. This involved in-depth interviews with federal-level stakeholders and state/local-level stakeholders. The interviews sought to understand issues around different de-facto and/or de-jure policies adopted following successful coups. They also asked about the lived experiences of various stakeholders through coups and changes in governments. While the primary mode of data collection was key informant interviews, we gave room for group interviews when multiple respondents were found together or preferred to be interviewed together. The characteristics of the respondents are discussed below.

3.3.4 Quantitative Data Collection

The quantitative element of this study was largely a retrospective survey, which was informed by a need to understand a broader pattern on issues noted from the qualitative interview analysis. It was also motivated by the paucity of data on issues around enrolment, school performance and wider educational development issues across Nigeria (both at Federal and state levels)

between 1960 and 2005. Various efforts made to obtain hard data on learning and other educational outcomes through searches and requests for data from the ministries of education and government archive did not yield much. The retrospective survey sought to fill this gap and understand the situation using perspectives of people who experienced and observed the policies and progress in the education sector between 1973 and 2003. Some statistical information was also retrieved from online sources, including the World Bank education data website. However, some datasets differed on certain issues and indicators. Hence, caution has been exercised in using them.

3.4 Instruments

The existing gaps observed in the literature, together with some of the overriding questions of the study around the political blocks, settlements and social foundations, were used to develop two different interview guides for the qualitative interviews: one for federal-level stakeholders and the other for state/local-level stakeholders. The interviews asked questions about their perspectives, observations and experiences around the policy changes enacted by different political regimes within the study period.

The quantitative data instrument was developed and deployed online via Kobo Collect Toolbox⁵. The instrument asked about respondents' demographic information and perspectives on education policies undertaken by different regimes during the study period, as well as how different categories of stakeholders responded to the policies and changes introduced in the primary and secondary education system. The survey took an average of ten to fifteen minutes to complete. It was designed to be self-completed by respondents. However, respondents who did not have internet-enabled phones or who, for one reason or another were unable to complete the survey by themselves, were assisted by the research assistants, who interviewed them and entered their responses into the survey form.

Both the qualitative and quantitative instruments included questions around schools' takeovers from missionaries and private owners, the introduction of Universal Primary Education (UPE), the introduction of continuous assessment and change in the school calendar, impacts of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) on education, impacts of the establishment of National and States Primary Education Commissions, the introduction of the Universal Basic Education (UBE) programme, and factors that contributed to influencing the growth and spread of private schools.

3.5 Training of the Research Assistants

The research assistants for both qualitative and quantitative study fieldwork were given virtual training via Zoom. The training covered the background and objectives of the study, technical and practical guidance on the use of the Kobo instrument, and issues around consent, objectivity and confidentiality. It also provided guidelines on different strategies for identifying potential

⁵ This is the link to the Kobo Collect Toolbox used for data collection <https://ee.kobotoolbox.org/x/2ebEFsHA>

respondents, strategies for data collection, practice with the electronic data collection tool and COVID-19 safety precautions. During the initial qualitative data collection, it was noted that many potential respondents did not own internet-enabled devices and did not operate the internet, while some may not be able to use ICT effectively because of age and health conditions. State-based research assistants were invaluable in identifying potential respondents and confirming their eligibility (which was largely based on age and belonging to the defined category within the period under study). Research assistants were also given guidance on how to determine if respondents would be able to effectively participate in the study because it was understood that many potential respondents may not be able to participate because of possible age and health-related conditions.

3.6 Pilot

Both qualitative and quantitative instruments were piloted in all five states where data was collected. After a virtual training, research assistants were directed to use the instrument to interview at least one person in each respondent category (see the categories below). The pilot helped to test the instrument, prepare the field team for the survey (it helped them to understand and familiarise themselves with the tool and the use of technology to collect data from people who are sixty years and above), explore possible challenges during the survey and confirm the average time it would take to complete the survey for each category. Feedback from the field teams was used to further refine the instrument. Their experiences also contributed to informing the final fieldwork guidelines.

3.6 Data collection

Qualitative data was collected in March and April 2021 while quantitative data was collected in May and June 2021. Both qualitative interviews and the survey were conducted in five states: Adamawa, Anambra, Delta, Jigawa, Kano and Oyo. Additional national-level qualitative interviews focused on individuals who worked at the Federal Ministry of Education or were in the leadership of the National Union of Teachers between 1973 and 2003.

The original survey strategies included sending the survey link to people who were 60 years old and above that meet the study criteria for them to complete the survey by themselves and, physically assisting those who do not have internet-enabled devices or may not be able to complete the survey by themselves. A database of retirees from the Ministry of Education could not be retrieved from the state ministries. Also, initial responses were limited, which led to the activation of other strategies, including a snowballing approach, town-to-town visits, going to pensioner's association meeting places during their meeting days, visiting prominent locations where retirees often meet, visiting churches, mosques and schools where former staff information was sought, and collecting lists of pensioners from their local associations or government offices and calling them on the phone to encourage them to complete the survey, or to arrange for interviews for those who could not complete the survey by themselves.

3.7 Research Respondents

The qualitative data were collected through a total of 119 key informant interviews (KII) with parents and former education sector workers, including former teachers, head-teachers, principals, administrators and staff of federal and state ministries of education. With few exceptions in Kano, all KII respondents were up to 60 years and above and (apart from those interviewed as parents) worked in the education sector between 1970 and 2003. See Table 3 for the numbers of interviews per category.


Table 3: Qualitative respondents by location

	Data Source	Adamawa	Anambra	Delta	Kano	Oyo	Federal	Total
1.	Present and past permanent secretaries and top officials of Federal and State Ministries of Education that worked in the education sector between 1970 and 2003.	1	1	2	1	2	4	11
2.	Present and former officials of the National Union of Teachers who had served between 1970 and 2003.	2	1	2	2	2	5	14
3.	Individuals who worked at the Federal and State Ministry of Education between 1970 and 2003.	2	2	2	2	2	2	12
4.	Present and former teachers who served between 1970 and 2003.	2	1	6	5	5	0	19
5.	Local school administrators, including public, Christian missions, Islamic, and private schools who served between 1970 and 2003	0	5	5	5	5	0	20
6.	Individuals who were involved in school administration at a local level, at some point between 1970 and 2003	3	3	5	2	4	0	17
7.	Parents who are 60 years and above	4	5	5	3	5	4	26
	Total	14	18	27	20	25	15	119

These categories of respondents were chosen based on their work in the education sector between 1970 and 2003. The year 1970 is chosen to mark the end of the Nigerian civil war, and the year 2003 indicates the first successful democratic transition in Nigeria.

The survey respondents also included former education sector workers (teachers, administrators, head-teachers and principals) who worked in the education sector between 1973 and 2003 and parents who were up to sixty years and above. A total of 2617 persons were surveyed (see Figure 2). Among these were 1593 (60.89%) males and 1024 (39.11%) females. The

respondents included 1234 (47.4%) respondents who identified themselves as former teachers, head-teachers and principals who taught between 1973 and 2003, 507 (19.19%) who were students within the period, 481 (18.41%) who were former school administrators and ministries of education staff and, 393 (15.01%) who were parents. Many of the former education sector workers were also parents but were given specific questions that relate to development and processes within the education sector, while parent-related questions were specifically asked to people who are categorised as parents for the study. Some questions were answered by all categories of respondents.



Note: in our analysis, we grouped the respondents into two broad categories (education sector workers and parents/former students) to simplify the analysis and reduce complexities.

3.8 Data Analysis

The qualitative data were analysed using narrative inquiry techniques that focused on the understanding of how social foundations and norms in the education sector were altered by political turnovers. The narrative approach was largely based on a recommendation in Daiute et al. (2000). The individual narratives were first organized thematically based on semi-structured interviews and conversations with the stakeholders identified above, which helped us understand the effects of the coups and political turnovers on the narrators and the education system. The desk-based review and the interview data contributed to influencing the current report themes (arranged in sections and subsections). Information from interviewees who lived through most of the period under consideration (triangulated with the information from the literature) was also used to organize narratives chronologically to understand how some of these

impacts evolved. Quantitative elements were used to provide additional information and support to the qualitative discussions, highlighting patterns and trends.

3.9 Study Limitations, Field Experiences and Challenges

Some of the initial challenges experienced during the study related to the paucity of data. As previously stated, gaps in the literature informed the nature and content of the primary data collection, but a severe scarcity of data on school records and learning assessments was observed. This inspired the retrogressive survey to generate information, as explained in the study approach subsection above. However, we could not address the difficulties experienced in assessing learning results over time, which were exacerbated by state creation, frequent changes in policy, poor record-keeping and loss of data in the public education sector. These made it difficult to examine the difference-in-differences over time.

Considering the ages of the respondents (people who were 60 years and above), identifying those able to grant interviews was quite tricky even while working with the association of pensioners. For example, in Anambra, ten potential respondents were initially contacted; eight of them agreed to participate in the study at the outset, but only five of them eventually granted the interviews. The remaining five declined on health grounds. Across the states, many of the respondents had retired to their villages and needed to be interviewed either in person (by visiting the villages where they are located) or on the phone. Many potential respondents insisted on in-person interviews. Some of them also requested material assistance (as one team member noted in the research diary: “someone whispered that they want something even if it is soap”). While no informant compensation was initially planned, some key informants were sent about £2 of top-up call cards during the qualitative interviews.

It is pertinent to note that it was quite tricky to conduct this survey at the time it was conducted for several reasons. The target age group was also a high-risk group during COVID-19. To address this, field teams were advised to strictly adhere to COVID-19 safety protocols. Besides wearing a face mask and using alcohol-based hand sanitiser, the field team also made free face masks available for respondents. Locating respondents from this age group, especially former education sector workers, was also challenging because many of them had retired to their respective villages.

Security issues in Nigeria were also a critical concern. The study was conducted when the security situation was very tense across the country, and incessant killing and kidnappings were widely reported, including mass kidnappings. Security challenges affected the study in two ways. One, there was a need to ensure the security of the field team. For example, in Anambra, the tension in the southeast and sit-at-home orders by some groups particularly affected the free movement of the field team during the fieldwork. The second challenge was the apprehension of potential respondents. For example, in Adamawa, a field team member noted in their research diaries that most people in one of the communities he visited suspected he came from a particular ethnic group and was in their community to collect information for his people.

4. Analytical Framework

This study draws on Political Settlements Analysis (PSA) for its analytical framework. The inquiry into the politics of learning from a political settlement perspective involves the “sweet spot” between political settlements and stakeholder analysis (Gershberg 2019, p. 4). Political settlements are understood as “the balance or distribution of power between contending social groups and social classes, on which any state is based” (John and Putzel, 2009, p.4). This study draws on the work of Pritchett (2019); Levy (2014); Hickey and Hossain (2019) and others to provide a theoretical backdrop that includes typologies of political settlement and public governance, and domains of contestation. The perspective focuses on contention and bargaining among and between different categories of elites (economic, political, regional, religious and local) and non-elites such as groups of non-state actors and classes (John and Putzel, 2009). Kelsall and von Hau (2020, p.3) thus define political settlement as "agreement among a society's most powerful groups over a set of political and economic institutions expected to generate for them a minimally acceptable level of benefits, and which thereby ends or prevents generalised civil war and/or political and economic disorder."

Political settlement scholars believe that the nature of political settlements in each country reflects and impacts the socioeconomic and political environment (Sen, 2012; Osei et al., 2015). The contested domains are numerous in the case of Nigeria: there was a contest over what the purpose of education ought to be and who should provide it, evident in the Federal Government’s takeover of mission schools, and subsequent delegation of funding to state governments. There are also contests over content, the public value of education, and the ownership of education (Usman, 2006; Aghedo and Eke, 2013; Umo, 2014; Ezegwu et al., 2017). PSA provides insights into how citizens, acting as individuals, or as collectives with or without the state, evaluate and respond to the performance of the education system (see Moore, 2015). The approach contributes to explaining the roles of political instabilities that were inspired by military coups. PSA is applied to elucidate education policy changes and challenges arising as a product of successive governments, administrative personnel, and policy turnovers, and how these have shifted the social foundations and norms of public education. Social foundations, in this case, refer to sociopolitical groups and actors that impact the nature of political settlements, some of whom might be persistent. This study specifically examines how changes from one regime to another influenced the beliefs and activities of education inspectors, teachers, parent groups, students, bureaucrats, and education providers as they attempted to adjust to the changes. Levy’s (2014) four ideal types of political settlement (summarized in Table 5) have helped classify the types of government that emerge from coups.

Table 5: Levy (2014) Classification of four ideal types of political settlement

	Dominant	Competitive
--	----------	-------------

Personalized	Elite cohesion is high, power exercised top-down by leadership, limited constraints on political actors.	Elite cohesion is low, settlement demands power changes hands on an electoral competitive basis, but "rules of the game" are personalized (this is also called "competitive clientelism").
Rule-of-law	Elite cohesion is high, power is top-down, but actions are anchored in rules which institutionalize how power is to be exercised.	Politics is competitive, impersonal rules govern the exercise of power.

Source: Pritchett 2019, Review Essay. Reproduced in and copied from the Guiding Principles paper (Gershberg 2019).

Coups naturally lead to the "dominant" section of the matrix, and in many cases, the rule becomes "personalized" within the military junta, represented by the Supreme Military Council in Nigeria (Nwanze 1979). Coups also potentially lead to a decline in professional rule-based norms, as governance is increasingly personalized and becomes unstable with successive coups. Additionally, coups inspire contests between the dominant groups and the affected or marginalized elite and non-elite groups. When it comes to education policymaking, this may result in a military junta facing constraints or pushback from preexisting social foundations and norms.

Thus, our analysis focuses on the ways in which various social foundations were altered with successive coups and regime changes, and how sociopolitical actors responded in the education sector. We also consider the limits and implications of political settlement frameworks. If political settlements are understood to represent an alternative to violence,⁶ and if significant policy shifts in education and other domains tend to occur when there is an establishment of a new political settlement or "rupture" of an existing one, then this raises the question of the degree to which political settlement analysis could be used to interpret the cumulative effect of repeated coups and sweeping turnovers. Finally, we looked into the stability of social foundations of public education because elites may have "fled" the public education system, and that could have implications for the development of the public education sector.

⁶ Reviewing the literature on settlements, Schultze-Kraft (2017, p. 616) notes (and contests) the "dominant narrative" in which "the existence of a settlement is categorically equated with stability and the effective regulation of violence."

5. Political and Policy Intermissions (1960 and 2000)

Table 6: Highlights of Political and Policy Intermissions (1960 and 2000)

Key Dates	Highlights of Key Events That Are Relevant to Basic Education Sector Development
October 1960 – January 1966	<p>Independence and the First Republic</p> <p>There were no major education policy changes from the colonial era</p>
January 1966 – October 1979	<p>First Military Era</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● There was a civil war (July 1966 – January 1970), during which policy changes were limited ● Coups and counter-coups produced governments with varying interests in education ● There was a National Curriculum Conference in 1969 ● Nigeria was moved from a four region country into a 19 state country (the creation of states had a significant impact on education policies and programmes at different times) ● The takeover of schools from missionaries and private owners in the early 1970s ● The Universal Primary Education (UPE) was launched in 1976
October 1979 – October 1983	<p>Second Republic</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● A democratic constitution included education in the concurrent list that allows all the three tiers of the government to operate education ● An experiment with the multi-tier operation of education in the economic downturn proved challenging to the education sector
1983 - 1993	<p>Second Military Era</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The military sacked the elected civilian government and suspended the constitution that made education a joint responsibility of various tiers of government ● Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) was introduced, which negatively affected the government funding of social services, including education ● National and State Primary Education Commissions were introduced by a military decree
1993 – 1999	<p>The Interim Government and Third Military Era</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The interim government was short-lived with no noticeable impact on education policy and programmes ● The third military era also had a limited impact on education policy and programmes
2000 - present	<p>The Fourth Republic</p>

- | | |
|--|---|
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none">● The fourth republic is credited with the introduction of the Universal Basic Education (UBE) programme which has led to the introduction of various reforms in the basic education sub-sector, including the introduction of various policies, the UBE Act and intervention programmes. However, this study is limited to 2003 (most of these reforms were introduced after 2003; the UBE Act, for example, was launched in 2004) |
|--|---|

The history of the post-independent Nigerian education system is a history of incessant interruptions and diverse changes in policy and programmes. Changes were informed by both political and economic factors. In some cases, educational policies were introduced and subsequently modified or entirely changed, even by the same political administration that introduced them (Oyedeki, 2015). Continuous change in administration, which led to policy adjustment, is considered one of the major problems affecting policy implementation (Obanya, 2011; Odukoya, 2012; Oyedeki, 2015). This is because most programmes initiated by a particular administration were inadequately implemented by subsequent administrations. Instead, the incoming administrations introduced their agendas (Obanya, 2011). In this section, different political regimes in Nigeria between 1960 and 2000 and their respective education policy and programmes are summarized.

5.1 Independent and First Republic (1960 - 1966)

Nigeria gained independence on 1st October 1960. At the time, Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa was the country's Prime Minister, the head of government, while Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe was the Governor-General and represented Queen Elizabeth II as the Nigerian head of state. On 1st October 1963, Nigeria transitioned to a republic with Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa as Prime Minister and Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe as President. Nigeria operated a parliamentary system of government adapted from the United Kingdom (Mackintosh, 1964; Jackson, 1972; Amuwo, Bach and Lebeau, 2001; Odinkalu, 2001; Library of Congress, 2008).

In the first decade of independence, Nigeria largely retained its colonial education structures. A literature search suggests that there was no significant education policy or structural change in the first decade of independence (Woolman, 2011; Imam, 2012). However, it is worth noting that in April 1959, the year preceding Nigeria's independence, the Colonial Government of Nigeria constituted a Commission led by Sir Eric Ashby (often referred to as the Ashby Commission) to examine the country's human capital needs in the coming two decades. The commission report highlighted an existing imbalance within the education sector between northern and southern regions, limited post-primary school admission opportunities, a limited number of qualified and certified teachers and, the parochial nature of Nigerian education (Nicol, 1961; Asiwaju, 1972; Ahmed, 1989; Jibril, 2007; Daniel-Kalio, 2018). Asiwaju (1972) observes that the Commission's recommendations were subsequently key sources of inspiration for Nigeria. They influenced the country's educational direction and development in the 1960s. Imam (2012) notes that the country's educational policy at this time (despite the Ashby report) had a narrow scope and was criticized for its obsolete methods, irrelevant curricula, high drop-out and repetition rates, persistence of access inequality, rural-urban disparities, regional and ethnic imbalances,

curricular disparities between mission and non-mission schools, and dependency of its graduates, who lacked initiative.

The First National Development Plan (1962-1968) was also formulated two years after independence (Lawal and Oluwatoyin, 2011; Ekundayo, 2015). It sought to advance development opportunities in the areas of education, health and employment. However, limited information exists on actual interventions undertaken by the Federal Government in the area of education (see International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1965). The plan generally failed because of weak political and institutional capacity and dependence on external funding to finance its implementation. The eventual military intervention and the civil war ended its regime (Lawal and Oluwatoyin, 2011; Ekundayo, 2015).

Another important milestone of the first decade of independence was the convocation of the National Curriculum Conference in 1969, which was organized after two military coups had taken place in Nigeria. These are discussed in the following section.

5.2 The First Era of Military Rule (1966 - 1979)

The first military era (1966- 1979) consisted of three military coups (and one mutiny) and four military heads of state (Odinkalu, 2001). The first military government in Nigeria came into effect after a successful but bloody military coup on 15 January 1966, where Prime Minister, Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Belewa, and some military and civilian leaders were assassinated (Odinkalu, 2001; Aremu and Buhari, 2017). The coup brought into power General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi, the then General Officer Commanding the Nigerian Army. This was followed by a counter-coup in July 1966 that overthrew General Aguiyi-Ironsi, killing and replacing him with Lieutenant-Colonel (later General) Yakubu Gowon (Odinkalu, 2001). The ensuing crises that followed the coups plunged the country into a 30-month civil war that began on 6 July 1967 and ended on 15 January 1970 (Nafziger, 1972; Garba, 2005; Aaronson, 2013; Aremu and Buhari, 2017). On 19 July 1975, a palace coup overthrew General Gowon and replaced him with Brigadier (later General) Murtala Ramat Mohammed as Nigeria's military leader. General Mohammed's regime was short. He was assassinated in an abortive coup on 13 February 1976 and was succeeded by General Olusegun Obasanjo (Utomi, 1985; Osoba, 1996).

5.2.1 Civil War- Inspired Shifts from Colonial Policy Direction

It may be argued that the initial impetus to shift from the colonial and early independence era's education policy emerged between 1966 and 1976 – a period that was marked by several coups and a bloody civil war. After two successful but bloody coups, a pogrom against the Igbo ethnic group in some northern parts of Nigeria and a civil war (between 1966 and 1970), the country felt the need to move towards national reconciliation, reconstruction and unification (Plotnicov, 1971; Bray and Cooper, 1979; Diamond, 2007). Bray and Cooper (1979) explain that Nigeria faced an overwhelming task of building a nation out of its cultural diversity and the need for this was heightened by the country's tragic civil war. Education played a leading role in the reconstruction and reconciliation mission and was seen as a hope for the country's national unification. This particular reason underpinned the prominence given to the Universal Primary Education (UPE) programme (Bray and Cooper, 1979). The consolidation of power, conflict,

reconstruction and nation-building demands of this era influenced the direction of the country's education policy (Bray and Cooper, 1979; Nwuzor, 1983).

Besides the first national development plan, the only known education policy-related initiative (which did not lead to actual policy and structural changes in education in the first decade of independence), was a National Curriculum Conference in 1969. The conference represents a major landmark that contributed to the decades-long shift away from the colonial era education system (Nwuzor, 1983). Many scholars have described the conference as a dramatic government initiative that marked the beginning of a new era in Nigerian education. It created space for the search for a national philosophy of education, national policy on education and a more responsive curriculum (Adaralegbe, 1972; Nwuzor, 1983; UNESCO, 1996; Ogunyemi, 2010; Akanbi and Abiolu, 2018). While the mainstream literature (e.g. Imam, 2012; Elechi, 2016; Daniel-Kalio, 2018) reports the conference as a national initiative (some give credit to the military government and the Nigerian Educational Research Council (NERC) for organising it), a UNESCO (1996) report indicates that UNESCO funded the conference.

In the second decade after independence, during Gowon's regime, immediately after the civil war, Nigeria formulated the Second National Development Plan (1970 – 1974). The plan focused on '3Rs' - Reconciliation, Reconstruction and Rehabilitation, and emphasized five national objectives: national unity, a free and democratic society, a strong and self-reliant nation, a dynamic economy and equal opportunity for all citizens (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1970; Sokari-George, 1987; Uche, 2019). Education was projected as an important factor for the realization of these national objectives (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1970; Nwuzor, 1983). According to Csapo (1983, p.91), "the federal government of Nigeria looked upon education as the instrument par excellence for realizing rapid national development, for achieving social change, and for forging together a nation split by civil war." It is important to reiterate that the socioeconomic woes and crises that (more than before) demanded an urgent reconstruction, reconciliation and interventions were originally triggered by the military interventions for which the same military wanted to use education as a repair tool (Udo, 1970; Onuoha, 2016).

While the National Policy on Education (NPE) was inspired by the National Curriculum Conference, its basic foundations were laid in the Second National Development Plan (1970-1974) that proposed equal opportunities for all Nigerians, freedom, national unity, justice and self-reliance (Nwuzor, 1983; UNESCO, 1996; Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2004). The plan consciously sought to correct regional imbalances in access to education (Woolman, 2011). UNESCO also funded a National Conference that focused on Educational Policy for Nigeria, which was held in February 1973 (UNESCO, 1996). The conference charted the way for a major structural change in Nigerian education policy with attention to the objectives articulated in the national development plan (Nwuzor, 1983; UNESCO, 1996).

It may be argued that the civil war and its resulting political changes exacerbated the existing elite power play in Nigeria. Regionalism and regional competitions were high in post-1960 Nigeria's federalism. Hence, the coups were also viewed from the regional perspective and contributed to what Olapopa (2021) described as "the corrosive political climate that was already

tending towards war"⁷. There were some clear signs of regional power play. First, while the war raged in the east against one of the three major ethnic groups in the competition for power control, which was considered to be more educationally advanced (like the southwest), the National Curriculum Conference was organized with support from UNESCO. Second, how the east that was enmeshed in the war could have participated equally in such an important and decisive conference remains a curious question that has not been fully answered. Viewed from the elite bargaining perspective, we may argue that other region's elites may have seen the conference as an opportunity to push forward their regional interests more than the east that was struggling under the impact of the war. Third, the National Development Plan, which articulated the government policy under 3Rs, appeared to have de jure presented a relatively balanced development approach, but it de facto (or its implementation) did not produce the needed reconstruction and reconciliation (the civil war echoes are very much active more than ever before in 2021). East, north and west elite cooperation was not fully achieved and this continues to escalate the divisive tendencies in policies and political establishments, as widely observed in the subsequent discussion. Fourth, the military governments used the creation of new states to break up the dominance of some ethnic elites and the tri-polar power struggle that existed among the three major ethnic groups and brought in other ethnic players like the south-south and middle-belt communities. During the war, some of the elites that began to control the new states contributed to providing support that was needed to win the war, especially from the south-south (see Nafziger, 1972; Corely, Fallon and Cox, 2014). According to Nafziger (1972, p.244):

“In the allocation of resources and development of policy for the post-war period, Nigerian leaders are very sensitive to charges from loyal elements, especially in the Rivers, South-Eastern, and the Mid-Western States, that a major focus on the needs of the East Central State can be interpreted as a reward for secession.”

The state creation was a useful tool used to canvas for support and also to weaken the support-base of the opposition forces. It also contributed to altering the educational structure and affecting its quality as further discussed in section 10.5.

5.2.2 Schools Takeover from Missions and Private Owners

The first practical nationwide education policy implemented by the military after it took over the government in 1966 and went through a thirty-month civil war (1966-1970) was a takeover of schools from Christian missions and private owners. This led to the centralisation of the education system, as control and management of schools were taken over by the government. Jella (Adamawa) stated that the government took over schools because it wanted to have control over the education system. Some respondents from both north and south [e.g. Lorna (Anambra) and Konde (Adamawa)] saw the takeover as a mistake. Lorna, for example, believed that “the takeover policy of schools by the government is a huge mistake because schools were doing better with better quality when it was in the hands of missions and private persons.” As earlier noted, the schools' takeover appears to have had some political bargaining element, which besides the consolidation of power and centralisation of educational administration, also worked towards winning popular support and appreciation. It appears to have attracted

⁷ See <https://thenationonlineng.net/elite-nationalism-and-the-salvation-of-nigeria/>


households' interests, as evidenced by parent respondents expressing support for the programmes. These responses are further discussed in the following subsections.

i. The Impact of the Takeover on Enrolment

During the interviews, Rothan (Adamawa), who was the Adamawa State NUT chairperson, mentioned that the government took over the missionary and private schools to make education accessible to all. This raises more questions than it purports to answer. Does the government need to take over schools before it can establish additional, free and accessible schools? Why must private schools be abolished before public schools can be made available as if they are mutually exclusive? Were there no lessons the government could have learnt from the private sector to improve its provision of schools and ensure an effective school management system? Rothan (Adamawa) notes that although private schools became a means of business, they had strict supervision and monitoring and proved to have better quality and standards than government schools, which were lacking in supervision and monitoring and neglected teachers welfare.

Both KII and survey respondents were divided about how the takeover was received but many believed that many parents felt the change favoured them and motivated them to send their children to school. According to Jasin (Adamawa) who was a retired teacher, “it took time before the parents and guardians accepted the change. Those who couldn't afford the fees of the missionary schools were happy with the development.” The survey data shows that a total of 55.4% of 901 parents and former students surveyed stated that the schools' takeover motivated parents to enrol more children in schools; 25.4% stated that it discouraged parents from enrolling more children in school, while 12% said parents did not care if the government took over or not (see Figure 3). These responses suggest that the schools' takeover made many parents enrol their children in schools.

Figure 3: Impact of the Private Schools' Takeover on School Enrolment (parents and former students – by state)



The respondents in the northern Nigerian states where access to education was generally limited at the time of the takeover were noted to have been more motivated by the takeover than their counterparts in the south. A total of 78.9% of parents in Adamawa and 72.2% of parents in Kano stated that parents were motivated to enrol their children in school. In the south, 36.1% in Anambra and 41.4% in Delta were motivated to enrol their children by the takeover, while Oyo recorded 52.5%. While the survey did not ask the reasons for the respondents' views, information from the literature suggests the possibility of a religious influence. While the southern regions largely accepted schools established by missionaries, Jayeola-Omoyeni and Omoyeni (2014, p.268) note that "the north rejected the Christian Missionary form of education when it was introduced to the area in 1845." Okoye and Pongou (2014, p.9) explained that "Not only did the colonial administration withdraw support for missionary activity in Northern Nigeria, they actively sought to slow down extant missionary activities" and this limited the number of schools and spread of Western education in the north. They explain how "a few missionary schools that were established in Northern Nigeria operated under the condition that religious education would not be permitted. When the Emirs protested against these schools, the administration had some of them closed." (Okoye and Pongou, 2014, p.10).

Some KII respondents also pointed out that besides the limited spread of education in northern Nigeria at the time of the takeover, there was a general suspicion of Western education promoted by Christian missionaries which some interview respondents (e.g. Konde (Adamawa, parent); Obi (Anambra, parent)) saw as a means of converting pupils to Christianity and inculcating Christian values in them. This suspicion was also reported in the literature (see Usman, 2006, 2008; Hoechner, 2011; Humphreys and Crawford, 2014). Accordingly, the Muslim-dominated northern states recorded a very high percentage of respondents who said the takeover of schools from missions and private owners encouraged parents to enrol their children in schools, while predominantly Christian locations recorded less than 50% of respondents who said parents were encouraged by the takeover to enrol their children in school. The southwest state (Oyo) was a little above the average in this category, possibly due to its mix of religious populations. The respondents' religious background was not investigated, and further investigation may be needed to understand if religion possibly played any role in this. So far, we can cautiously hypothesize that religion-induced interests might have played a role in how the takeover and the introduction of the UPE were perceived and accepted, and these link to key bargaining assumptions about interest (as discussed in the preceding subsection).

The general response to the schools' takeover was an increase in enrolment. The majority of 1716 former education sector staff surveyed noted that school enrolment increased as a result of schools' takeover from missions and private owners by the government. Only 12.1% mentioned that school enrolment decreased while 5.5% said the school enrolment remained the same despite the schools' takeover by the government.

ii. *Schools Takeover and Quality of Learning*

There is overwhelming consensus across the literature that the quality of education has eroded over time due to military activities while in power (see Pakata, 1977; Nwuzor, 1983; FME, 2005; Oyelere, 2006; Achinewhu-Nworgu, 2019). This was particularly noted in reference to the schools’ takeover. During the interviews, Tunde (Oyo), who was a school administrator in Oyo, observed that “before the takeover, the quality of education was high, but access was limited. The government took over schools in 1973.” According to Osho (Oyo), who was also a school administrator, “the standard of mission schools [schools inherited from missions] dropped as the government could not sustain the quality of education in these schools after takeover.”

On the surface, the survey data appears to disagree with the literature. However, careful observation of a trend in the data suggests a north-south divide. As Table 7 shows, a higher percentage of parents and former students within southern Nigeria (Anambra, Delta and Oyo) believed that education quality reduced as a result of the takeover while a higher percentage of respondents within the north (Adamawa and Kano) believed that the quality improved as a result of the schools' takeover.

Table 7: Impact of schools takeover on pupils learning and performances (parents and former students views by state)

Responses	Adamawa	Anambra	Delta	Kano	Oyo	Total
No response	1.4%	1.4%	1.8%	0.6%	0.9%	6.1%
I do not know	0.7%	0.4%	1.2%	0.7%	0.8%	3.8%
Pupils' learning and performances in school deteriorated	4.8%	10.4%	7.9%	0.8%	4.0%	27.9%
Pupils' learning and performances in school improved	11.4%	9.1%	5.3%	12.3%	7.4%	45.6%
Pupils' learning and performances in school remained the same	3.2%	4.1%	1.8%	2.7%	4.9%	16.6%

*Data for this table (and state-level data throughout this report) is disaggregated to show percentages of different categories of responses within states, while the last column shows the aggregate percentage for the five states.

A total of 60.5% of 1716 former education sector workers stated that pupils' learning and performance in schools improved while 27.2% said pupils' learning and performance in schools deteriorated. Former education workers’ views differed from those of the parents and former students. While 60.5% of former education workers believed that pupils' learning and performance in schools improved, less than half (45.6%) of all the 901 parents and former students stated so. A total of 27.9% of parents and former students believed that pupils' learning and performance in schools deteriorated as a result of schools’ takeover, while 16.6% believed they remained the same. This suggests a gap between the former education sector workers’ perspectives and those of the parents/former students. The view expressed by Ubi (Federal) during the interview provides some explanation:

“I belong to the school of thought that will tell you quality has not gone down but that it is the learning achievement of pupils that has gone down. Primary schools in

the 70s required children to learn about 6 or 7 subjects but, over time, there's been an improvement in the number of subjects. Children now learn a vocation, computer, French, music. Hence, the quality has improved but are children learning as much as they used to? My answer is NO."

Possibly, while former education workers' views may have focused on the overall learning activities and what pupils have to learn, parents may have focused on the actual learning achievement. Additional investigation may be needed to fully explain this difference. A slightly different view among the high percentage who said that education quality improved may be related to the respondents' perceptions about education quality at different times for reasons unrelated to school takeovers. Lizzy (Anambra), a retired principal said that "performances in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s were averagely okay but today, performance is better because of exposure to the internet, external competitions, excursions and other modern facilities."

From a different perspective, it may be argued that both parents/former students and former education sector workers were interested observers in this context: the parents' and former students' responses may have been based on their observations of their children (in the case of parents) and themselves (in the case of former students), while the former education sector workers may have observed general school characteristics and classroom performance. Again, considering that former education workers benefited from the takeover in terms of an increased salary, we may consider their views to be less independent than those of parents and former students -it is not clear whether this influenced their responses. However, there were former education workers, even in northern Nigeria, who felt the takeover negatively impacted the quality of education. For example, Ismaila (Adamawa), who was a school administrator, stated that the "government takeover of missionaries and private schools was the beginning of the problem education is facing".


iii. The impact of the takeover on teachers' recruitment, promotion and remuneration

Information is scarce in the literature on teacher management during the initial schools' takeover from the missionaries and private owners. This gap inspired the inclusion of teacher questions in the survey tool. The respondents' views on the impact of the takeover on teachers' recruitment and promotion standards and norms suggest that it was positive: a total of 66.7% of the former education sector workers stated that teacher recruitment and promotion standards and norms improved while 17.1% stated they decreased (12.4% said that they remained the same).

As summarised in Figure 4, within states, it is observed that a higher percentage of former education sector workers from the south than those from the northern states mentioned that teachers' recruitment and promotion standards and norms deteriorated as a result of the schools' takeover by the government. Responses from this category show that 23.2% of all respondents in Anambra, 29.8% of all respondents from Delta and 17% of all respondents from Oyo stated that teachers' recruitment and promotion standards and norms deteriorated as a result of the schools' takeover. Only 4.9% of all respondents from Kano and 12.3% of all respondents from Adamawa who were former education sector workers stated that teachers'

recruitment and promotion standards and norms deteriorated. This further highlights the regional dimensions of the responses.

Figure 4: Impact of the takeover on teachers' recruitment and promotion standards and norms (former education sector workers)



The effect of the takeover on teachers' salaries and overall remuneration was also perceived as positive by the survey respondents (only former education sector workers were given questions on this). A total of 66.2% of teachers said that teachers' salaries and overall remuneration improved as a result of the schools' takeover, while 17.1% said they remained the same. Only 12.5% said they deteriorated. 22.7% of all former education sector workers in Delta felt teachers' salaries and overall remuneration deteriorated; 17.3% and 10.9% respondents from this category in Anambra and Oyo, respectively, also said teachers' salaries and overall remuneration deteriorated. In the north, 6.8% of Adamawa respondents and 6% of Kano respondents who belong to this category felt that teachers' salaries and overall remuneration deteriorated.

iv. Responses to the schools' takeover

The government takeover of schools received mixed reactions, mixed interpretations and also had mixed results. It created a uniform curriculum and programme, but the quality and effectiveness suffered. These mixed reactions to the school takeover were partially fueled by the divisive nature of missionary school's curriculum as observed by respondents:

"There was one of the mistakes the Gowon regime made, they were competitors with the government schools that acted as motivation to get the government schools doing well, but they were more about converting pupils to Christians and there were more devotions in their curriculum. The government take-over was to unify the educational system." – Konde (Adamawa, parent).

"The missions were doing greatly well then in morality and supervision of teachers but then, they were moulding children according to their religious beliefs, causing divisiveness. So the government felt it doesn't augur well for the citizenry. They now

took over schools and students began to attend any schools irrespective of their religious Background and affiliations.” – Obi (Anambra, parent)

“Schools were taken over by the government to create unity and oneness in the education sector. Religious bickering, segregation and acrimony were breeding problems in the Education sector. But then morality was lost after the government takeover of schools.” – Muna (Anambra former Ministry of Education staff).

Ugowe (Delta) stated that “the government wanted to have uniformity in the academic syllabus because the missions had different academic syllabi.” In the literature, supporters of the takeover contend that it was necessary to create uniform management, structure and curriculum and to promote national unity and equal access to education (Csapo, 1983; Domike and Odey, 2014). However, Egbe (Delta) explained that the takeover of schools brought about a decline in discipline in schools. Jajuro (Adamawa), a retired Local Government Education Secretary and head of an Islamic School concluded that the government taking over the missionary schools and private schools was the beginning of the problem education is facing. Chay (Anambra) observed that the takeover also negatively affected public schools because of instructional irregularities emanating from the policy changes.

Meanwhile, survey data suggests that the military bargain to take over schools may have paid off with massive support from stakeholders. Our survey examined responses of various categories of stakeholders to the government takeover. Some of the key observations are summarised below.

a. Teachers’ response

An analysis of responses from former education sector workers (teachers, head-teachers, principals, school administrators and ministries of education staff) shows that out of 1716 former education sector workers surveyed, 63.9% of them said that teachers were happy with the schools’ takeover while 17.7% said teachers were not happy and did not support the schools’ takeover. Information from the qualitative interviews suggests that the takeover did not affect teachers negatively. Firstly, it increased their salaries. Second, their jobs were not affected by the takeover. According to Sade (Federal) who worked at the University of Maiduguri:


“The secondary school that I went to was also taken. 1973/74 was the year they took over the schools that were run by the various missionaries, my school was a missionary school, it was taken over that year. So, my principal was that of the missionary; he continued with the government.”

A higher percentage of former education sector workers surveyed from the north said teachers were happy and supported the schools' takeover than from other regions. A total of 79.7% and 67.8% of all respondents in Kano and Adamawa, respectively, said teachers were happy and supported the schools' takeover from private owners. Proportions in the southern states were also high but lower than the northern states’ responses. Delta (48.1%) followed by Anambra (52.4%) had the lowest percentage of former education sector workers who said teachers were

happy and supported the schools' takeover from the private owners. These were the states that were most affected by the post-war policies of the government, including the initial takeover of schools. Similarly, Kano (10.8%) and Adamawa (14.2%) in northern Nigeria had the lowest percentage of former education workers who said teachers were not happy about the takeover of schools (See Figure 5). This implies that a higher percentage of former education sector workers from the north than those of the south said teachers were happy when the government took over schools from private owners. Teachers' experiences under missionary schools' managers may have possibly contributed to influencing even southern teachers to like the takeover. Chay (Anambra), who worked with the Anambra State Ministry of Education, mentioned that teachers worked their fingers to numbness because the missions were very strict on teachers but paid them little. Egbe (Delta), a parent who was also a teacher educator, noted that:

“When the government took over schools in the 70s, there were mixed reactions. The general public did not receive it with joy. The teachers accepted it because they felt the missions were very tight-handed. The general public felt that some things will be missing in terms of discipline.”

Figure 5: Teachers' response to schools' takeover by the government (former education sector workers - by state)



b. Parents' Response

As Table 8 shows, the perspective of people who were parents and former students between 1973 and 2003 on how parents felt about the schools' takeover followed a similar pattern. However, a careful examination of the data reveals that the total percentage of parents and former students who said parents were happy was noticeably lower than the percentage of education workers who said teachers were happy. Only about half (50.3%) of parents and students said parents were happy (up to 63.9% of former education sector workers said teachers were happy) while 23.9% said parents were not happy (17.7% of former education sector workers said this about teachers).

Table 8: Parents'- response to schools' takeover by the government (parents and students – by state)

Response to Schools' Takeover	Adamawa	Anambra	Delta	Kano	Oyo	Total
Parents did not care if the government took over or not	0.5%	3.5%	5.6%	1.3%	7.4%	3.6%
Parents were happy and supported the takeover	78.4%	31.7%	36.4%	61.4%	46.3%	50.3%
Parents were not happy and did not support the takeover	5.7%	44.3%	29.0%	8.5%	25.9%	23.9%
There were mixed feelings of being happy and not being happy about the takeover	7.7%	13.5%	16.7%	23.5%	16.0%	15.0%

As Table 8 summarises, Adamawa (78.4%) and Kano (61.4%) had the highest percentage of parents and former students who said parents were happy and supported the takeover of schools from private owners and missions. All the Southern states (46.3% in Oyo, 36.4% in Delta and 31.7% in Anambra) had less than fifty percent of parents and former students who said parents were happy and supported the schools' takeover from missions and private owners. On the other hand, southern states (44.3% in Anambra, 29% in Delta and 25.9% in Oyo) had the highest percentage of parents and former students who said parents were not happy and did not support the takeover, while Kano (8.5%) and Adamawa (5.7%) had the lowest percentage of those who said parents were not happy and did not support the takeover.

Scholars have identified interests as a key issue in bargaining, and some have gone ahead to develop an interest-based bargaining perspective that focuses on mutually beneficial solutions for both management and labour or to any parties involved in the bargaining (Martin, 1997; Boniface and Rashmi, 2012, 2013; Eaton et al., 2004; Leavy, 2015). For the teachers (representing labour), the school takeover, which improved salaries following Ugorji reform, may have been in their interest. Also, the northern Nigerian parents, who shared an ethno-religious background with the dominant military groups in power, might have felt some association. This could explain the high percentage of former education sector workers who noted teachers' and parents' acceptance of the school takeover in the north, while southern Nigerian parents may not have seen a mutual position in it, hence their limited support of the takeover policy.

c. Missions' Response to the Takeover

Both KII and survey respondents believed the missionaries did not like the takeover of schools from them but they could not do much about it. The survey asked questions about the responses of missions and private schools owners to the schools takeover by the government. A greater percentage (44.7%) of parents and former students stated that missions and private schools owners did not like the takeover, but there was nothing they could do about it (see Table 8). According to Ubo (Delta), a retired school administrative staff, the school owners and other stakeholders at the grassroots such as parents and communities were all voiceless. He mentioned that "when the government decides what to do, people just followed, in Ika language, they say

Opi Obi gbu, nke inhi ale agba nkiti (when the trumpet of the king blows, others will keep quiet and follow the trumpet of the king).” Onu (Anambra), who was a retired NUT Chairman and head of primary school, said the takeover policy forced missions and private owners to comply or face shutdown of their businesses. A similar view was held by Ike (Anambra), a retired school manager, who noted that missions and private school owners had no choice but to comply with government policies. According to Irene (Delta), the military governs by decree. If the military says this is what we are giving to schools, you just take without asking questions, so when the government took over schools from missionaries, some of the missions were not happy but they could not do anything about it except to grudgingly complain because they could not fight the government. Those who could have resisted were intimidated by the military forces.

Greater percentages of respondents within southern states said missions and private schools owners did not like the takeover, but there was nothing they could do: 51.3%, 55.6% and 38.8% of parents and former students from Anambra, Delta and Oyo, respectively, said this. In the north, 36.6% in Adamawa and 29.4% in Kano said that missions and private schools owners did not like the takeover, but there was nothing they could do. On the contrary, 27.3% said they were happy about the takeover, while 11.1% said they fought against the takeover. A greater percentage of those who said they were happy about the takeover were respondents from northern states: 39.2% of all parents and former students from Adamawa and 49% from Kano stated this. In the south, only 15.2%, 13.6% and 23.5% from Anambra, Delta and Oyo, respectively, said they were happy (see Table 9).

Table 9: Missions and Schools’ Owners Response to the Takeover (parents and former students – by state)

Responses to Schools’ Takeover Policy	Adamawa	Anambra	Delta	Kano	Oyo	Total
They did not like it, but there was nothing they could do	36.6%	51.3%	55.6%	29.4%	48.8%	44.7%
They fought against the takeover	5.2%	23.5%	10.5%	4.6%	7.4%	11.1%
They were happy about the takeover	39.2%	15.2%	13.6%	49.0%	23.5%	27.3%
They were not bothered whether the government took over schools or not	9.3%	2.6%	4.3%	11.1%	12.3 %	7.5%

The divided responses may be expected, particularly the difference in opinions of the southern and northern respondents. This is because the takeover began in the east (possibly the reason Anambra and Delta had higher responses to “they did not like it” and lowest for “they were happy about it”). Those in the east and neighbouring Delta (which also suffered heavy war casualties and devastation) may have been conversant with the diverse kinds of complaints, cries and discomfort felt by the schools owners and churches, which many of them attended. According to Adigwe in Onwuegbuchulam (2017, p.161):

“All schools belonging to Christian churches in the East Central State were by radio announcement taken over by the government. The cry of the churches in the affected areas was rewarded by the government with a decree consolidating the radio announcement and depriving the churches of all rights to establish any institution that

would look like a school. It was only by negotiations that seminaries for the training of priests were reluctantly allowed to exist. The Christian churches in all other states of the federation did not seem to have perceived what was happening or regarded it as a peculiar arrangement designed for East Central State alone. It did not take long, however, before the plague of the takeover of schools spread to other states of the nation."

The claim that Christian churches did not fully appreciate what happened in other states may have possibly been the case in Oyo and Adamawa where some sizable populations of Christians exist. Kano, which is almost entirely dominated by Muslims (besides non-indigenes), may also not have noticed the prevailing feeling among missions and schools owners. Hence, nearly half of all Kano respondents (parents and former students) said missions were happy. How would they have been happy when the government subsequently ordered the demarcation of schools' premises from churches, and the churches that owned the properties were barred from participating in the demarcation and wall building? Instead, the Catholic priests and nuns, for example, were labelled squatters for occupying houses built by churches on such premises (Omenka, 2007; Onwuegbuchulam, 2017).

A different view was presented by Tosti (Delta), a retired principal, who believed that the missions did not feel bad when the government took over their schools because they were compensated. Daj (Delta) said some missions may have been happy because they felt that the burden of managing schools was too much for them.

Some KII respondents mentioned that there were some protests and efforts to recover their schools by the missionaries. Daj (Delta), a retired teacher and NUT staff, said the missionaries did not react against the takeover initially. However, they later mounted pressure on the government to give back their schools because the government was no longer teaching moral values. In Oyo, Tunde, noted that there were agitations as responses to the school takeover by the missionaries, so the government compensated them. On the other hand, as Nike (Oyo) observed, some of the school owners who had their school acquired by the government responded to this by demarcating their land to establish another school and releasing one of the schools to the government while they managed the other school:

"You see, Christians cut their schools into two. They have larger compounds so where the school was, they made a fence so that this one is for government, we are the owner of this other one. If you go to Oyo, Oliveth, then C.A.C Grammar School, if you go to Onireke, you will see it." – Nike (Oyo)

Many respondents (e.g. Egbe, Okoro, Onu and Daj) mentioned that there was no strong opposition to the government policies from the school owners and parents, who had no option and were concerned over possible implications of resisting government policies. Okoro (Delta) used an example of what happened during his time in school to highlight how it was difficult to challenge the military decisions: "in 1983 military personnel were posted to the school where I

was, as security. During the Idiagbon regime, you could not try laxity, there was a kind of fear that made everyone do what was expected of him or her" (Okoro).

Irene (Delta) said that in the 1970s, the government just wanted to remove religion from education, and they were not happy that the schools had become an avenue where Christian and moral values were being imparted to the students. Though the government took over, they did not have any properly structured plan for education. The missionaries were very dedicated to the schools but when the government took over there was no commitment on the part of the government and this affected the schools negatively. The later return of the schools back to the missions is an indication that the Government failed in the administration of the schools (Irene, a retired teacher).

In a study by Igwe (1977), critics of the takeover policy such as Catholic leaders held the view that the Military Government began the takeover of schools in the east because it believed that the region's advancement in education enabled it to face the rest of the country in the civil war. Thus, "the state take-over of schools was therefore designed to slow down the rate of educational development in the east to enable the other sections of the country to catch up" (Igwe, 1977, p.594). While this may need further evidence to substantiate, Ahanotu (1983, p.336) reports that:

"As the southern states took over schools from the voluntary agencies, Islamic social and political institutions in the northern states also came under increasing pressure. For example, there were suggestions to integrate the Quranic schools into the formal secular educational system and possibly to administer them as nursery schools...the introduction of universal compulsory primary education by the military governments of the northern states deprived the mallams (teachers) of the Quranic schools of some of their pupils and, as a result, some of their income."

Besides, Igwe (1977) observed that the fact that the government's take-over policy was also implemented in other regions, mostly in the southern states, tends to weaken the argument of the religious leaders that this was a government strategy to slow down the educational development of the people of the southeast. By 1973, eight out of the then twelve states of the Federation had also implemented the school's take-over policy (Igwe, 1977). Another argument noted by Igwe (1977) was that some religious organisations, such as the Catholic church, which operated schools before the war, also played important roles through their international networks to provide relief materials to the starving Biafrans during the war. Such support could as well have inspired take-over of their schools after the war.

Whatever the reason for the school takeover, there is an agreement in the literature that government policies prohibited the operation of schools by private agencies (Igwe (1977; Ahanotu, 1983; Fabunmi, 2005; Maigida, 2018; Adefeso-Olateju, 2013). Igwe (1977, p.18) explained that "The Missions and other private agencies were banned by law from opening or running schools and the provisions of the Edicts were not to be challenged in any law court in the land." The return to democracy in 1979 opened another opportunity and market for private

schools. The market for the growth of private schools from the 1980s onwards grew further as the public school system continued to fail.

5.2.3 The Universal Primary Education (UPE)

In terms of education policy, the first military era is mostly remembered for the launching of the UPE scheme, which was the second major nationwide education project the military implemented. Before the coup by General Murtala Mohammed that sacked Gowon's regime, Gowon had initiated a move to launch the UPE scheme. When General Obasanjo replaced Mohammed, who was assassinated in a failed coup, he formally announced the UPE in September 1976. According to Csapo (1983), "the political expectations were that universal free primary education would enable the nation to overcome the hurdles caused by unbalanced educational and economic development which resulted in southern dominance." It was also expected to redress the "educational imbalances of urban opportunities over the rural, and the preponderance of male over female enrollment in schools" (Csapo, 1983, p.91). The stated aims of the scheme included wiping out illiteracy, creating a uniform system of education across the country, establishing a broader base for increased secondary schools' enrolment, increasing the available manpower needed for the country's development and increasing primary schools' student intake in Nigeria (Domike and Odey, 2014). The military regime also launched the National Policy on Education (NPE) in 1977, which spells out the terms, philosophy and objectives for the government's investment in education (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2004). Based on the survey responses, the impacts and responses of the UPE are discussed in the following subsection.

i. Impact of the UPE on School Enrolment

From the survey data, there is no doubt about the positive impact of UPE on school enrolment. Across states, most parents and former students said parents were happy about the introduction of UPE and that it enrolled more children in schools. Most of the former education sector workers surveyed stated that the introduction of UPE led to an increase in the number of pupils in primary and secondary classrooms. A total of 86.2% said this, while only 5.3% said enrolment decreased as a result of UPE introduction, and 4.8% said that enrolment did not change as a result of UPE introduction. As summarised in Table 10, a total of 71.6% (87.9% in Adamawa, 64.8% in Anambra, 59.3% in Delta, 78.4% in Kano and 67.9% in Oyo) of respondents said this. The state breakdown also shows that northern states had a greater proportion of respondents who were happy and enrolled their children in school when UPE was introduced. It appears that possible differential experiences may have contributed to this north-south dichotomy in response. For example, Ilo (Anambra, parents) explained that when the government could no longer continue to finance UPE, "they stopped giving out textbooks and other materials they were giving to our children at the inception of UPE. So we started buying books, uniforms and paying fees again. They said this was due to a lack of finance. But UPE continued in the north unlike in the east." It is not clear either from other interviews or from the literature if this was true. Another possible reason, which was observed in the survey data, is that more respondents from southern states mentioned that most children were already in school. Hence, UPE likely did not make as much difference to these parents. This is understandable considering that UPE was introduced in the

southeast and southwest in the 1950s, and missions freely advanced their Western education campaign in the south before 1970.

Table 10: Influence of UPE introduction on schools' enrolment by states (Parents and former students)

	Adamawa	Anambra	Delta	Kano	Oyo	Total
Most children were already in school, hence, UPE did not make any difference to the parents	4.10%	23.90%	13.00%	4.60%	11.10%	12.10%
Parents did not trust the government and did not enrol more children in school	1.5%	0.4%	4.3%	2.6%	8.6%	3.2%
Parents were happy and enrolled more children in schools	87.6%	64.8%	59.3%	78.4%	67.9%	71.6%
Parents withdrew their children from school	0.5%	0.9%	3.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.9%

It may be concluded that Gowon's Federal Military Government initiated some educational development policies that positively impacted schools' enrolment which many segments of the country's population enjoyed. These initiatives continued into the military regime of Obasanjo. These policies (and other related policies of the regime) may have contributed to the relative support and peace enjoyed by the government. According to Odoziobodo, Alu and Ozigbo (2010, p.4-5):

“Obasanjo’s military regime also made tremendous strides in education with the introduction of Universal Primary Education with the vision of providing basic education to Nigerian children especially in primary school, irrespective of social status, tribe, religion or class standing... Obasanjo's tenure as Nigeria's military Head of State could be said to be peaceful and that era has been known as the military era with the best record of respect of human rights in Nigeria's 29 years of military rule.”


The National Policy on Education and the Universal Primary Education were active government policies General Olusegun Obasanjo's regime handed over power to the elected civilian government of Alhaji Shehu Shagari in 1979.

ii. The Impact of UPE on Quality of Education

The study respondents (KII and survey) did not rate UPE's contribution to pupils' learning and performance improvement highly as compared to how they rated its contribution to enrolment improvement. A total of 50.5% of all former education workers mentioned that pupils' learning and performances in school improved, indicating that about half of them believed that UPE contributed to learning improvement while 5.8% said it deteriorated. Anambra (35.1%) and Delta (43.6%) recorded the lowest percentage of respondents who felt pupils' learning and performances in primary and secondary schools improved as a result of UPE (see Figure 6). Among parents and former students, only 23.7% believed that UPE contributed to improving pupils' learning and performance. Within states, Adamawa (30.1%) and Kano (24.9%) recorded

the highest proportion of those that stated that UPE contributed to improving learning and performance of pupils. Delta (15%) followed by Oyo (21.3%) recorded the lowest.

Figure 6: Impact of UPE on Pupils Learning and Performance in Primary and Secondary Schools



In the literature and among KII respondents, the major challenge that UPE experienced on quality issues appeared to have been created by the explosion in schools' enrolment. The explosion in schools' enrolment was poorly planned for and when it happened, the government could not manage it. According to Ekeke (Federal):

"We had a population explosion in Nigeria which was not matched with an increase in finances to meet the needs. Over the years, when you go back to a primary school you saw in 1970 and you go there in 1985, 15 years after with no improvement, increased number of students, no new classrooms. Before we had like 35 students in the classroom and later 50 students in the same sized classroom with the same teacher teaching them. The quality of learning would be different."

Various scholars note that poor planning, inaccurate statistics and poor funding resulting from dwindling oil revenue contributed to weakening the capacity of the UPE to promote education quality (Csapo, 1983; FME, 2003; Olaniyan and Obadara, 2008; Obanya and Binns, 2009; Gersberg et al., 2016). Csapo (1983) observes that there was a tidal upsurge of rapidly swelling pupil enrollment. Using Niger state as an example, Csapo (1983, p.91) reports that "in April 1976, 244 primary schools offered instruction to 15,796 pupils. Four months later, the state needed 931 primary schools for an additional 63,384 pupils: a growth rate of almost 400 percent." The increase also necessitated an increase in the number of primary schools. By 1978, Niger state had a record of 1,091 primary schools that offered instruction to 179,861 children. Similar experiences were recorded in many other states. For example, in the first year of UPE, between the 1975/76 and 1976/77 academic years, the percentage increase in

pupils' enrolment stood at 557% in Niger, 491% in Kano, 442% in Kaduna, and 263% in Benue. The lowest increase was 11%, which was recorded in Gongola State (which was parted to create Adamawa and Taraba states). The number of primary schools also increased in these states. Between the 1975/76 and 1976/77 academic years, the percentage increase stood at 301.3% in Niger, 227.1% in Kano, 196.4% in Kaduna and 142.9% in Benue. Imo state (in the southeast) recorded the lowest increase in the number of schools with a 1.5% increase (Csapo, 1983).

The lowest percentage of additional schools being recorded in Imo State somewhat confirms Nike's (Oyo, school administrator) claims during the interview that the Federal Government's school-building effort was concentrated in northern Nigeria. It also highlights the differential experiences that might have possibly contributed to the differential responses between the northern and southern respondents, especially since Anambra and Delta data largely showed the opposite of the northern (Adamawa and Kano) responses to many of the survey questions. It may be argued that the southeast states may have had more schools initially, having experienced campaigns for school expansions and enrolment since the 1950s. It may as well be argued that they ought to have needed more infrastructure considering the devastating impact of the war on the region and its public facilities. These regional differences point to the politics of regions in which the military used their positions to advance their regional interests. In return, they received more support from the northern and western regions than from other regions

iii. The Impact of the UPE on Teachers' Remuneration and Recruitment


The introduction of UPE appears to have made a major difference in teachers' recruitment and promotion standards and norms in terms of the increased demand for teachers. Batuk (Adamawa) noted that teachers were recruited directly from the teacher training college and were given an appointment immediately after their final examinations. The former education sector staff surveyed largely agreed that the introduction of UPE contributed to improving teachers' recruitment and promotion standards and norms, with a total of 75.3% noting that the introduction of UPE had a positive impact while 13.1% said there was no change. Only 6.8% said that the introduction of UPE led to the deterioration of teachers' recruitment and promotion standards and norms.

The survey data appears to somewhat contradict the information in the mainstream literature about the impact of UPE on teacher recruitment standards and its ultimate contribution to quality education. On the other hand, focusing on the demand for teachers it created may mislead any observer to conclude that UPE made a positive impact on teacher recruitment and promotion norms. Scholars observed that UPE manpower estimates and budget were inadequate, and there were insufficient teaching staff and facilities, causing the programme to make some inappropriate adjustments such as recruitment of unqualified teachers and provision of inadequate teacher training to fill manpower gaps (Obanya, 1982; Csapo, 1983; Obanya and

Binns, 2009). According to Obanya and Binns (2009), the UPE programme recruited students of secondary school who lacked requisite teacher qualifications and were offered very limited training that was inadequate for the UPE teacher job. Similar observations were made by Obanya (1982) and Csapo (1983).

A total of 65.2% of all former education workers surveyed said UPE contributed to improving teachers' salaries and overall remuneration while 22.4% said that they remained the same. As summarised in Figure 7, a relatively higher proportion of northern respondents believed that the salary and overall remuneration of teachers improved with UPE introduction (71.8% in Adamawa, 55.4% in Anambra, 40.7% in Delta, 88.1% in Kano and 67.7% in Oyo), whereas a greater proportion of southern respondents said it deteriorated (3.1% in Adamawa, 8.1% in Anambra, 13.1% in Delta, 6.8% in Kano and 7% in Oyo).

Figure 7: Impact of UPE on Teachers' salaries and overall remuneration



iv. Military's Quest for Political Legitimacy with UPE as a Bargaining Tool

Following how UPE was planned and implemented and its differential impact, we may conclude that it was a tool the military used to bargain with the Nigerian public and gatekeepers. Political interruptions created a need for coup leaders to search for political legitimacy, which introduced a tendency to pursue policy initiatives that garnered support for the military. As Agbese and Kieh (1992) observe, the interventions and the military regimes' activities reduced popular support, which inspired the population to demand its exit from power. Hence, there was a need to look for a way to bargain and win public trust by introducing public appeasement and settlement policies. This is where education played an important role. It appears that education policies that benefited the majority of Nigerian households (such as one that removed fees parents and households paid) were considered useful. The military, therefore, gave more attention to the expansion of the UPE project "due to political pressures than from a concern about the provision of greater access to quality education" (Moja, 2000, p.4). Asagwara (1995) argued that the military governments in Nigeria between 1966 and 1976 were searching for political legitimacy

and implemented educational reform programmes to win national recognition and acceptance from all sections of the society. Hence, populist programmes like UPE appealed to them. This contributed to informing their policy decisions, some of which they announced to score political points before returning to seek expert advice and views and engage in actual planning for the policy they already promulgated (see Obanya, 2012). The way UPE was initially announced suggests it followed this pattern. According to Ogbaji (2013, p.7) "on a visit to Sokoto, the then Head of State had promised to start the Universal Primary Education scheme in the nation in 1976" and despite both "changes of government and the advice of experts, the Murtala/Obasanjo regime went ahead and launched the programme on September 6, 1976." Ogbaji also observed that "the announcement of the scheme in Sokoto was unplanned, unprecedented and targeted at securing political legitimacy" (Ogbaji, 2013, p.7). It is important to note here that Sokoto is the seat of the Islamic Caliphate in Nigeria, which is at the helm of northern Nigerian Islamic affairs. Winning the Caliphate's support could go a long way to winning the support of the northern population, which also had large numbers in the military.

5.3 The Second Republic (1979–1983)

General Olusegun Obasanjo's military regime transferred political power to Alhaji Shehu Usman Aliyu Shagari on 1st October 1979. This marked the beginning of the Nigerian Second Republic and the country's first experiment with an American-style presidential system of government. It was a clear departure from the parliamentary system the country had acquired from its colonial masters. Oko (1998, p.341) observes that Shagari's regime "witnessed a replay of events and problems that led to the collapse of the first republic. Lack of democratic traditions, corruption, and abuse of power thwarted the nation's ill-prepared experimentation with the presidential system of government." Ihonvbere (1987, p.268) summarized the regime as one that "inherited an economy and society that was badly distorted, disarticulated and crisis-ridden. The state, despite the 'benefits' of the civil war, was as unstable, pre-hegemonic and weak as ever." Ihonvbere (1987) also observed the dominant class was corrupt, dependent and unproductive. Information from the interviews corroborated this. Osho (Oyo), a former school administrator, said that military regimes were autocratic and did not negotiate the implementation of educational initiatives, but politicians politicized education provision, which was characterized by wastefulness, favouritism and promising free education without having the capability and resources to provide it.

Information from the literature also suggests that the military did not totally leave power to enable Shagari to maintain control of government machinery. This was also complicated by various parties' wrangling. Matthews (1984, p.1) reports that the Shagari regime was a clear reminder that "there are, in fact, only two parties in Nigeria that really count – the civilians and the military." Matthews recalls an observation in *The London Times* that the New Year's Eve coup that sacked the government "could be seen as simply a transfer of power in accordance with overwhelming popular desire: the opposition has taken over again."

The 1979 constitution, on which the democratic dispensation operated, was the main legal basis for the government's provision of education. Section 18, Sub-Sections 1-3 of chapter II of the constitution provided the objectives of education as follows: (i) The government policy shall

direct towards ensuring equal and adequate educational opportunities at all levels. (ii) The government shall promote science and technology, (iii) The government shall strive as and when practicable, to provide (a) Free, compulsory and universal primary education (b) Free secondary education, and (c) Free adult literacy programmes.

Education was listed in the concurrent list of the constitution, which implies that the three tiers of government (federal, state and local governments) shared the authority and responsibilities of providing education. While some specific issues for post-primary education were provided in Chapter 11 of the constitution as the prerogative of the federal government, primary and secondary education, which are the focus of this study, were shared responsibilities of the three tiers of government. The states had powers to establish and manage schools within their territories without interference from the federal government (Fabunmi, 2005). For example, in Bendel and Ogun primary school organizations and administration were transferred to the Local Government (Fabunmi, 2005).

Educational facilities grew rapidly at the post-primary levels in many states (Nwagwu, 1981; Longe, 1982; Csapo, 1983). According to Longe (1982), by October 1980, five out of the nineteen states in Nigeria (Bendel, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo and Oyo states) had embarked on a free secondary education programme. Longe also notes that there was a plan to extend this nationwide in 1982 to accommodate UPE graduates. However, this faced major constraints, including a shortage of trained teachers, unequally distributed secondary school facilities, and a shortage of funds (Longe, 1982). While the government was experiencing rapid growth in school enrolment and its associated demand for increased expenditure (for hiring more teachers and building more schools), it was also experiencing a revenue decline (Longe, 1982; Moja, 2000; FME, 2005). Also, an earlier upward review of salaries based on the Udoji Report at the time of the oil boom posited another challenge as the government needed to pay an increasing number of teachers with higher salaries at the time it was experiencing an economic decline (Nwagwu, 1981; Longe, 1982). In an interview, Misa (Adamawa), a retired Director at the Ministry of Education, said: during Shehu Shagari's regime, teachers were neglected, their salaries were not paid when due. Tony (Federal) said "I was a teacher in the primary school during Shagari's era and was owed 10 months' salary. The opportunity came so I decided to further my education. Other teachers changed their careers... people could not sustain themselves." In the early 1970s, teachers were being paid at their duty post by a team of paymasters from the local education authority.

Corruption also contributed to weakening the education sector. Salamatu (Kano), who worked with a local education authority, mentioned during an interview that the "education system during the military regime was much better than in the democratic period because... everything was set in order, unlike the so-called democracy where their families and friends were their priorities." A similar view was held by Abioye (federal):

"Shagari's regime was one of the worst regimes with regard to education. That was the longest time teachers went on strike. We were on strike for 8 months without a salary. His regime, in the history of education in Nigeria, was one of the worst that we experienced. In the latter part of his regime, I was already a teacher in secondary school, in 1984, and Buhari came in and tried to ameliorate the situation. In my area, there

wasn't anything good Shagari was able to put in place in terms of education though some people probably might have enjoyed it in their area. In 1975, shortly after the war, education was supposed to be on its footing but, just 9 years later, education went down the drain again because of wrong policies and poor funding to drive the policy put in place.”

The democratic experiment could not successfully transition to a new administration. The controversial general elections in 1983, which were considered to be fraught with rigging, electoral malpractice and thuggery, exposed smouldering ethnic tensions and corruption, which were part of the reasons offered for the military takeover. President Shehu Shagari's government was cut short by another military intervention on 31 December 1983. The coup brought Major General Buhari to power (Oko, 1998; Odinkalu, 2001).

Before we conclude this section, it is important to note that the democratic era had a constitution that allowed separation of power (among the legislative, executive and judicial institutions) and power-sharing between the central government and the constituent units (states and local governments). This reduced the level of centralization and concentration of power exercised by the central government under Shagari. The democratic dispensation also brought together political parties that had different philosophies and interests, which made it difficult for the central government to completely enjoy the level of loyalty the preceding military regimes had (Ihonvbere, 1987; Onikalu, 2001). Ihonvbere (1987, p.268) captured the experience of the regime this way: “at the level of politics, the Shagari administration had to operate within an environment of extremely bitter competitive politicking amongst five (later six) different political parties” and unlike the military regimes, “the civilian administration had to contend with powerful civil servants and severe constitutional limitations on the powers of the Executive President.” The outgoing military government of General Obasanjo foisted on the country an American-style constitution that differed from the Westminster system the country was groomed into by the colonial administrations. Also, while the revenues accruing to the civilian government in this era was higher than those of the first republic, it was smaller than the preceding regime that handed over massive UPE tryout. UPE was launched during the oil boom. Shagari's administration that inherited the UPE experienced the oil boom decline and was also exposed to the demands of electoral politics and distributive state patronage (Ihonvbere, 1987; Forrest, 1986; Ogbaji, 2013).

5.4 The Second Era of Military Rule (1983–1993)

The Second Republic that was inaugurated in 1979 lasted only about four years before it was ended by yet another military coup on 31 December 1983. General Muhammadu Buhari became the military Head of State and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Nigeria on January 1, 1984. One of the first things the regime did, as in most military coups, was to suspend the 1979 constitution and take over both executive and legislative functions (Oko, 1998; Odinkalu, 2001). This new military era (from Buhari to Babangida) unleashed another litany of decrees regulating education, including changing the existing school calendar that ran from January to December in 1988 and 1999. Many interview respondents vividly recalled this as a major change of the time. Egbe (Delta), who was a parent and teacher educator, observed the confusion that arose from

the change of academic calendar that made it end in June rather than December. Egbe explained that those in school then had to do just four-and-a-half years of study instead of the usual five years. The coup that brought General Muhammadu Buhari into power was the beginning of another chain of military coups and a long period of military rule.

The Buhari government was overthrown through a bloodless coup on 27 August 1985, and a new military regime led by Major-General Ibrahim Babangida began. Babangida's regime lasted from August 1985 to August 1993. It implemented a Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) and betrayed its promise to hand over power to a civilian government. In 1993, the regime annulled the result of a completed election that should have brought in a civilian government (Lewis, 1994; Ijeomah, 2000; Odinkalu, 2001). This aborted effort to return to civil rule is referred to as the third republic in Nigeria. Local and international pressures following the annulment of the successful 1993 election contributed to forcing General Babangida out of office in August 1993. He stepped out, handing over all affairs to Chief Ernest Shonekan to lead the interim government (Lewis, 1994; Odinkalu, 2001).

Meanwhile, as part of the strategy for the (failed) effort to return the government to civilians, the Federal Military Government set up a committee to review the 1979 constitution. The committee submitted a draft constitution, in which the Armed Forces Ruling Council made eleven modifications and deleted sections of the constitution that made Nigeria a welfare state and provided for free education for primary and secondary education levels (Oko, 1998). Among several decrees that guided and regulated the provision and management of education in Nigeria were Decree No. 16 of 1985 which provided for new National Minimum Standards and Decree No. 20 of 1986 which changed the academic calendar. The calendar was changed from starting in January and ending in December to a new calendar that began in October and ended in September (Fabunmi, 2005). According to Dare (Oyo), who was a former official of the Nigerian Union of Teachers (NUT), "this change in school calendar was to make pupils available to help on the farm during harvest periods in Nigeria". According to Hassan (Kano) who worked with the local education authority, these changes in the school calendar revealed the inconsistency of government policies in the educational system.

5.4.1 The Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP)

Major General Ibrahim Babangida's regime that began in August 1985 introduced a Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). His quest for international support was reported as one of the major reasons for SAP, which was presented as economic diplomacy aimed at promoting Nigeria in the global market and aligning with global regimes. At the same time, SAP devastated social services in the country. Thus, we may argue that he was bargaining with the international community to garner support for his government. Major General Babangida was the longest-serving peacetime military leader in Nigeria.

i. The Impact of SAP on School Enrolment

The survey data shows that while respondents' views are divided, SAP generally received relatively lower credit for increasing students' enrolment when compared to previous policies discussed. The views of former education workers were divided over SAP's impact on school


enrolment. 33.6% said it led to a decrease in enrolment, while 43.2% said it led to an increase in enrollment. The majority of northern respondents (61.8% in Adamawa and 51.8% in Kano) said it led to an increase in enrolment. Views from southern respondents were also divided: 45% in Anambra, 31.1% in Delta and 39.8% in Oyo said it led to a decrease while 28% in Anambra, 37.4% in Delta and 33.4% in Oyo said it led to an increase in school enrolment (see Table 11).

Table 11: How did SAP impact primary and secondary school enrolment? (education workers by state)

	Adamawa	Anambra	Delta	Kano	Oyo	Total
The number of pupils enrolled in schools decreased	25.4%	45.0%	31.1%	29.5%	39.8%	33.6%
The number of pupils enrolled in schools increased	61.8%	28.0%	37.4%	51.8%	33.4%	43.2%
The number of pupils enrolled in schools remained the same	4.8%	16.2%	16.4%	14.9%	17.8%	14.0%

Parents and former students were also divided over SAP's Impact on enrolment. While 29.1% said it led primary and secondary schools' enrolment to decrease, 35.4% said it led to an enrolment increase, and 17.6% said enrolment remained the same. Higher percentages of northern respondents (62.4% in Adamawa and 41.2% in Kano) mentioned that it led to an enrolment increase compared to 17% in Anambra and 21% in Delta. (see Figure 8).

Figure 8: SAP impact on primary and secondary schools' enrolment (parents and former students by state)



In the literature, a negative impact of SAP on school enrolment and overall access to education is observed. In a study on education under SAP in Nigeria and Zambia, Babalola, Lungwangwa and Adeyinka (1999) note that:

“Fiscal measures introduced by Nigeria and Zambia during SAP had some devastating effects on public expenditure on education, the purchasing power of teachers, quality of education, access to education, and the gender gap in the provision of education at all levels. Between 1984 and 1988, for instance, both countries experienced about an 8

% reduction in the share of education in the national budget. In a similar vein, public spending per student fell by 32.96% and 60% in Nigeria and Zambia, respectively. At the same time, the high inflation rates in both countries led to a significant reduction in purchasing power. Consequently, there were, in most cases, downward trends in the gross enrolment ratio, female participation in education, completion rate, pupils per school, pupil-teacher ratio, and performance in international examinations.”

This observation, and the lower percentage of respondents who mentioned the positive impact of SAP, highlight that despite the north-south gap in perspectives about SAP, it likely had a noticeable negative impact on Nigeria's educational development.

ii. Impact of SAP on Pupils' Learning and Performance

Tables 12 and 13 indicate that survey respondents were greatly divided on the impact of SAP on pupils' learning and performances. A total of 37.1% of all former education sector workers surveyed said these deteriorated under SAP, 32.4% said they improved while 20.2% said they remained the same. Parents' and former students' views were even less positive (see Tables 12 and 13).

Table 12: Impact of SAP on pupils' learning and performances (former education workers)

	Adamawa	Anambra	Delta	Kano	Oyo	Total
Pupils' learning and performances in school deteriorated	35.3%	39.5%	24.9%	33.9%	30.4%	32.4%
Pupils' learning and performances in school improved	43.0%	30.6%	30.1%	48.2%	32.0%	37.1%
Pupils' learning and performances in school remained the same	12.0%	18.8%	27.9%	14.4%	27.3%	20.2%

There was a slight division among parents and former students as 33.4% said pupils' learning and performance improved under SAP, while 27.9% said these decreased under SAP. A total of 19.8% said there was no change in pupils' learning and performance during the SAP period. Higher percentages of parents and former students said these factors improved in northern Nigerian states (53.6% in Adamawa and 39.9% in Kano) than in the south: Anambra and Delta recorded 17.8% and 20.4%, respectively, but Oyo recorded 38.3% (which is close to Kano's response).

Table 13: Impact of SAP on pupils' learning and performances (parents and former students)

	Adamawa	Anambra	Delta	Kano	Oyo	Total
Pupils' learning and performances in school deteriorated	17.0%	36.5%	19.1%	27.5%	17.3%	24.2%
Pupils' learning and performances in school improved	47.4%	18.7%	18.5%	39.9%	40.1%	32.3%
Pupils' learning and performances in school remained the same	7.2%	22.2%	30.9%	19.0%	27.2%	20.9%

One important thing to note is that unlike for schools' takeover and the UPE, less than 50% within all categories of respondents for SAP said that learning and performance improved, which points to the negative impact of SAP on pupils' learning and performances. In contrast, a total of 76.5% of former education sector workers said the introduction of UPE led to the improvement of pupils' learning and performance in school. Only 8.9% said that pupils' learning and performances in school deteriorated while 10.3% said it remained the same as before the introduction of UPE.

With regards to the quality of education, we may argue SAP carried a carrot and a stick approach. Babangida's SAP devastated social services in the country. In what looks like a contradiction to the SAP approach, the regime abolished fees for primary education nationwide and reinstated direct grants for primary education (Saliu, 1997; Tyona, 2020). While schools received some support, many households may not have been able to support their children's education and create a conducive learning environment at home. Nonetheless, scholars agree that social services, including educational development and quality, dipped due to the downward economic movement and attendant socioeconomic hardship that followed the military interventions and approaches to governance, especially SAP (Osaghae, 1995; Adeoye, 1991; Uwakonye, Osho and Anucham, 2006). The implementation of SAP led to severe further reductions in government spending on education. This resulted in unpaid teacher salaries, the dilapidation of education facilities, strikes in public schools, and eventual decline in educational quality and outcomes (Osaghae, 1995; Adeoye, 1991; Max & Aduma, 2016). (add the Ukim (1995) cited in Max & Aduma (2016, p. 130-131) quote here:)

SAP's carrot and stick approach is not quite different from Babangida's politics that helped sustain his power. While he wooed the international community with his economic diplomacy on the one hand, he also tried to build a support-base for his administration through the fee waiver-bait, in addition to other strategies that helped to build a guild of supporters for his regime. Members of this guild benefited from his global political economy games (see Ikpe, 2000; Odubajo, 2017; Ogbonna and Ogunnubi, 2018). This may also be connected to his general local and international economic diplomacy, political bargaining and payoff (this is further explained in Section 73).

While the survey data show higher percentages of respondents saying pupils' learning and performances improved during SAP, in the literature, scholars are in agreement that social services, including educational development and quality, nosedived due to the downward economic movement and attendant socioeconomic hardship that followed the military interventions and approaches to governance, especially SAP (Osaghae, 1995; Adeoye, 1991; Uwakonye, Osho and Anucham, 2006). According to Ukim (1995) cited in Max & Aduma (2016, p. 130-131):

The Obasanjo administration introduced in late 1970s, economic austerity programme, which was abandoned by the Shagari regime's profligate spending; the Buhari administration reintroduced austerity measures and strict regulation of the economy but the administration was short-lived. Then the Babangida administration introduced the structural adjustment programme in 1986 to champion [an] economic reconstruction programme based on a free market approach involving floatation of

the exchange rate of the naira, wide-range reforms including privatization and commercialization of all State industries and parastatals that were considered loss-making in their operations, financial sector and the deregulation of the economy.

Adeoye (1991) notes that there was both a social cost of SAP and a spread of SAP burden, both of which are linked to the government's level of commitment to social justice. The increasing social services costs introduced by the government and its agencies became so astonishing that such social services like education, electricity and healthcare were “priced out of the reach of the vast majority of Nigerians. Government officials openly declared that these utilities and conveniences are not meant for the poor!” and there was a “virtual collapse of vital social services” (Adeoye, 1991, p.37-38). Social policies, including education, suffered heavily during this period. According to Adigun, who had held the position of the Registrar and Chief Executive Officer of the Nigerian Teachers’ Registration Council, the introduction of SAP was responsible for many ills. Some teachers were not paid their salaries for up to a year. Many teachers left the job. Those who remained taught part-time. There was complete disillusionment among the teachers and the teaching profession became a laughingstock in society. “Then, you would see things like ‘House for rent, not for teachers’ because teachers could not afford it” (Adigun, Delta). SAP produced a drastic increase in the poverty rate and the number of people becoming poor, which was noticeable in urban areas (Osaghae, 1995). Increasing poverty opened doors for various other forms of vulnerability, criminality and manipulation by patrons of clients in the deep struggle for survival. It also critically harmed educational development. Osaghae (1995, p.36) further explains that “prebendalism, criminality and corruption increased in government circles. At the other end of the spectrum, dropout, withdrawal and failure rates in schools increased (failure rate in the West African School Certificate examinations,” which he observed to have reached an unprecedented 70% in 1985.

iii. Impact of SAP on Teacher Recruitment and Remuneration

Respondents were divided on the impact of SAP on teachers' recruitment and retention norms and standards. Altogether, a sharp difference is observed here in relation to the pattern of responses on teacher recruitment and retention norms and standards during schools’ takeover and UPE introduction. A far lower percentage mentioned the positive impact of SAP compared to the above two factors, indicating a negative trend in the perception of SAP impact. While 37.7% of former education sector workers said that SAP led to an improvement in teacher recruitment and retention norms, 29.7% said it led to their deterioration. Although more respondents in Kano (48.2%) and Adamawa (40.5%) said these improved than those in the southern region (32.5% in Anambra, 32.8% in Delta and 33.1% in Oyo), the northern respondents (in a total deviation from the previously reported pattern) also recorded a higher percentage of those who mentioned that SAP led to the deterioration of teacher recruitment and retention norms and standards than those in the south. This number stood at 33.6% in Adamawa and 42% in Kano while Anambra recorded 25.5%, Delta 15.8%, and Oyo 30.6%. However, more

respondents from the south said the norms and standards remained the same: 31.7% in Delta, 32% in Anambra and 27.9% in Oyo. Adamawa and Kano recorded 16.5% and 8.1%, respectively. The reasons for this shift in the northern respondents' pattern or the elevated percentage of southern respondents who believed that these norms remained the same are not clear. Nonetheless, this shows that a majority of the respondents in both the north and south may not have believed in the positive impact of SAP on teacher recruitment and retention norms.

Data from qualitative interviews with respondents as well as the literature reveals that SAP was implicated in the failure to pay teachers' salaries, which led to strike actions by teachers. Ubo (Anambra) explained that the "government began to abandon education from SAP policy. Salaries were owed." Ubi (Federal), who retired from the Universal Basic Education Commission, narrated his experience:


"After my NYSC, I taught for some years. As a young graduate, there were times we were owed salaries as long as six months salary. I was looking for a house to rent then but I discovered that landlords were unwilling to give out their accommodation to teachers because they would not be able to pay. Such things affected teachers' morale and quality. Some of us who did not study education left the profession to other professions."

Abioye (Federal) also said:

"The introduction of Structural Adjustment Programmes from the early 1990s was responsible for some many ills. Teachers were not paid their salaries for months, for some others, a year. So many teachers left the job. Those who remained did it as a part time job. There was complete disillusionment among the teachers and the teaching profession became a laughing stock in the society."

Generally, scholars note that the 1980s' market failures and economic challenges as a result of neoliberal structural adjustment programmes affected various sectors and shrank the public purse, which adversely affected the education sector in particular (Osaghae, 1995; Adeoye, 1991; Nwagwu, 2000; Adefeso-Olateju, 2013; Max & Aduma, 2016). Survey responses show that while 35.7% of all former education sector workers said teachers' salaries and overall remuneration improved during SAP, 24.8% said they deteriorated, while 29.1% said they remained the same (see Figure 9).

Figure 9: SAP impact on teachers' recruitment and retention norm and standards (former education sector workers)



The two northern states recorded the highest percentages of respondents who believed that teacher recruitment and retention norms improved. This proportion stood at 40.5% in Adamawa and 48.2% in Kano, while all the southern states recorded less than 35%. A field note based on an observation of one of the research assistants in Kano possibly provides relevant insight:

“Has anyone realised just as I did that the issue of a private school has different views among southern and northern respondents domiciled in, for example, Kano? I was shocked yesterday when some respondents (females) said they got a letter of appointment to teach before graduation from Advanced Teachers College, and that their first salary came with an option of a line of various models of cars for you to choose from. Is it political that some do not see anything good in the Babangida regime while some others hail it, or is it their confusion?”

The research assistant’s claim could not be verified, but it points to possible differential experiences of northern and southern education workers that might have affected their different views. During the report writing, when research assistants were asked about their experiences and observations in the field, a research assistant from Oyo mentioned:

“It's obvious that many of my respondents show grievances against the government that launched the SAP programme (General Ibrahim Babangida). They all claimed that the SAP did not only affect education but all sectors of the economy. Teachers were not catered for, students and pupils weren't serious with education. I can't say these reports were biased since their views were almost the same.”

The first research assistant’s reference to politics and appreciation of Babangida’s regime and the grievances expressed by Oyo respondents underscores the prevailing north-south divide in the experiences, appreciation and perceptions of political changes in Nigeria. Mustapha (2005,

p.6) explains that “historical factors such as the misguided colonial educational policy in northern Nigeria” and differences in the levels of ethnic receptivity to education that was introduced by the missionaries caused a huge gap between northern and southern regions, which Mancini (2009, p.3) described as an “unfavourable interplay of hostile geography and biased colonial policies.” This created a “persistence and often the widening of the north-south development gap.” The gap also contributes to influencing both the perception and "effectiveness of post-independence governments' policies in producing an inclusive society." Campbell (2011) observed in a Council on Foreign Relation's article that the broad differences that exist between northern and southern Nigeria are the country's historical, political and religious reality and provide a useful and legitimate analytical lens.

5.4.2 The establishment of Primary Education Commissions

Following various challenges associated with managing the primary education sector as a result of increased enrolment, the Babangida regime established the National Primary Education Commission (NPEC) with Decree 31 of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1988 to administer and manage the primary education sector. This Commission was later scrapped by Decrees 2 and 3 of 1991 and subsequently re-established by Decree No. 96 of 25th August 1993. The NPEC and its states and local government chapters shared the primary school management responsibility: the direct management and day-to-day administration of primary schools in each Local Government Area (LGA) was assigned to the Local Government Education Authority (LGEA) while the State Primary Education Board (SPEB) was responsible for the administration of primary schools in the state and overseeing the activities of LGEAs in their respective states. The NPEC was the national coordinating body, supervising the SPEBs across the Federation (Iwuanyanwu and Anene, 2001; Sokoh, 2013; Akuma, 2014; Odewale, 2019).

i. Impact of NPEC, SPEC and LGEA on learning and performance of pupils

Limited information exists in the literature on the operations and impacts of NPEC and SPEC. From what we know based on the available literature, as Anero (2014, p.58) notes, the back and forth of the government on the establishment of the NPEC "speak(s) volumes of the premium attached to primary education by the government. Although the government may not be described to have improved primary education through the NPEC policies, it was a show of interest." Olaniyan and Obadara (2008, p.10) see their establishment as “moves of the Federal Government of Nigeria in accepting views and its commitment to provide educational opportunities at this level of education” but these do not tell us about the actual impact of the commissions. Also, Abel and Amenger (2014, p.2) claim that the NPEC and its satellite offices in states and Local Government Areas as well as the ward levels contributed much to the effective primary education management but failed to provide examples of the impact on the education quality.

The survey explored the contributions of NPEC and SPEC to education quality (it did not ask about schools' enrolment). As summarised in Table 14, in response to a question about their impact on learning and pupils' performance, a majority of former education sector workers believed the

NPEC and SPEC had a positive impact on the quality of learning and performance of pupils. There was no particular north-south division in the pattern of responses: a total of 69.2% (85.5% in Adamawa, 56.8% in Anambra, 67.8% in Delta, 67.2% in Kano and 66.3% Oyo) stated that the introduction of NPEC and SPEC improved pupils' learning and performance.

Table 14: Impact of the establishment of NPEC and SPEC on the quality of learning and performance of pupils

Impact of NPEC and SPEC on performance	Adamawa	Anambra	Delta	Kano	Oyo	Total
It did not make any impact, pupils learning and performances remained the same	4.0%	16.6%	15.8%	16.5%	20.1%	14.6%
It led to pupils learning and performances deterioration	1.7%	10.3%	5.5%	12.7%	8.4%	7.6%
It led to pupils learning and performances improvement	85.5%	56.8%	67.8%	67.2%	66.3%	69.2%


ii. The impact of NPEC, SPEC and LGEA on teacher's salary and overall remuneration

The National Primary Education Commission (NPEC) was established to address the gap in primary education sector management. Information from the literature suggests that it appears to have made a noticeable impact on teacher recruitment and remuneration. According to Olaniyan and Obadare (2008, p.16):

“Significant changes and improvements have taken place since the re-establishment of the NPEC in 1993. Teachers' salaries have been paid out generally on time and their overall conditions of service have been somewhat improved. These changes have raised the morale of teachers from its very low point. Previously, the education system had suffered from problems of high turnover and difficulties in recruitment and retention.”

A total of 60.8% of former education sector workers surveyed mentioned that NPEC and its state chapters, State Primary Education Commissions (SPECs), led to improvement in teacher salary and overall remuneration, while 22.1% said these remained the same. Only 7.9% said they deteriorated (see Figure 10).

Figure 10: Impact of the establishment of NPEC and SPEC on the amount and payment of teacher salary and overall remuneration (former education sector staff)



iii. Quality Structure (NPEC) as a Patronage Network Servicing Tool?

In section 7.2, we discuss the pattern of military appointment which was bedraggled with corruption, rent-seeking and patronage networks that are hallmarks of the political settlement system. Although information is limited on the existence of patronage networks in the NPEC, available information indicates that NPEC and SPEC may have been part of the patronage and payoff conduits, which could have also induced different forms of political bargaining in its recruitment processes. Ojukwu (2006, n.p) observed that NPEC "was scrapped because of administrative and personality conflicts within and outside the commission" and the key managers were particularly "more interested in the money released by the Federal Government than being committed to the cause of primary education. This gave rise to conflicts within themselves on how to use the money." In such a situation, attention could shift from the quality of the appointees and employees to prebendal appointments.

As further discussed in Section 7.2, the military appointments were sometimes based on personal connections rather than qualifications and experiences (Muhammad and Liman, 2018). This could have also inspired the practices observed by Ojukwu as the appointees jostled for their shares of the allocations without regard to the standards of practice. This does not appear to have ended with the military's exit from power. Recent reports reveal diverse kinds of corruption and funds diversion in the Universal Basic Education Commission and Universal Basic Education Boards that inherited NPEC and SPECs. Such practices may have inspired severe conflicts and contests for important posts in the commissions (see Jones et al., 2014; Gershberg et al., 2016; Economic and Financial Crimes Commission 2017; Samuel, 2018). According to Ojukwu (2006, n.p), "under this circumstance primary education fund was not properly utilised. In fact, what seemed to be a fraud in NPEC could have been averted with better supervision by the Ministry of Education." We may add that under such circumstances, the commissions may have been used as bargaining tools for support and to pay off people and groups that were loyal to the political leadership.

5.5 The Interim National Government and Third Era of Military Rule (1993-1999)

The interim government was not difficult for the military to shove aside and resume military rule. On 17 November 1993, the then Defense Minister Sani Abacha forced Chief Ernest Shonekan to resign and hand over power in what some observers refer to as a palace coup (Lewis, 1994; Idachaba, 2001). Abacha assumed power as the Head of State and Commander-in-Chief of Armed Forces of the Nigerian Federation and summarily dissolved the existing civilian transitional regime and its associated political structures, including the elected federal and state legislatures. He also sacked the state governors and local government chairpersons, suspended the constitution and began a full-fledged military dictatorship that plunged the country into an acute political and economic crisis. The regime also attracted international sanctions for the country because of its numerous human abuses and political oppressions (Lewis, 1994; Amuwo, Bach and Lebeau, 2001; Idachaba, 2001; Odinkalu, 2001)

Abacha's attention was largely focused on the consolidation of power and perpetuation of his rule. Amaje (2012, p.31) summarized the regime's contribution to the country's educational development thusly:

“The military government of Gen. Sani Abacha (1993-1998) was to make an impact on the education sector except that, he was busy trying to adopt a transition to civil rule programme which almost [ate] up his regime. He adopted no new policy on education. He was to follow the 6-3-3-4 policy initiated by the Babangida administration. “

While limited information exists on the education policies and programmes of the Abacha regime, the regime established the Petroleum (Special) Trust Fund (PTF) in 1994, which contributed funds for rehabilitating infrastructure, including primary, secondary and tertiary education infrastructure across Nigeria before the trust was scrapped in 2000 (Moja, 2000; Ade Yusif and Odeyinka, 2003).

Abacha made a promise of returning power to a civilian government but was perceived to have had a plan to succeed himself as a civilian President before his death on June 8, 1998. General Abdulsalami Abubakar replaced him and eventually handed over to a democratically elected president, retired General Olusegun Obasanjo, on 29 May 1999. General Abubakar's regime was a very short one that was focused on a transition programme. Amaje (2012, p.31) notes that General Abdul Salam Abubakar (1998-1999), “did not last in power. He had no record of public policy on education.” Little is known about the regime's education policies and interventions (see Odinkalu, 2001; Okeke and Chukwuka, 2013).

5.6 The Fourth Republic (1999–present)

The current democratic dispensation that began in May 1999 is referred to as the fourth republic. Retired General Obasanjo's election marked an end of military rule in Nigeria. His election was strategic for a number of reasons: he gained respect for being a military ruler that handed over to civilians in 1979; he was seen as one with the capacity to bridge the gap between the departing military and civilians, and there was a growing concern whether the military would hand over power but the military seems to have trusted him more than other civilian candidates that lacked

any military background (Ekeh, 1999; Itugbu, 2011; Shopeju and Ojukwu, 2013). Itugbu (2011, p.566) believes that when the military planned to hand over power in 1999, "the regime's [Abdulsalami] inner circle picked Obasanjo when they needed the right candidate to calm the political tension in the country." This suggests that the continued interests of the military contributed to influencing whom the military junta handed over the political leadership to. Whatever the reasons for the choice of Obasanjo might have been, Obasanjo's programme, in education, for example, maintained some degree of continuity from previous military programmes.

5.6.1 The Universal Basic Education (UBE) Programme

When Obasanjo came to power as a democratically elected president of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in 1999, he launched the Universal Basic Education (UBE) programme the same year. The UBE is largely a refined version and replacement of UPE. In addition, a new edition of the National Policy on Education (NPE) was launched in 2004 to accommodate the UBE programme. The education structure of 6-3-3-4 was subsequently slightly adjusted to 9-3-6 (nine years of uninterrupted education that include six years of primary education and three years of junior secondary education, three years of senior secondary education and four years of tertiary education) (Federal Ministry of Education, 2004; Daniel-Kali, 2018).

The UBE seeks to ensure the provision of a free, compulsory and uninterrupted nine years of education for every school-going age child and consists of six years of Primary Education and three years of Junior Secondary education. It also provides for a one-year Early Childhood Care Development and Education (Universal Basic Education Commission, 2004). The Universal Basic Education Act (2004) stipulates the functionalities and structures of the UBE (see FME, 2004). In line with the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the UBE is relatively decentralized and allows the participation of the three tiers of government. The Federal Government funds the UBE through an Education Tax Fund levied at 2% on some categories of corporations (Moja, 2000; Fabunmi, 2005; Gershberg, et al, 2016). The fund was set up in 1995 to receive 2% contributions from pre-tax earnings of companies that have more than 100 employees. When it was established, 40% and 10% of these funds were dedicated to primary and secondary levels of education respectively, while higher education received 50% (Moja, 2000). In the subsequent sections, various issues around the UBE are discussed.

i. UBE and School Enrolment

Former education sector staff surveyed largely agreed that school enrolment improved as a result of UBE. A total of 84.1% of former education sector workers stated that pupils' enrolment increased after the introduction of UBE. Only 4.7% of all former education sector workers said that it decreased while 4.5% said it remained the same.

Also, the majority of parents and former students (68.7%) believe that it encouraged more parents to enroll more children in school. Although Adamawa had the highest record of those who said this, there appears to be no particular regional pattern in the data.

Table 15: Influenced parents decision to enrol their children in school


	Adamawa	Anambra	Delta	Kano	Oyo	Total
It did not make any difference to parents, hence, they did not do anything new	0.1%	2.7%	0.9%	0.7%	1.8%	6.1%
It discouraged more parents to enrol more children in school	0.3%	1.0%	0.2%	0.4%	0.6%	2.6%
It encouraged more parents to enrol more children in school	20.3%	11.5%	13.9%	11.7%	11.3%	68.7%
Most children were already in school, hence UBE made no difference	0.2%	1.2%	0.6%	0.4%	0.9%	3.3%

While there is no reason to doubt the respondents' observations (and although this study is limited to 1973 to 2003), it is worth mentioning that the enrolment increase since the establishment of the UBE has not fully addressed the stated objectives. Both the UPE and its modified UBE version sought to address the historical imbalance in education, especially the imbalance between the north and south as well as gender imbalance. For example, the primary education enrolment rate in 1913 stood at 22.1 in the south and 1.8 in the north. By 1960, when the country got its independence, the southern enrolment rate was 68.2 while the north stood at 5.6 (Okobiah, 2002). As of 2013, the available record shows that primary school completion rates in southern zones were above 90% but northeast and northwest could not record above 55% (NBS, 2013). These indicate that a significant enrolment gap still exists. The Universal Basic Education Commission report shows that in the 2015/2016 academic session Gross Enrolment Rate (GER) for both males and females stood at 83.81 while the Net Enrolment Rate (NER) for both males and stood at 64.92 (Universal Basic Education Commission, 2019). According to the 2017 Multiple Cluster Indicator Survey (MICS) report, the percentage of women (aged 15-24 years old) that were literate in the northeast and northwest were less than 45%. In all the southern zones, it stood well above 90%. The national rate stood at 59.3% (National Bureau of Statistics, 2017).

ii. UBE and Quality of Learning

A total of 75.7% of parents and former student respondents mentioned that UBE contributed to improving the quality of education. Only 10% said the quality of education deteriorated after the introduction of UBE. Similarly, a total of 72.2% of all former education sector workers believed that pupils' learning and performance improved as a result of UBE introduction. A total of 12.7% said it remained the same, while a total of 8% said it deteriorated (see Figure 11). Anambra and Delta have the lowest percentage of respondents that felt UBE contributed to improving pupils' learning and performance.

Figure 11: Influence of UBE on learning and performance



Various learning assessments by both the government and independent organisations indicate that learning has been quite limited despite the UBE reform. The Nationwide Monitoring of Learning Achievements conducted by the Federal Ministry of Education and subsequently the Universal Basic Education Commission in 1991, 1996/1997, 2003, 2006 and 2009 all point to low learning outcomes (see UBEC, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2011; NPC and RTI International 2011). These assessments largely focused on English, mathematics and basic science. During the study, we could not access the initial assessments conducted between 1990 and 2003, however references to the findings in some literature point to low learning outcomes. In the Nigeria Education Sector Analysis report, Moja (2005, p.5) notes that:

A Situation Analysis Policy Study” (SAPA) was conducted in cooperation with the United Nation Children’s Education Fund (UNICEF). The study was undertaken to analyze the factors that inhibit access to education and factors that affect the quality of education. This study was conducted between 1991 and 1992. The second study was conducted in 1997 for the purpose of assessing learning achievements of Nigerian primary school children at level four. The results of this study indicated that the children lacked basic numeracy and literacy competencies .

Moja further notes that the 1997 study “confirmed that the quality of education offered at the primary school level was low” (Moja, 2000, p.13). The 1997 assessment tested pupils’ competencies in literacy, numeracy and life skills and noted that “the level of numeracy competence was found to be generally low and performance in literacy was the worst amongst the three competencies measured”. The 2006 edition of the assessment reveals that students’ performances were very low in core subjects. “The national performance ranged from mean score of 21.05% (JS 2 Integrated Science) to 50.00% (JS 2 Introductory Technology)” (Moja, 2000, p.13). According to Humphreys and Crawford (2014), the outcomes of the assessments in 1996, 2001, 2004 and 2006 altogether demonstrated very low students learning outcomes. “National mean percentage test scores attained by Primary 4 children in the first study in 1996 were 32% in numeracy and 25% in literacy” while the “national mean scores at the JSS level in 2004 were

25% in Mathematics and 32% in English” (Humphreys and Crawford, 2014, p.49). These point to a declining education quality in primary and secondary schools. The UBEC monitoring of learning assessment of primary 4 English and Mathematics in 2001 shows that learners’ marks were noticeably very low and (Humphreys and Crawford, 2014).

Other independent and project reports confirm this trend; the Junior secondary schools result in 2004 was reported to be worse when compared to other African countries (ESSPIN, 2009; Global Education First Initiative, 2013; Humphreys and Crawford, 2014; Gershberg et al, 2016). It was particularly observed that about 10% of school-age children were not able to do simple addition at the end of primary school. There were also remarkable regional disparities that contributed to the overall national outcomes: "while 29% of children in the North East are unable to do a simple addition by the end of Primary 6, all pupils in the south can perform the task by the end of Primary 5" (Humphreys and Crawford, 2014, p.52)

iii. UBE impact on teachers' recruitment and retention norms and practices

The introduction of UBE, like UPE, created a demand for qualified teachers. The survey data reveals that up to 71% of the former education sector workers believed that UBE contributed to improving teachers' recruitment and retention norms and practices. 14.4% said they remained the same while 7.4% said they deteriorated. Similarly, a total of 70.5% of all former education sector workers believe that teachers' salaries and overall remuneration improved as a result of the introduction of UBE. 19.2% stated that it remained the same. Only 5% said it contributed to the deterioration of teachers' salaries and overall remuneration

Available information in the literature does not suggest that teacher quality (which largely depends on the recruitment and teacher development factors) improved under UBE. The subsector has been flooded with teachers who lack the necessary qualifications and capacity to teach (see UBEC, 2012a, 2012b). At the primary and secondary levels, a Universal Basic Education Commission's (UBEC) report indicates that up to 40% and 24% of teachers respectively were not qualified nationwide. In the North West and North East, the percentage of unqualified teachers stood at 66% and 59% respectively. In the north-central, it stood at 35% while South West, South-South and South-East recorded 8%, 20% and 25% respectively (UBEC, 2012b). A study in Kwara State (North-Central) by the Education Sector Support Programme in Nigeria (ESSPIN) that examined the quality of all primary and secondary school teachers in the state revealed that only 75 teachers (0.4%) out of 19,000 teachers scored the minimum threshold standard. This implies that only the 75 teachers may be described as competent and among these only seven of them got up to 80% and above in all four tests that examined (a) basic numerical understanding needed to teach primary school mathematics; (b) basic literacy needed to teach simple language structures and particularly synonyms, opposites and meanings; (c) the application of basic literacy in the lesson development and; (d) the application of basic numeracy in classroom administrative tasks. It is noteworthy that their levels of education and qualification did not affect their outcomes (ESSPIN, 2008).

Further, the FME's (2005) Education Sector Diagnosis report on teacher qualification and availability indicates that between 1998 and 2001 less than half of the teachers had a minimum qualification for teaching in primary schools. The National Certificate in Education (NCE), which is obtainable at the end of a three-year teacher education programme in the Colleges of Education, is stipulated by the National Policy on Education as the minimum qualification for teaching at the basic education level. Between 1960 and 1996, the number of teachers with NCE increased to about 31% and the percentage of teachers without formal training dropped to 21%, but the total percentage of teachers with necessary qualifications for teaching stood at about 48% of all the teaching staff (Moja, 2000). In 2002, 50.8% had the NCE. This implies that less than half of the teachers over these years (except in 2002) were qualified to teach in Nigerian primary schools. The record shows 44.5% in 1998, 44.8% in 1999, 46.1% in 2000 and 46.6% in 2001 met the minimum qualification (Moja, 2000; FME, 2005). At the secondary level, FME (2005) reveals that while up to 54.64% of secondary school teachers in 2003 had a minimum of a university degree, 12.83% of the teachers did not have any teaching qualification and 10.41% were still teaching with Teachers Grade II qualification that was scrapped in 1977.

Also, teacher development significantly suffered over the years. After decades of intervention through the UPE, teacher education programmes and professional teacher development experienced a serious setback. The Nigeria Education Sector Diagnosis (FME, 2005) report concludes that there appears to have been very few opportunities for the professional development of teachers. With regards to pre-service training, the FME (2005) reports that there was a decrease in trainee teacher enrolment in seven universities that were studied from 9,469 in 1999 to 6,180 in 2000. After the launch of UBE, and possibly as a result of increasing demand for teachers, advocacy campaigns to increase the production and supply of teachers for the UBE programme, a sharp increase of 69.22% (from 6,180 in 2000 to 10,458 in 2001) was observed. A similar observation was made on enrolment in 15 Colleges of Education that were included in the study. The study notes that a total of 14,438 students enrolled in the institutions in 1998, which reduced to 11,656 by 2000. As in the universities, enrolment increased to 14,272 by 2000, which again slipped to 11,373 in 2002. Altogether, it could be said that the launch of UBE in 1999 might have helped inspire interest in the teacher training and teaching professions (FME, 2005).

6. The Rise of Private Schools

The history of Western education in Nigeria began with private establishment and ownership of schools. The early schools established in Nigeria from the 1840s up to the 1950s were largely pioneered by voluntary agencies, especially the missionaries, beginning with the establishment of the first primary school in Badagry, Lagos State, in 1843 by Methodist missionaries. By 1914, there were already 91 mission primary schools, mostly in southern Nigeria and 59 government primary schools. The establishment of secondary education was also led by the Church Missionary Society (CMS) with the establishment of the CMS Grammar School in Lagos in 1859. As of 1914, there were 11 private secondary schools and one government secondary school in Nigeria (Nigerian Bureau of Statistics, 2015).

In the early years of independence, there was some cooperation in the control of these schools between the government and the private owners (Ahanotu, 1983). In the early 1970s, the military governments centralized educational management and outlawed private school ownership in the country. However, the centralization and government monopoly in educational management was not sustainable (Ikoya, 2007). The promulgation of the 1979 constitution created some space for private ownership by decentralizing education again as it placed education in the concurrent list. This was also a period of instability, ineffectiveness and inadequacy in the education sector (Nwangwu, 2000). In both the literature and study data, there is consensus that the failing standards and quality of education alongside the failure of government education policies and programmes also contributed to the revival of private schools in the 1980s. The government takeover of schools from the private owners ended the first era of private provision of education that began with the missionaries' establishment of the first schools in the 1840s. Some of the issues surrounding the second coming of private schools and their impacts are summarized in this section.

6.1 Failure of the public education system and the rise of private schools

There is broad agreement in the literature that the failure, inadequacy and ineffectiveness of public schools contributed to the spread of private education provision in Nigeria (Nwangwu et al., 2005; Adefeso-Olateju, 2013). According to Nwangwu et al. (2005), various challenges and shortcomings that pervade the public education sub-sector contributed to inspire the rise and patronage of private schools. Adefeso-Olateju (2013, p.26) explained that parents sought “educational alternatives from the private sector and the increasing demand led to the burgeoning of private schools.” Consequently, private schools began to proliferate and gain wider acceptance as a viable alternative to the failing public school system. The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS, 2015, p, n.p.) notes that:

“The growing confidence in private schools across Nigeria over the years has been informed by the belief that these schools out-perform their public counterparts, particularly in the area of education. Also, owing to the peculiar nature of education in Nigeria, most private schools are known to be consistent with their academic calendars compared with public schools, which are known for repeated strikes and unstable time frames.”

Citing the example of Lagos state, which is the most economically viable state in the country with a strong capacity to sustain itself without dependence on Federal Government monetary allocations, Härmä (2011, 1) observes that:

“The Lagos education sector is dominated by private schools. Since the 1980s, the state government has been unable to expand the public education system to keep pace with demand. As a result, many areas of the state are un-served or under-served by the public school system. To fill this void, a large private school sector has developed, unplanned, which is now shouldering the majority of the state's education burden. The sector spans the elite to the slum school and caters to pupils of all ages.”

The survey presented several assumptions for which the respondents were asked to state if they agreed, disagreed, strongly agreed or strongly disagreed. An assumption that an ‘increase in the

number of private schools was caused by the decline in the quality of education in public schools' was affirmed by 78.1% (39.2% agree and 38.9% strongly agreed) while only 11.6% (10% disagree and 1.6% strongly disagree) disagreed on this among former education sector workers. As for parents and former students, up to 74% (40.8% agreed and 33.2% disagreed) agreed that the increase in the number of private schools was caused by a decline in the quality of education in public schools. Only 11.1% disagreed, and 1.6% strongly disagreed. The impact of SAP, prebendalism and corruption contributed to "the deterioration of educational standards in public schools especially at the primary and secondary levels led to a mushrooming of expensive private schools which poor parents and guardians could not afford" (Osaghae (1995, p.36).


The interest and patronage further fueled the proliferation of private schools which was regaining wider acceptance as an alternative to public schools that were bedraggled by various kinds of challenges and shortcomings (Nwangwu et al., 2005; Adefeso-Olateju, 2013). An assumption that 'parents were losing trust and interest in public schools and this led to the increase in the number of private schools in the 1980s and 1990s' was agreed to by 81.9% (44.6% agreed and 37.3% strongly agree) of the former education sector workers. Less than one per cent (0.6%) strongly disagreed, while 7.7% disagreed. There was also a strong affirmation among parents and former students: a total of 46.5% agreed, and 29.7% strongly agreed. Only 8.7% disagreed, and 1.6% strongly disagreed.

While private schools are arguably considered better than public schools (NBS, 2015), the proliferation of private schools has contributed to polarise the education system and lower the standards of practices (e.g. promoting examination malpractices), ultimately lowering the quality of education. Firstly, it is argued that many private schools alter norms and encourage malpractices to retain and attract more pupils (more pupils mean more fees paid, thus making the owners richer). This reduced the standards and quality of education (Adefeso-Olateju, 2013). Secondly, as Härmä (2011, 1) observes, the "unplanned growth in the private sector has given rise to concerns regarding the quality of this unregulated provision (as the vast majority of schools are unknown and unapproved by the government)." The absence or inadequacy of regulation of many schools constitutes a significant challenge for quality assurance. National NBS (2015) also notes that "the efficiency and effectiveness of private schools across Nigeria are marred by the lack of accreditation and high tuition, as just some of the challenges facing private sector-driven services in education."

In response to another assumption that stated that 'the number of private schools increased in the 1980s and 1990s because public schools were overpopulated, and many parents did not find enrolment space for their children in public schools,' 29% of former education sector workers surveyed just agreed while 28.3% strongly agreed, totalling about 57.3% that may be said to have agreed with the statement; 18.7% disagreed while 13% strongly disagreed, totalling 31.7% that disagreed. There was no major differential pattern between northern and southern respondents (see Figure 12). Similarly, slightly above half of the parents and former students (34.6% agreed and 18.9% strongly agreed) agreed that the number of private schools increased in the 1980s and 1990s because public schools were overpopulated and many parents did not find enrolment space for their children in public schools. A total of 24.4% disagreed, while 7.7% strongly

disagreed. According to Okoro (Anambra) during the interview, there were not enough public schools to accommodate children, hence private schools started springing up; they escalated because of incessant strikes and because parents did not like their children being idle at home or roaming about. According to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS, 2015, p. n.p.), as a result of the increasing demand for more schools across the country, "the private sector's involvement in education delivery across Nigeria has been on the increase."

Figure 12: Overpopulated Public Schools and the Rise in Private Schools (former education workers, by state)



Also, another assumption that 'the number of private schools increased in the 1980s and 1990s because of the incessant and prolonged teachers' strike as a result of non-payment of salary' was agreed to by 88.6% (42.7% agreed and 45.9% strongly agreed) of former education sector workers. Only 4.9% and 1.2% disagreed and strongly disagreed, respectively. It also received strong affirmation from parents and former students, of whom 44.4% agreed, and 39.4% strongly agreed.

The inability of the government to shoulder the free education programme and subsequent introduction of school fees were also implicated in the rise of private schools. On a statement about the rise in private schools that said 'when government schools began to charge fees, the number of private schools increased' 38% of former education sector workers agreed and 28.2% strongly agreed totalling 66.2% of those that agree. Disagree and strongly disagree were 16.7% and 5.2%, respectively. Only 8.4% neither agreed nor disagreed. A closer look at state-level responses indicates that Anambra and Oyo states had a different pattern of responses as Anambra recorded 31.7% of those who disagreed and Oyo recorded 21.7%, while all other states recorded less than 15%. The reason for this is not very clear, but from our understanding of the two cities, Anambra is very well known for commerce, indicating that a slight rise in fees may not significantly sway parents' interest while people in Oyo have enjoyed free education for decades

(it was the headquarters of the southwest region that pioneered free education in Nigeria in the 1950s). In the case of Oyo, after enjoying government-provided free education for decades, the government charging fees ought to have been disappointing to the parents. Among parents and former students, a total of 61.7% (40.8% agreed and 20.9% strongly agreed) agreed to this. Around 15.2% disagreed and 6.3% strongly disagreed.

After taking over schools from private operators and introducing the nation-wide Universal Primary Education, the government faced several challenges in the management and operation of primary and secondary schools. The impact of the dwindling oil revenue and shortcomings of the government's centralized education management was evident from the state of education access and quality (Fafunwa, 1991; Adefeso-Olateju, 2013). Parents, communities and Parent-Teacher Associations (PTAs) in schools were contributing to bear the cost of schooling, school and teacher maintenance (Abati and Ajayi, 1995; Adefeso-Olateju, 2013). Also, the inability of states and local governments to effectively manage and finance education in their areas of jurisdiction led to several teachers' industrial strike actions over non-payment of salaries. These challenges and shortcomings in the public education system evoked interest in and patronage of private schools as alternatives to public schools.

We may conclude that both the failure in the public education system and failing standard of education, evidenced by the prevailing examination malpractices, are results of some connected processes, which Abioye (Federal) aptly summarised:

“The need to have these private schools came as a result of the poor teaching that parents found in the public schools. Public schools could not deliver their mandate by producing students that are knowledgeable and competent enough to pass examinations leading to entrance into universities. Because of the quality of teachers and lack of supervision that accompany the poor quality of teachers, infrastructure, etc., parents decided to take their children to private schools where there are more facilities and better teaching and learning. From there, private schools began to increase. Parents who heard testimonies of good results from private schools regardless of how the results came in (writing exams in ('miracle centres')). Public school teachers did not have the funds to bribe supervisors. So many parents run to private schools where they have miracle centres for their exams and they come out with beautiful results. That was how schools began to spring up. A student was admitted into the university with 7 credits at a time when I was Level coordinator. He came to me for registration and I asked him a few questions. He could not answer any of the questions and could not also write. I asked him how he got his results but he couldn't respond. Since he had the admission letter and the registration did not state that students who couldn't speak English should not be admitted, I registered him. He started school and wrote the first-semester exam. Out of the nine courses he took he failed seven and as a result, got probation in the first year and was eventually dismissed from the department in the following year.”

6.2 Ethnic Dimensions of the Private School Development

An important issue that emerged during the interviews was about the drive for people to go to school. Halima (Kano), an assistant headteacher, explained that in those days it was the government that wanted people to go to school and everything needed was provided to support education, unlike now where parents want to educate their children instead of the government. This observation points to two realms: the public realm and the private realm. Right from the pre-colonial and colonial era, education in southern Nigeria has been advanced by players in the private realm. Colonial administration (public realm player) consciously limited the spread of private driven education in the north. While the households and communities in the south largely accepted education and sponsored their wards to attend schools, in the north, as scholars observed, besides the colonial restrictions, some groups, households and communities were suspicious of western education that was spread by Christians, which they perceived secular, as opposed to the prevailing Islamic schools (Usuman,2006; Aghedo and Eke, 2013; Ezegwu et al. 2017; Ezegwu, 2020). Besides religious concerns, there were also concerns about possible outcomes of Western education and its impact on culture, which some believe that western education represents a serious threat to (Aghedo and Eke, 2013; The Economist, 2014; Ezegwu et al., 2017).

Usman (2006, p. 168) observes how Fulbe parents consider Western education curricula as "not only dysfunctional to the daily needs of Fulbe nomads but ineffective to the needs of their herding and social lifestyle" and constitutes "an insult to their intelligence and culture." In this milieu, the promotion of access to education needed to be driven from the public realm – the government. A slightly related situation narrated by some respondents is as follows:

"In some places, they did not believe a child should go to school. They wanted to have a farming estate. Until the HM [head master/mistress] will visit parents to persuade them to send their children to school. My father who was a Headmaster visited many homes to talk to parents. They practically 'kidnapped' some children and housed them but informed their parents to not look for them. They only released them to visit their parents during holidays. Pure pagan parents refused their children from going to school. Some of them were supposed to inherit the shrine and as a result would not be allowed to get an education." – Dare (Federal, former Director at the Ministry of Education)

"Student enrolment was a big problem, take for example I followed my father because he was the headmaster, I followed him to school. Their parents were not so particular about school. Most parents were illiterates at that time; they were more willing to see their children go to the farm or rear their cattle or help them in their other trades. They were not particular about enrolling students. The key thing that might be interesting in it was that those that went to school did not go to school because there was nothing so attractive about school. Even though we were given pocket money, uniform, key soap to encourage them but there was nothing in particular that impressed parents in the villages to take their children to school. Those who worked with the missionaries

saw the value of education and asked their children to go to school. The Almajiri⁸ system is also a system of education that has been preferred long ago because of its religious colouration.” - Sade (Federal)

On the contrary, Ubi (Federal) argued that:

“In my part of the country [southwest], parents were willing to sell their clothes to send their children to school. I know a family who was not that rich but the mother sold her wrapper to send their children to school. They believed that whatever you got through education would help you to thrive better in anything you decide to do later in life.”

The two realms also streamed into the issue of the north-south dichotomy in education. According to Osho (Oyo), private schools became popular in the 1980s and they were to complement the government's efforts in education especially for parents who could afford the cost. The failure of the government's control and monitoring allowed the proliferation of private schools in the south. In the north, a slight difference was noted. Between the 1970s and the early 2000s, the number of private schools, apart from the missionary schools, were not more than 15 according to Mallam (Adamawa),. Chay (Anambra) explained that when the policy of free education came, northerners did not embrace it because their belief and culture preferred their own religious Islamic education. And their women were kept perpetually in purdah. Easterners and Southerners embraced education the more. But westerners embraced it most. Northerners were affected negatively (Chay).

Thus, while Mallam notes the limited expansion of the private schools in the north, southern respondents described how the failure of public schools contributed to fuel the proliferation of private schools in the south. On the one hand, as Irene (Delta) observed, people saw private schools as a better option when the government exhibited weakness in delivering quality education. The rise of private schools shows the failure of the government. On the other hand, many respondents (e.g. Ugowe (Delta), Oye (Oyo), Ozor (Anambra), Ike (Anambra) and Egbe (Delta)) explained that when the quality of education began to fail and the government could not implement effective public policies, the standard of schools started dropping and private persons and groups saw an opportunity to establish private schools to make money. Ismaila (Adamawa) mentioned a religious dimension but this has not been explored. He stated that “in early 1980 there was a rise in private schools and religion played a vital role in this rise; churches had their primary school and also Islamiyah the schools”.

6.3 Private Schools: For Whom?

During the qualitative interviews, a business argument was raised as a key factor in the rise of private schools. Theo (federal) noted an increased category of players, noting that there has been an increasing range of private sector actors that are owning and running schools. In the pre-military era, Theo said that there were only government and missionary schools but today there

⁸ They are street children, mostly boys who are supposed to be acquiring Islamic education but are often seen in streets with plastic bowls begging alms.

is an increase in the number of players, including foreign investors and managers of education. According to Madaki (Federal):

“It has become an enterprise that people want to partake in to make money. Before they were doing very well in terms of stepping in when the missionaries had gone but later it became an all comers’ enterprise. People diversified their means of money. It is not that they are offering anything better than the government schools.”

The alternative provision of education and quest to make money from it raises some questions about whom they are established for. It is argued that the genre of private schools that subsequently emerged in place of the mission schools when the government gave another opportunity for private provision of education has been largely capitalist oriented and the good ones are usually beyond the reach of poor parents (Osaghae, 1995). Ugowe (Delta) noted that when the government could not implement its policies effectively, the standard of schools started dropping and private persons cashed in on it, setting up private schools simply to make money.

A statement that 'the number of private schools increased in the 1980s and 1990s because people saw it as a means of making money for the schools’ owners and managers, was affirmed by former education sector workers, among whom 41.1% and 41.8% agreed and strongly agreed, respectively, indicating that a total of 82.9% of all education sector workers affirm this assumption. There was no specific north and south pattern in the responses received on this. This assumption also received a strong affirmation from parents and former students, among whom 79.1% (45.2% agreed and 33.9% strongly disagreed) affirmed this. Only 5.5% disagreed, and 1.4% strongly disagreed.

Kwire (Adamawa) who worked at the Ministry of Education argued that the pursuit of wealth contributed to the rising number of private schools; she saw them as money-making machines. It seems "individuals took advantage of government's incompetence and authorization to set up and manage schools. Everything now becomes business" (Obi, Anambra). Mamman (Kano) posited that governments failed to implement effective education policies and programmes, and that contributed to the growth of the private schools in the country, and “even the children of those in government are in private not public schools, they are in private schools in the country while others are studying abroad.” In a study by Ezegwu (2020, p.145), some respondents in Sokoto argued that “if you tell the governor to take his children to the public school, he will not agree because he knows that they are not doing better.” The respondent contended that in the past, there were no private schools in the state. Both rich and poor children attended the same public schools and as a result, the government took good care of schools because other elites and their children were also attending the schools. The same level and quality of education were also offered to all children that went to school "but now poor people have their school, the middle class have their own, and rich class have their own, they have these private schools where they are paying huge amounts of money” and some of them send their children to study outside the country, “not even in Nigeria that does not have an education.” They also argued that the level of "education they are giving to children in government schools [which the poor attend]

does not equal the level delivered at private schools. Nursery one of private schools performs better than the primary one in a government school" (Ezegwu, 2020, p.145).

It may therefore be concluded that education in Nigeria is highly stratified. While the elite children largely attend private schools, there are also other categories of private schools for the poor. Private schools in Nigeria are provided in different forms. Some were established for elites, some were established for the middle classes and others were established for the poor and these also have varying qualities and charging different ranges of fees (Härmä, 2011; Adefeso-Olateju, 2013; EDOREN, 2016; Unterhalter, Robinson and Ibrahim, 2018). Tawney (1943) and Reay (2012) argue that a socially just education should accord equal rights to every learner and abolish all kinds of barriers and hierarchical education frameworks. Social justice in education particularly demands "the abolition of private and elitist schools that fundamentally undermine equality and perpetuate advantages of middle and upper classes over others" (Ezegwu, 2020, p.146).

6.4 Private education and Malpractices

There is an interesting conversation in the literature over the contribution of private schools to the escalating and entrenched malpractices in the school system and lowering the standard of education. Ojo (2020) contends that the desire to enroll and keep a large number of students to make huge profits inspires proprietress and proprietors of private schools in Nigeria to engage in negative school management practices, which help to give impressions that they perform very well in examinations. According to Animasahun and Ogunniran (2018, p. 183) "teachers get involved in examination malpractices, dictating answers to students in the examination hall in a bid to boast that the school has the highest distinctions and credit passes. This situation is common in private schools." Also Ugochukwu and Omokhoa (2019, p.164) point that "private schools' principals who want to be in the good books of their employers and their schools to be seen as best schools by the public also engage in examination malpractice." They also note that both private and public schools are altogether involved in examination malpractices. During the interview, Ike (Anambra) maintained that while the number of private schools is increasing because the government could no longer contend with the teeming population of learners and private schools tend to give employment to graduates that the government could not, the "proliferation of quack private schools is the major factor for exam malpractice, arranging magic centres." Nike (Oyo) believed that the emergence of private schools facilitated malpractices in exams and assessments. Chay argued that after EXPO79, exam malpractice has kept on increasing because of the influx of private schools which are business-oriented. "Children's interest in education dropped after EXPO 79. They began to hope on malpractice to achieve education. Some students will score 'A's but with nothing to show for it."

7. The Nature of Military Education Policies and Programmes

In this section, the nature of the military education policies and their influences are summarized. Attempts are made to discuss these using the Political Settlement Analysis (PSA).

7.1 Policy Motivations

An important question that relates to political bargains, which may provide some useful basis for discussing the outcome of the government policies, relates to the perceived motivations of the government for promoting education reforms. Many of the military education policies do not seem to have been based on evidence-based needs. In the literature, there are differing perspectives on the rationale of and responses to the schools' takeover. For example, in a study by Igwe (1977), critics of the takeover policy, such as Catholic leaders, held the view that the Military Government began the takeover of schools in the east because it believed that the region's advancement in education enabled it to face the rest of the country in the civil war. Thus, "the state takeover of schools was designed to slow down the rate of educational development in the east to enable the other sections of the country to catch up" (Igwe, 1977, p.594). A similar view was held by Ubo (Anambra), a former Local Government Education Secretary, who contended that "the takeover was done on malicious and ethnic grounds because it was all missions and private schools in the Eastern region that were taken. Mission and private schools in the west and north continued."

While this may need further evidence to substantiate, Ahanotu (1983, p.336) reports that as the takeover happened in the south, Islamic social and political institutions also increasingly came under pressure, but limited information exists on whether they were taken away from their owners as was done to the mission schools. Igwe (1977) observed that the fact that the government's takeover policy was also implemented in other regions, mostly in the southern states, tends to weaken the argument of the religious leaders that school takeovers were designed to slow down the educational development of the people of the southeast. By 1973, eight out of the twelve states of the federation at that time had also implemented the school takeover policy (Igwe, 1977). As Igwe argued, it is possible that the takeover was done in up to eight states but we also do not have information on the extent of takeover in each state (whether all or few were taken over in other states) to help us understand the possible reason for the conflicting claims. This is particularly important because Dede (Federal), a former federal minister for education who rose from the position of a teacher to university lecturer made a similar claim as highlighted below:

"In the eastern region where schools were taken over, after the war, they did not have very much resistance but, subsequently, the government in its wisdom and response to proper advice, gradually returned the schools to the owners and, somehow, some of the missionaries have also built new schools which are also run as private schools now."

The emphasis on where schools were taken over gives an impression that schools may have either not taken over at all or partially taken over in other regions.

Another argument noted by Igwe (1977) was that some religious organisations, such as the Catholic church, which operated schools before the war, also played important roles through their international networks to provide relief materials to the starving Biafrans during the war. Such support could also have inspired the takeover of their schools after the war. The Federal Government consciously employed starvation as a strategic weapon to win the civil war (Mudge, 1970; Diamond, 2007; Uche, 2008; Akresh et al., 2017). Hence, there may have been a conscious policy effort to sanction institutions that helped the secessionists overcome the starvation policy. Mudge (1970, p.228) quoted the declaration of Brigadier Benjamin Adekunle (Nigerian Army), who stated: "I want to see no Red Cross, no Caritas, no World Council of Churches, no Pope, no missionary and no UN delegation. I want to prevent even one Ibo having even one thing to eat before their capitulation." Akresh et al. (2017, p.2) also quoted another statement from Alison Ayida, who was the Head of Nigerian Delegation to Niamey during a Peace Talk in July 1968: "Starvation is a legitimate weapon of war, and we have every intention of using it against the rebels." This suggests that Igwe's observation on the claims about possible punishment of the mission after the war could be a reason for the schools' takeover. Some scholars have noted that the government conspicuously sought reasons to take over schools from missions. According to Ajuzie in Onwuegbuchulam (2017, p.155):

"Besides the post-war social demands, the government nursed several allegations against the missionaries who controlled more than 75% of the educational establishment in then Nigeria. They were branded as inefficient in their accounting system, pointing to possible misuse of the fund in their school administration. The missionaries were accused of observing too many public holidays during the school years.... The last straw was the government's allegation that the missionaries worked on the side of Biafra during the civil war. The Christian missionaries, of course, remained in parts of Nigeria during the war on account of their works of charity. Those of them in the east were helping the refugees of the war-torn areas. They tried to rescue lives, solicit for and to bring relief from overseas to the hungry people of Biafra. For these and the rest of the philanthropic services they rendered, the government was displeased with them. It was felt that their activities helped to prolong Biafran resistance."

Madaki (Federal) who taught at Advanced Teachers' College in 1972, believed that missionaries offered better quality education on the one hand, but their efforts may have been weakened by their commitment to their faith principles, values and passion to advance their missionary work. According to Ezegwu (2020, p.15), although the development of the formal Western school system in Nigeria was pioneered by missionaries, "its introduction and expansion across the country are inextricably tied to three different historical factors: European exploration, Christian missionary activities and colonialism..." and these three groups had one thing in common: "the promotion of education [was] a means of promoting their respective businesses and particularly to produce educated persons that served as middlemen for effective communication with the local people, which was necessary for business promotion, evangelism and political administration." Thus, Madaki (Federal) argued that the schools' takeover impacted negatively on education because:


“... it was faith-based, they were out to give the best to the students and the school system. Partisan politics and religious bias made the whole thing not work. It was not as if they did policy level by level but it was just a transfer of authority to the government and then, the standard of education fell. Even when some states handed back the schools, the schools were not the same again as the missionaries were already out of the country.”

It is worth noting that in the second decade after independence, immediately after the civil war and during Gowon's regime, Nigeria formulated the Second National Development Plan (1970 – 1974). The plan focused on '3Rs' - Reconciliation, Reconstruction and Rehabilitation and emphasised five national objectives that were centered on national unity, a free and democratic society, a strong and self-reliant nation, a dynamic economy and equal opportunity for all citizens (the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1970; Sokari-George, 1987; Uche, 2019). Education was projected as an important factor for the realisation of these national objectives (the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1970; Nwuzor, 1983). While Csapo (1983, p.91) notes that “the federal government of Nigeria looked upon education as the instrument par excellence for realising rapid national development, for achieving social change, and for forging together a nation split by civil war,” it does not appear that its economic development dimensions were pursued – at least in certain parts of Nigeria, as there were conscious efforts to undermine the economic development of the southeast. Available records indicate that the federal government paid a flat sum of twenty pounds to all pre-war Igbo bank account holders at the end of the war irrespective of the amount they had deposited in the bank, and their properties in some parts of the country were declared as abandoned properties after the war (Nnaemeka, 1997; Olutayo, 1999; Unegbu, 2010). This does not indicate an effort to implement the 3Rs or advance economic development. It is also important to reiterate that the socioeconomic woes and crises that (more than before) demanded an urgent reconstruction, reconciliation and intervention were originally triggered by military interventions. The same military that took part in these interventions sought to use education as a tool to repair the crises they caused (Udo, 1970; Onuoha, 2016).

As Kwire (Adamawa) who worked with the Ministry of Education stated, “the government always wants to introduce something new, not minding if it affects the system or not.” A major concern is what inspired the introduction of the new policies. According to Lorna (Anambra) who was a member of the State Universal Basic Education Board (SUBEB), “policy changes are done for best global practices but then Nigeria has a terrible foundation of corruption. Every good policy is bastardized because of avariciousness.” As summarised in Figure 13, responses from our survey respondents also reveal issues that highlight how education reforms were possibly used as political bargaining tools. While enhancing nation-building (25.86%) and promoting national unity (22.73%) were the two most mentioned reasons for reforms such as curricular changes, the third and fourth reasons were to win political support (14.4%) and to make policies that will be associated with the regimes (14.06%). Winning political support is a major reason for political bargaining. Ortnor (2013) observes that political actors and parties can attract and broaden the scope of support they receive from the public with greater ease by allocating discretionary spending. They are also more likely to gain platforms for reaching important political agreements when they have a large support base among the citizens. The military appears to have played this

game of widening their scope of support among the citizens, especially in the northern part of the country, by investing in free education, which they might have felt could draw popular interest and appreciation. With the wider support, it becomes easier to attract recognition among other categories of stakeholders and reduce popular disenchantment that often heralds opposition and demands for military intervention, which could trigger coups.

Figure 13: Reasons Governments Promoted Policy and Curriculum Changes



Human capital development, which is a major reason for promoting education and learning, received the lowest mention among all options presented (besides no response, 'I do not know', and 'others'). This suggests a major weakness in Nigeria’s education planning. Although the respondents mentioned that learning improved, we may not confidently say that this was the chief reason behind various government reforms in education. Human capital development (learning) was sacrificed to promote nation-building and national unity and to win political support.

7.2 The pattern of appointment in the military

Nepotism, corruption, the tendency to appoint friends and cronies, became entrenched in the Nigerian governance system, and the pattern of appointment in the military regimes. These were also evident in the pattern of military juntas appointment of ministerial officeholders. As Muhammad and Liman (2018) contend, military rule in Nigeria contributed enormously to the erosion of the capacity of the executive office in the country’s public sector, which should have

gained from improved training and high recruitment standards. The military reduced the public sector operations to a mere platform for the provision of patronage to their friends, relatives, retired and serving colleagues. Consequently, the orchestration of political patronage to people that lack requisite skills became the norm and set the standard for nepotism that currently pervades public sector recruitment in Nigeria. The appointed ministers that headed ministries largely had military backgrounds and these appointments were not based on any coherent criteria, experiences in governance or standard of academic qualification. Moreover, office terms were not fixed but depended on a culture of patronage (Jegede, 2013; Muhammad and Liman, 2018). Muhammad and Liman also argue that in such situations it is the well-connected that were appointed into public offices for which they were not usually intellectually equipped or suitable. The system of recruiting personnel on a patronage basis or personal favourites thus becomes a very dangerous precedent for subsequent political administration. "The ways and manners the military sometimes made an appointment to top posts in the public service made the mockery of public service rules and regulations governing appointments and promotions (Muhammad and Liman, 2018, p.46).

The pattern of appointment did not end with the military. It engulfed the whole system in the struggle to maintain a balance of power among the multipolar forces, ensure payoff to and protection of former military officials, as observed during Obasanjo and Buhari's civilian regimes (Obioha, 2016). LeVan (2019) identified various pacts and bargains within the military in 1998–1999 in preparation for the handing over of power to civilians. "The military received several exit guarantees pertaining to career advancement, controversial promotions for regime hardliners, protection from corruption prosecutions, and impunity for human rights abuses." Joseph (1983, p.33) observes that one of the obvious outcomes of the combination of military and bureaucratic control of the machinery of governance in Nigeria "is that higher state officials, through 'triangular relationships' with foreign and domestic businessmen, were able to appropriate public funds in ways which shielded such disbursements from the pressures for distribution to subordinate strata within ethnic constituencies." Outside the military, there was another internal bargain that was congruent with the military's transitional government's consensus. "By selecting Obasanjo, the former dictator trusted by the military and the Hausa-Fulani, as its presidential candidate, the party effectively paid off the 'Yoruba debt' triggered by the annulment of the 1993 election, when Abiola was denied the presidency" (LeVan, 2019). There was also an agreement with the party's elites to share and alternate the office of the president between north and south as a way of ensuring power balance (Obasanjo handed over to a northerner). In Obasanjo's administration, according to LeVan (2019, p.65), nearly 900 officers were promoted before the end of Obasanjo's first term as a "large down payment on democracy, "spoiling" them for staying out of politics".

The military experience seems to have contributed to the federal character principle that has become a dominant pattern at the expense of merit, experience and qualification in Nigerian government appointments and recruitment into the civil service. While some quota systems that sought to ensure regional representation at the federal level existed in Nigeria before independence, the principle of the federal character became official in the 1979 constitution

(Joshua, Loromeke and Olanrewaju, 2014). It particularly became a conduit for oiling the political clientele system and patronage networks. According to Suberu (2013, p.79):

“The innovative Nigerian principle of “federal character,” according to which the country's ethnic and regional diversity must be reflected in all governmental appointments and disbursements, has effectively transformed prebendalism (or the personal, factional, and communal appropriation of public offices) from an informal norm of political competition into a directive principle of state policy.”

The military enshrined the principle in the 1979 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, which was adapted as the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Adamolekun, Erero and Oshionebo (1991, p.75) posit that “the makers of the 1979 Constitution who introduced the “federal character” principle specifically linked it to the objective of achieving national unity. Some of them also believed that the principle would help to “secure and maintain stability in the country.” Section 14, Subsections 3 and 4 of the 1979 Constitution states that:

“The composition of the Government of the Federation or any of its agencies and the conduct of its affairs shall be carried out in such manner as to reflect the federal character of Nigeria and the need to promote national unity, and also to command national loyalty thereby ensuring that there shall be no predominance of persons from a few States or from a few ethnic or other sectional groups in that government or any of its agencies.”

Adamolekun Erero and Oshionebo (1991) explained that establishing a system of representation in the government and federal civil service became very appealing between 1966 (when the military first came into power) and 1975-1976 (when it centralized the system and elevated the power of the federal tier over the states and local governments). This also contributed to advance the prevailing federal ascendancy over other tiers, including the domination of the policymaking and control of the education sector. “This de facto superiority was formally acknowledged by the Udoji Commission (1974), which placed the highest-paid career officials (permanent secretaries) in the state governments in a salary grade below that of the federal permanent secretaries in a unified (national) salary structure (Adamolekun Erero and Oshionebo, 1991). In the education sector, this also naturally makes the federal Ministry of Education and federal schools more attractive than those of the states.

7.3 Unplanned Reforms informed by a Search for Political Legitimacy

In mainstream social science game theory, the literature of bargaining, cooperation and settlement, which is varied, recognizes different domains of interests (see Shubik, 1973; Munck, 2001; Elsner et al., 2014; Wajzerand Cukier-Sygula, 2019). Wajzerand Cukier-Sygula (2019, p.1) notes domains of 2 × 2 games: “a single-population and a two-population model. The first one assumes the existence of interactions between representatives of the same population, while the second focuses on interactions among individuals from two different populations.” Levy’s (2014) four ideal types of political settlement pictures four domains of elite games of competitions and cooperation that gives a clearer insight into the 2 x 2 game domains and are

particularly useful for our discussion of the governments that emerged from coups and their outcomes. Levy expands what may be categorized as Wajzer and Cukier-Sygula (2019) individual and group actors based on their nature: dominant and competitive (see section 3).

For our discussion that focuses on the military coups and rules, Nwanze (1979) further simplified the domains, noting that the military coups often produce a dominant part of the matrix, which often becomes personalized and represented by the Supreme Military Council in Nigeria. The nature of the military elite cooperation was relatively high compared to those of the non-military elite within the study period. The personalized system in which power was concentrated in the hand of the few (members of the Supreme Military Council) with the military leader as the arrowhead enabled power to be exercised without requisite consultation – not even with technocrats and bureaucrats in the education sector – the military-political actors had no independent authorities that checked their actions and they were responsible to no one. This accorded enormous power to the military rulers who “decreed into existence” (Obanya, 2012, p1) whatever they felt could enhance their political legitimacy.

According to Akinsanya (1976, 118), “The main problem of military regimes is their lack of legitimacy. Few people, including the military, believe that the military has any right to rule.” Information from the literature and interviews suggests that despite the supreme position held by the Supreme Military Council (SMC), the intervening military juntas faced a need to engage in some multidimensional bargaining and settlement as parts of the efforts to secure legitimacy and establish themselves in power. The ruling military authority recognized its need to bargain and settle the public to gain popular support that will enable them to remain in power (this bargaining with the Nigerian public through UPE is already discussed in section 5.2.3 iv). The second was a need to bargain with the international communities by courting various international policy regimes and programmes to gain acceptance and support. The third was their need to bargain with and ensure internal settlements within the military ranks and files to create stability, prevent counter coups and be able to prolong their stay in power. How these played out in the educational policies of the military are subsequently discussed.

Apart from the Abacha and Buhari regimes, the Nigerian leaders' courting of international communities to gain support was obvious. For Gowon, which faced the rebellion from the east, international support was very important to execute and win the war. It was in the middle of the war that Nigeria organized a curriculum conference. This conference was funded by UNESCO but the military received the credit for organizing it (UNESCO, 1996; Imam, 2012; Elechi, 2016; Daniel-Kalio, 2018). The military government also keyed into an international trend. During the interview, Adigun (federal), who had held the position of the Registrar and Chief Executive Officer of the Nigerian Teachers' Registration Council, mentioned that:

“Global expectations also determine the policies the education sector will have. For example, the girl-child education which was introduced after the Beijing Conference of 1995, is seen as critical. International best practices also drive policy changes.”

Similarly, Theo (federal) a retired school principal and former Deputy Director at the Ministry of Education, explained that global trends were one of the key influences behind Nigerian education policies, noting that “the former president Olusegun Obasanjo upon return from a visit to one country, launched the UBE. He made another trip, returned and introduced a 10-year plan in education. Hence, what leaders see in other countries influences their decision.” Egbe (Delta), a parent who was also a teacher educator, particularly noted that the UPE programme was in response to an international policy that was aimed at making education free and accessible to every child. In the literature, it is noted that the UPE was part of the discussion of the African Head of States meeting at the Organization of Africa Unity (OAU) in 1961 in Addis Ababa (Nwangwu, 2003; Elechi, 2016). Gowon was observed to have announced the UPE years ahead of its introduction (before his government was even ready to implement it). The government could have been seen as an independent rational actor in the game, acting on its own volition, if it exhibited the capacity to implement the projects, ensuring adequate planning was done and making necessary resources available. Instead, the expansion initiative was not matched with a commensurate increase in funding, which impacted education quality (Moja, 2000).

While the military regimes of Abacha and Buhari did not give much attention to political maneuvering, bargaining and settlements with the international community (Odinkalu, 2001), the regime of Babangida gave full attention to it. For example, not long after Babangida took over power, his quest for international support was evident in his economic diplomacy aimed at promoting Nigeria in the global market and aligning with global regimes through his Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) that devastated social services in the country. In what looks like a contradiction to the SAP approach, the regime abolished fees for primary education nationwide and reinstated direct grants for primary education (Saliu, 1997; Tyona, 2020). It was like a double courting: seeking international support with SAP while dangling free education to gain local support. Thus, it could be said that the regime initially gave attention to building local support and courting international support by taking up various ambitious foreign policy initiatives, including the Technical Aids Corps Scheme (which supported many African countries in the areas of social amenities, health care services, education etc) and defence (Odubajo, 2017; Ogbonna and Ogunnubi, 2018). This was also a period of the quest for global fame and uptake of international responsibilities that secured the OPEC Chairpersonship, United Nations General Assembly Presidency, and Secretary-General of the Commonwealth of Nations positions for Nigeria. The military regimes built a strong international image and positioned Nigeria as the leader in Africa dedicated to the welfare of the black race in the world. What Babangida did afterwards when he began to enjoy the windfall of support revealed that these lofty policies were to buy support and establish himself: in a dramatic twist he began to pursue programmes of political office elongation (Odubajo, 2017). According to Ikpe (2000, p.155):

“When Babangida felt secure enough, he began to undermine and destabilize the transition programme which he had extravagantly planned. It was obvious that he had a hidden agenda, which was to perpetuate himself in power through dexterous manipulations. His most favourite strategy was dispensing largesse to powerful

groups and individuals to buy their support. In the local parlance, this came to be known as 'settlement'. "

Ikpe further notes that the politics of settlement combined patrimonialism and incorporation and was based on a conviction many Nigerians can be bought over with institutional positions and socioeconomic opportunities "to support any regime that offers attractive patronage" (Ikpe, 2000, p.155). Babangida's effort enjoyed good cooperative bargaining and pay-off to his acolytes (see Doron and Sened, 1995).

Despite the return to civil rule, Obasanjo, who previously led a military government, continued in the quest for political loyalty and announced policies before they were planned. In just four months of coming to power, in a military-style, General Olusegun Obasanjo launched the UBE on 29 September 1999 in Sokoto (the same state Gowon announced it) before necessary consultation with different stakeholders and other tiers of the government (Obanya, 2014; Gershberg, et al, 2016). The UBE was launched in 1999 but the actual policy frameworks were provided in form of the Universal Basic Education Act and National Policy on Education in 2004 (FME, 2004).

Also, like the UPE, components of the UBE appear to have been influenced by global dynamics, donor-driven initiatives and its antecedents (see Ezegwu, 2015; Gershberg, 2016). The Universal Basic Education Commission (UBEC), which is an agency of the Federal Ministry of Education that is responsible for the implementation and management of the UBE programme, states that the programme "is intended as evidence of Nigeria's commitment to the Education For All, at Jomtien (1990)" (UBEC, 2004, p.16) rather than national interest and national development needs. Also, the Nigerian Policy on Gender in Basic Education, which seeks to ensure gender equality is effectively embedded in the UBE, states that "this policy was developed in the context of the Girls' Education Project, developed in 2005 and implemented by the FGN, DFID and UNICEF as a contribution to the pursuit of EFA/UBE" (FME, 2007, p.3), indicating that it has been externally driven and not a homegrown initiative (Ezegwu, 2015).

The choice of Sokoto as a location for announcing the UPE and UBE brings us closer to accepting Kosack's (2012) argument on how political leaders arrive at policy choices and determine which groups to pay due respect to in their policy choices as either an appeal for support or part of an existing bargain to remain in power. Kosack (2012, p. xi) contends that "if leaders were free to pursue policies of their choosing, then, perhaps, their policy choices could be explained by the differences of political will, knowledge, or morality." While the military and subsequent democratic leaders have some influence "above politics" as Angerbrandt and Themnér (2020, p.1) observed in the case of Obasanjo and Buhari civilian regimes, they were aware of constraints they faced in choosing and pursuing any policy option because of "particular set of citizens – selected voting blocs or certain business elites, landowners, workers, or other economic, social, religious, or ethnic communities" (Kosack 2012: xi). Sokoto, and particularly the Sultan of Sokoto is an important figure in Nigeria, and especially in the northern geopolitical zones and to Nigerian Muslims at large. Seeking Nigerian Muslims' and the northern block's support demands respect to the exalted office of Sultan. Both Gowon and Obasanjo were Christians at the times they went

to Sokoto to announce their intentions for UPE and UBE respectively. Their religious background appears to have put additional pressure and responsibility on them to prove to Muslims in Nigeria and the core north (Gowon is from the north-central of Plateau state while Obasanjo is from the southwest) that they respect Sultans' authority. Besides being the Seat of the Islamic Caliphate in Nigeria, Sokoto is the home of the two dominant ethnic groups in northern Nigeria: Hausa and Fulani (see Unterhalter et al. 2017; Ezegwu, 2020).

The military leaders' engagement in internal bargaining and settlements may somewhat be explained in the context of cooperative and non-cooperative bargains (see Doron and Sened, 1995). As noted earlier while the military leaders were somewhat powerful, they also experienced some constraints. This raised a need for internal bargaining and settlements with the military rank and file. Levan noted two pointers to this. In relation to the circumstances surrounding the annulment of the 1993 election, he notes that "the north dominated the military and they were afraid Abiola was going to clean out the army. The army is their compensation for the 1966 coup" (Leval, 2019, p.38). Hence an incoming leader should be one that would respect the military, which is one of the two parties that counted in Nigeria – the other party was the civilian, at the helm of which Sultan and others dominate (see Matthews, 1984). The second pointer relates to the transition programme of General Abdulsalam Abubakar, which reveals the cooperative (soft-liners) and non-cooperative (hardliners) groups within the military. Leval (2019, p.45) notes that "Around March 1999, as the handover neared, Abubakar was being squeezed on one side by soft liners such as Mike Okhai Akhigbe, Chief of General Staff, who insisted that transition proceed, and on the other side by hardliners." Levan particularly notes that "the transition also proved largely beyond Abubakar's control when it came to delivering on his promises to release pro-democracy activists or to rein in hardliners such as Jerry Useni and Abacha's Chief Security Officer, Hamza Al- Mustapha" (Leval, 2019, p.44). These are possible kinds of behind-the-scenes influences of various national politics and policies of the military, including education policies.

While the core motives of Obasanjo to re-introduce the UPE in the form of UBE are not very clear in the literature, various political bargaining and pay-offs that went into bringing Obasanjo back are worth mentioning. Firstly, outside the military, LeVan (2019, p.48) explains that the consensus to bring Obasanjo back was predicated on a need "to contain the dismemberment of Nigeria on account of Western Nigeria's dissatisfaction with the handling of Abiola's election annulment." The choice of Obasanjo by the outgoing military top brass as the right candidate to hand over power to in 1999 also appears to have paid off as his regime seems to have ensured that policies did not radically deviate or become offensive to the military. Angerbrandt and Themnér (2020) examined the role played by ex-military leaders that later re-emerge as civilian presidents in sustaining the dictatorial tendencies, focusing on Obasanjo and Buhari. They noted that the "ex-generals tendency to engage in politics from above is largely a function of to what extent they have diversified their political identities beyond their role as "militaries" and they leveraged on these to operate in burgeoning democracy, benefiting from advanced opportunities these offer to locate themselves above politics (Angerbrandt and Themnér, 2020, p.1). They also created space for the inclusion of the military top brass that departed politics. Obioha (2016, p.263) observes the "reality of the feelings of the military personnel during the Obasanjo

administration, their disconnection during Goodluck Jonathan and reconnection in the present Nigeria government under President Buhari." Obioha contends that these may not be divorced from the extent the retired generals as well as other army officers are involved in the current democratic dispensation. In furtherance of political inclusion of the ex-military and as part of the payoff from the political bargains, Obasanjo "banked on the tacit support of the retired military generals" and his part, he appointed them into strategic positions in his cabinet and paying them off with attractive positions like defence minister and minister of police affairs offices. While this may have not been strongly maintained under Goodluck, it has been sustained by President Buhari by appointing retired military Generals into strategic ministerial positions (Obioha, 2016, p.263).

7.4 Poor planning

In the above subsection, we discussed the issue relating to unplanned reforms. This subsection highlights shortcomings that existed when attempts were made to plan for educational development. Looking beyond the staggering enrolment statistics (discussed in section 5.1), the enrolment explosion revealed the inaccuracy of the statistics used for educational planning and the weak institutional capacity for effective education sector planning and development. Csapo (1983) reveals that the military government expected about 6.4 million pupils to enrol in the UPE in 1976 but over 8.2 million pupils came to schools and by 1977 the figure had risen to 9.5 million. The initial registration of pupils into the UPE further revealed the government's lack of capacity to manage or control the enrolment upsurge. For example, in Anambra State, while about 188,000 children registered for the UPE, about 288,000 came to schools in September 1976. The government's estimate was far lower than the actual number that turned up. The increase caused an urgent need for an additional 150,995 classrooms by 1980. Again, "predictions where the classrooms were to be most needed were as inaccurate as the estimation of enrollment" as the staffing gaps soared (Csapo, 1983, p.93).

At the secondary level, access to secondary education was very limited, restricted and competitive before the launch of the UPE. FME (2005, p.100) reveals that "pupils who passed the prescribed entrance and consequent interview examinations were placed in the relatively few available secondary schools." The upsurge of UPE-influenced enrolment at the primary level contributed to the increase in secondary school enrolment. Many states were able to prepare for this by building additional secondary schools, which was boosted by the return of democracy in 1979 (FME, 2005). During the Second Republic, especially as a result of various promises made during electioneering campaigns, the number of new secondary schools established in some states as well as their secondary school enrolment increased (FME, 2005). This contributed to reducing the competitiveness and stress of secondary school admissions. Yet, as with the overall UPE, the upsurge in secondary provision lagged significantly behind in terms of the number of available classrooms, teacher supply and effective planning (FME, 2005). The connection between campaign promises and an increase in the number of schools represents a good example of what was lacking in the military regimes. There was no opportunity for alternative political platforms and competitions that could have encouraged good performance. Osho (Oyo) notes that under the Shagari (Bola Ige in Oyo state) regime, the government provided infrastructure and textbooks for students, which strengthened the quality of education but the

subsequent government displaced the democratic governance and did not continue in this direction.

Also, the military-style of policy introduction (without adequate planning and evaluation of the cost) impacted the system capacity to sustain the success recorded. Akinwumi (2006) believes that the inconsistency in government and its policies might have contributed to the downward trend in enrolment numbers. Some years after the launch of UPE, there was a reduction and, in some cases, withdrawal of incentives parents received, which affected their ability to support their children's education. As for schools, "things became so bad in the public primary schools that pupils had to bring their chairs and desks from home.... Various levies were also imposed on the pupils in the schools" (Akinwumi, 2006, p.161-162). On their part, many households were experiencing financial difficulties and increased household poverty, which made it difficult for them to bear the various costs of sending children to school (FME, 2005). While the enrolment might have continued to increase in some places, and in terms of numbers due to the country's huge population and increasing awareness of the value of education among the populace, the percentage of the increase was no longer as it was in the first two years of the UPE (Akinwumi, 2006; Olaniyan, 2011). According to Madaki (Federal):

"The standard was good and the classes were enough. We had 20-40 in the classrooms. However, when parents became better aware of the benefits of education things changed. Class size increased from 20-40 to 60 students to a teacher. It was terrible. The minister of education made a surprise visit to a primary school in Lagos and he came back crying because of what he saw. No desk for the teacher, both teachers and pupils sat on the bare floor with no toilets in the school. With more awareness, the standard became poor, teachers are not motivated and teachers' salaries were not paid."

Similar observations were made on the UBE, which had mixed records in terms of students' overpopulation. According to FME (2005, p.181), in 2002, while the reported average pupil-teacher ratio in the country stood at 39.33, the generalization "masks a lot of variations and distortions from state to state. At the Primary school level, six states had a ratio between 21 and 30. In the same year, 20 states had between 41 and 70 pupils per teacher." This challenge may have not been entirely caused by UBE, but the inadequate planning preceding its launch might have exacerbated it. Moja (2000) reports that before UBE, some schools recorded up to a 1:76 pupil-teacher ratio. At the secondary school level, FME (2005) reports that only four states in Nigeria had pupil-teacher ratios that were between 41 and 60.

The Nigeria Education Sector Diagnosis report (FME, 2005, p.96) revealed that the provision of UPE "is still far from being attained and if this trend continues unattended to, the attainment of UPE under any programme could prove elusive, more so the disparities that exist between state, localities and by gender." The report shows that female participation remained lower than 50% over the years. Overall, the Gross Enrolment Ratio (GER) at the primary level stood at 93% in 2001, which suggests that participation in basic education was relatively low even though there was a presence of pupils of different ages (such as underage and overage pupils). At the junior

secondary school level, GER stood at 44.27 in 1999, 44.07 in 2000, 44.02 in 2001 and 42.83 in 2002. The data shows a continuous decline in junior secondary enrolment (FME, 2005).

Focusing on the enrolment and schools increase alone, as many scholars have done (e.g. Csapo, 1983; see Akinwumi, 2006; Olaniyan, 2011), tends to mask various political, policy and management issues created by the interruptions as discussed in the subsequent subsections.

7.5 Inadequate preparation for new policies due to frequent changes in government and education ministers

Further to the challenge of unplanned reforms, a state of inadequate preparation and mobilization was observed in the literature. The policy developers, technocrats and ministers of education were largely ill-positioned to draft a well thought out plan for the Ministry of Education. Olaniyan (2012, p. 154) sees inadequate preparation and mobilization of policymakers as “the bane of policy enactments.” The lack of preparation has been a product of regular changes in government, political and administrative structures. Olaniyan argued that ministers of education were often unsure when they would be removed from office. It is difficult to fully assess the problems of national education within a short time, let alone propose long-term changes. The constant turnover in political leadership, ministers and other important officers negatively affected policy continuity, the consistency of implementation and policy sustainability (Odukoya, 2009; Obanya, 2011; Gershberg, et., 2016).

Nigeria had five regimes and eight ministers of education between 1991 and 1999 (Odukoya, 2012). Odukoya (2012) and Obanya (2011: 18) shared pathetic examples of how changes in the offices of the minister of education impacted policies. Ajayi, as cited in Odukoya (2012, p.13), describes a personal experience:

“Within the eight years (1991-1999) that I served as Provost, the nation passed through five different regimes (Babangida till 1993, Shonekan for less than four months in 1993, Abacha 1993-1998, Abubakar 1998-1999, Obasanjo 1999-2007). Within this period I had to operate under eight Ministers of Education. The same thing happened at the state level. Each of the Presidents, Ministers, Governors and Commissioners had their different conceptions and policies on education that they tried to implement during their tenure. With such instability in the system of governance, coupled with constant changes in “Ministers of” “Ministers for” and “commissioners for,” one should not be surprised at the level of the crises the nation's education system has witnessed over the years and the inconsistency and often contradictory nature of the educational policies and practices. It is one step forward and two steps backwards.”

Obanya (2011, p.18) also reports that:

“The minister who was in office from 1999 to 2001 was preoccupied with seeing through the Universal Basic Education (UBE) programme. His successor was more

concerned with ensuring the take-off of the National Open University. His successor focussed on curriculum reform and the review of the National Policy on Education. After him came a minister who vigorously pursued structural reforms of the sector... The minister who came after that (2007-2008) was preoccupied with 'reforming the reforms', while the minister currently in the post has as a pet project a national educational 'Roadmap' project."

The frequent regime changes led to frequent promulgation of new policies, many of which were discarded midway (Aluede, 2006; Gersberg et al., 2016). These led to diverse, changing policies as further discussed in the following subsection. According to Dare (Federal):

"The military slowed down the pace of education in Nigeria. Each time there was a new government, there is a new agenda-driven by decree or the constitution, which most times, are not followed to the letter. We kept having somersaulting the school calendar."

7.6 Policy Somersault

Some conflict between national interest and personal interests of people in power, which often results in a policy summersault, may help explain the nature of military education policies. Babalola (2018, p.3) explains policy somersault as a situation of "consistent policy tumbles, flip-flops, turns over, or is abandoned midway" and this "can manifest in form of lack of consistency in, commitment and conformity to established perspective, policies, programmes and projects owing to so many reasons including misconception, mischief, manipulation, misfit, misinterpretation, misunderstanding, misplacement of priorities and misapplication." During the interview, Adigun (federal) stated that "the nature of government, whether military or civilian, determined the kind of curricular and educational policies the sector would have. There had been a series of policy somersault[s] – one policy today and another tomorrow." The policy inconsistency also appears to provide political pay-offs and settlements, of which political cronies and investors are key beneficiaries. Ozor (Anambra), a retired secondary school teacher, contended that incessant policy changes had negative effects on the education system and particularly noted that those "that created these policies were politicians, military persons and mediocre with their god-fathers." The reference to god-fathers refers to prebendal politics that hold up corruption and rent-seeking behaviours. Ola (Oyo) who was a school administrator, noted the tendency for new governors and political administrators to reject policies and programmes of the predecessor in order to create space for new contractors, suppliers, political god-fathers and clients to access state resources.

Scholars have also documented how it is attractive for political leaders to pursue educational access and quality improvement agenda because it tends to give an impression of active leadership evidenced by visible service, popular policies and interventions. However, these do not always yield expected outcomes in the short run, leading to some confusions and sometimes policy somersaults (Kosack, 2012; Shrestha et al., 2019). Shrestha et al. (2019, p.11) explain that:

“The elite has formal and informal coalitions, whose priorities and incentives may or may not align with a commitment to equity and quality. They have other interests, such as maintaining power and allegiance to the “vital constituencies” that are central to keeping them in power or championing the needs of special interest groups. Thus, education policies may or may not be introduced with the expectation that learning outcomes will improve.”

During the interviews, various respondents pointed out manifestations and implications of policy inconsistencies. Irene (a retired teacher, Delta) noted that constant change of policy is not good for education. These include the changes in educational processes, contents and materials, which made stability difficult. For Oyedeji (2015, p.200), one of the banes of education policy implementation is “lack of continuity of policy implementation whenever there is a change in government or administration and lack of political will by the government.” According to Ike (Anambra), retired school manager, policy changes were many because of incessant change in government; as one doesn't last before another forces them out to take over. Ike explained that such frequent changes in policies did not augur well for the education sector: “education policies were narrow. Policy planners did not consider the needs of the learners and their environment. It was colonial policies” (Ike, Anambra). Similarly, Ubo (a retired school administrative officer, Delta) mentioned that there have been many policy changes and these changes continue to affect the education sector. He noted that between 1977 and 80s when Delta was still part of Bendel state:

“for a period of almost seven or eight years we were static, no promotion, nothing, so it was not easy for those of us who were working as secondary and primary school teachers, it was difficult, salaries were not being paid, they were owing us salaries of over 5, 6 months...”

In situations of non-payment of salaries, teachers are often forced to explore other means of generating income. Whatever each teacher decides to do, contributes to reducing the teacher's time and mental commitment to providing quality education.

The military interventions in Nigerian politics exacerbated the Nigerian experience of policy somersault that manifested largely in the form of a lack of commitment to policy consistency over time (Babalola, 2018). According to Oyedeji (2015), the policies were not usually allowed sufficient time to mature before they were interrupted or terminated. The political climate created by the military coups is that of instability and inconsistency and had not been very conducive for policy maturation and continuity. Educational plans and policies were rendered ineffective because every political leader that came to power, both civilian and military, wanted to be identified with new ones (Obanya, 2011; Oyedeji, 2015). Consequently, the frequent policy changes and politics surrounding them have tended to negatively affect the policy implementation and ultimately contribute to harming the standard of education (Oyedeji, 2015; Elechi, 2016).

An example of frequent changes can be found in the constitutional provisions for education. The military drafted both the 1979 and 1989 constitutions, yet military interruption affected both. In the 1979 constitution (drafted under Obasanjo), the legal basis for free education was established. It stipulated that the government policy should ensure equal and adequate educational opportunities at all levels, strive to provide free, compulsory and universal primary and secondary education, and adult literacy programmes when practicable (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979; Fabunmi, 2005). It was not long before the constitution was suspended by the military intervention that brought Buhari to power. When the military attempted to draft another constitution (under Babangida) it changed the legal basis for free education. The Babangida-led junta closely supervised the drafting of the constitution and ensured that the free element of the UPE was removed from the constitution (Oko, 1998).

Also, the National Policy on Education (NPE) has been repeatedly reviewed with limited impacts. Moja (2000, p.2) comments that the country's NPE that was published in 1977, revised in 1981 and 1990 respectively, again needed to be revised to "address the perceived needs of the government in power." Onu, a retired chairperson of the teachers' union and head of primary school in Anambra, explained that policies may have been properly set and pronounced, but implementation posed problems. Lawmakers destabilized the policies because they wanted their people/persons to reap benefits. This somewhat suggests that the interests of the leadership can override the national development needs which education ought to serve. The ease with which the constitutions and policies were changed under military rule introduced a negative precedent for leaders to change laws and policies that did not suit their interests. The literature is replete with information on efforts by subsequent leaders, such as Abacha and Obasanjo, to 'bend the rules' towards their interests and pursue perpetuation of their stay in office through constitutional reform (Jibrin, 2006; Lindsay, 2006; Mohammed, 2010; Isumonah, 2012; Oyeleye and Osisanwo, 2013; Kieh, 2014). Kieh (2014, p.34) explains that when Obasanjo realized that he was about to lose power, "having learned from the successful constitutional coups", he sought to amend the Constitution in his favour.

Another policy inconsistency was evident in the trajectory of UPE. The inception of the Second Republic in 1979 ended the regime of the federal government's provision of direct subsidy for UPE. It was transferred to the local governments and ended the UPE scheme in most states. The return of the military in 1984 brought UPE back, however, without the 'free' element as fees were introduced. Again in 1986, fees were abolished for primary education nationwide and direct grant for primary education was reinstated. In 1988, National Primary Education Commission (NPEC) was established by Decree 31 of 1988 to bear the responsibility of primary schools' management but it was subsequently abolished by Decrees 2 and 3 of 1991 that transferred the responsibilities back to local government. Yet, Decree No. 96 of 1993 came and re-established it along with State Primary Education Board (SPEB) and Local Government Education Authority (LGEA) as key management structures for primary education in Nigeria. These were modified and transferred to the UBE management structure – the Universal Basic Education Commission (UBEC) at the Federal level, State Universal Basic Education Board (SUBEB) at the state level and the Local Government Education Authority (LGEA) at the local government level (Moja, 2000; Olaniyan and Obadara, 2008).

Furthermore, the unilateral military approach created some tendency towards ambitious projects without due calculation of the cost and implications. The UPE represents a good example of this. According to Duze (2012, p.40) when the Federal Government launched the scheme on September 6, 1976, it was launched as “Universal Free Primary Education” but “it seems that it was the moment the “free” factor was expunged from the popular tag of “UPE” instead of “UFPE” that the scheme began to die.” At the time the language and approach changed, public UPE schools collected fees from pupils. This scheme collapsed “due to inadequate funds to sustain it arising from the unexpected astronomical increase from the number of children that eventually turned up” (Duze, 2012, p.40).

Although sometimes passed between the time UPE was conceived by Gowon and the time Obasanjo launched it, it appears to have been introduced without deep-seated thought. Also, while the NPE was inspired by the 1969 conference and follow up workshops, there appears not to have been adequate preparation for the policy. When the government launched the National Policy on Education in 1977, Asagwara (1995, p.92) notes:

“One year later (1978) the Implementation Committee produced a blueprint that detailed all the steps and measures necessary for successful implementation of the new education policy. The Blueprint cautioned against the hasty and careless implementation of some aspects of the new education policy if negative and disastrous consequences on the economy, the political and social systems were to be avoided. It specified in clear terms: gradual implementation of the universal free education programme; emphasize the importance of the facilities required for each level of education; the number and types of teachers needed; the need for appropriate and adequate learning environment; the need to employ graduates of the new education system, and most essentially, the financial implications. It warned against the full implementation of the new education policy without properly providing for the above needs.”

This suggests that meaningful thought, expert and stakeholders' consultation and planning were omitted before UPE was decreed into existence. It also appears that the developers of the NPE may have failed to do necessary background work before it was produced in 1977. The blueprint's caution that came about two years after the UPE's launch and one year after the NPE release point to what was not done well.

7.7 Centralisation of Education Structure and Management

Another feature of the military intervention in education is the centralization of the education structure. The takeover of schools from private owners and management responsibilities that were previously under the regional governments created a centralised education system. The centralisation of the management also led to the unification of the education structure. Previously, each region operated what is considered best for effective learning within its territory, possibly based on the understanding of their respective peculiarities and development needs: there was 8-5-2-3 system in the east, 7-5-2-3 system in the north and 6-5-2-3 system in

the west (Imam, 2012; Oyedeji, 2015; Babalola, 2018). The independent constitution gave some freedom to regions to decide what they wanted. The military not only unified it, but the military-imposed constitutions also dictated what the central government believed the states needed. “In the military-supervised Constitution of 1979, no state has a right to choose what it wants. Big Brother federal military government knows what every state needs” (Ekeh, 1999, p.74). The regional structures were unified and collapsed into a 6-5-2-3, which was later changed to 6-3-3-4 in 1982, representing six years of primary education, three years of junior secondary education, three years of senior secondary education and four years of university education (Imam, 2012; Oyedeji, 2015; Babalola, 2018). Imam (2012) describes that this change resulted from the government takeover of schools from the missionaries and its attempt to create a unified educational system. Ekeke (Federal – former Director at the Ministry of Education), explained that children were to spend six years in primary school (earlier, it was seven years, five years in secondary school. If you were following the academic line, there were two years of advanced courses before going to the university). The idea was then changed because not everybody could become academic and the country particularly needed middle-level manpower, technicians, people who are specialists in different areas, not just academics. Hence, the junior secondary education level was introduced to prepare people for some kind of skills for specialization in different businesses. Ekeke argued that the senior secondary school was not expected to be an academic programme preparing children for university but it ended up being like that. One major reason for this was that there were no workshops to give children practical skills to become specialized in their chosen fields. Consequently, there emerges a mere 6-3-3-4 that was not practised and poor funding of the education particularly contributed to this.

While some scholars (e.g. Chuta, 1986; Moja, 2000) believe that some of these changes are necessary to improve the quality and management of education, other scholars perceive the changes as distractions, confusion and disorganization in the country’s education system. During interviews, Anya (Anambra) mentioned that “Government takeover of schools did not impact positively because they couldn't contend or provide infrastructure for the crowd of children and couldn't pay salaries”. The latter group of scholars contends that the country’s problem lies in the policy implementation, and the non-availability of personnel, funds, materials, political and administrative will rather than the structure (Odukoya, 2009; The Vanguard, 2012; Elechi, 2016). In the literature, it also noted that the centralization of the education system had some shortcomings that impacted the overall quality of education in the country. Firstly, it altered the historically decentralized structure of Nigeria’s education system that gave an opportunity for school choice. Secondly, the decentralized structure that evolved had a form of the duality of management and control that existed between the government and the private agencies (Nwuzor, 1983).

8. Political Bargaining and Settlement through Education Interventions

In a study of elite bargains and political deals for reducing violent conflict, Cheng, Goodhand and Meehan (2008) note the centrality of elite bargaining in conflict management. They observed that "an understanding of underlying power relations is an essential starting point for effective policy and practice, this is frequently lacking amongst external interveners" (Goodhand and Meehan, 2008, p.1). Some of the critical issues that have weakened educational development in Nigeria since independence relates to elite politics (this particularly affected street children education programme development in northern Nigeria), violent conflict that sparked off from struggles for allocation of resources and mismanaged relationships (this has contributed to weakening intervention efforts on access to education in many Nigerian states), and misunderstanding and suspicion that tend to inspire the rejection of Western education in some locations in Nigeria (AAAS, 2011; NPC and RTI International 2011; Amnesty International, 2013; Jones and Naylor, 2014; UNHCR, 2014; Gershberg et al., 2016). Hence, success in the provision and management of effective education programmes in the country demands an adequate understanding of how different factors and demands have been bargained and (mis)managed (or paid off) by different categories of stakeholders in Nigeria. In this section, we summarise key historical political bargains and settlements we observed in the study of military-political and policy intermissions.

8.1 Political Investors and Political Changes

Some of the important groups in the game of political interventions in Nigeria are the sponsors of various coups. They represent a strong group of influencers, political investors that must be paid off or settled and who must be considered in policy-making processes. While the coup plotters may not be widely seen as god-fathers, they decided who ruled the country and by extension how the country has been governed. The coup plotters decided on whom to invite to take over power in the coups that brought Ironsi, Gowon and Murtala/Obasanjo to power (Ihonvbere, 1991; Dummar, 2002).

Information in the literature suggests that these coup leaders and their sponsors were expected to be carried along and accommodated in government decisions. The fear of them and fear of the opposition groups were potent influences on government decisions. Dummar (2002, p.24) explains that installing the trio of Muhammed, Obasanjo and Danjuma did not end the tremor in government as Mohammed. who reluctantly accepted his assigned position as the new head of state "under conditions established by Garba and his fellow coup plotters," was assassinated by supporters of his predecessor within the ranks of the army (they planned to kill the trio but succeeded only with Muhammed, leading to the failure of the coup). Although the coup failed, Dummar (2002, p.24) mentioned that Obasanjo "attempted to pass the post to Danjuma (middle belt), but Danjuma declined. Obasanjo would lay the groundwork to hand over power to an elected government," suggesting that the fear of the group may have as well contributed to inspire some of the government's policies and programmes, including the election and the

eventual hand of over to the civilian government of Shagari, which was "still dominated by Hausa-Fulani interests, and had many of the old NPC members pushing for Sharia law in Nigeria." Yet, there were speculations that the outgoing military government "had favoured the party and of course the criticism that the NPN backed the powerful northerner's agricultural agenda" (Dummar, 2002, p.25). This may as well possibly explain why Obasanjo pursued the UPE agenda that was announced at the seat of Caliphate, possibly to appease the Hausa-Fulani and the Muslim-dominated north.

Both at the federal and state levels, the political patronage and settlement system also created some inconsistency in policy that contributed to affecting the overall education system. Ola (Oyo) who was a school administrator, explained that "the change in government affected education policy because when governor B comes, he will condemn the books used during governor A's tenure and the curriculum also change during the different tenures". A similar observation was made by Jajuro (Adamawa), a retired Local Government Education Secretary and head of an Islamic School, who noted that curriculum change brought about different book authors and different textbook content. Dantani (Adamawa), who was a NUT chairperson, contended that the change of government and the attendant change in government-contracted authors contributed to affecting students' performance in national examinations. These observations point to the entrenched practice in the system in which each new government brings in its political contractors to supply goods and services to recover the money they invested in the political competitions and also make some gains from the public coffers. Coups were sponsored and the sponsors were political investors that must be paid back (just as godfathers in a democratic system, who must be paid back through awards of contracts and allocation of juicy political appointments and allocations). While we may not claim that this originated from the military regimes, we rightly say that this contributed to affecting the quality of education as each regime came with new changes, new political investors that must be paid off and the payment may include the award of education contracts and request to supply educational materials as Ola (Oyo) observed.

8.2 National Bourgeoisie and International Interests' Settlement

Besides, the coup sponsors outside the military appear to include both civilians with powerful economic and social positions and, external bodies. Okeke and Ugwu, (2013) explained that external bodies tend to exercise influence on the military activities in Nigeria and had sponsored military coups across the world on narcissistic grounds. Wiking (1983, p.40) explains that some of such coups are "often supported and planned by the metropole and its intelligence service. They are directed not only against progressive regimes but also against regimes which are not able to maintain the political stability which the metropole finds desirable." While Austine, Charles and Raymond (2013) claimed that some northern Nigerian groups sponsored the counter-coup that brought Gowon to power in 1966, the Babangida coup in 1985 was labelled the 'IMF coup' (Momoh, 1996, p.19). Following Wiking's view on the roles of the metropole, the

welcoming of the coup by the international community and financial speculators, and the introduction of the IMF/World Bank -favoured SAP (which further devastated the education sector) points to a possibility of some association (see Momoh, 1996).

According to Momoh (1996, p. 19), during the Shehu Shagari regime, "the dominant fraction of the bourgeoisie realised that the interest of the bourgeoisie, in general, was endangered, they decided to sponsor a military coup in December 1983", which brought Buhari Junta to power. When Buhari's ascendancy appeared not to be paying off, the Babangida coup came to their help. Momoh's narrative of this suggests that the local and international business interests intersected and produced what he calls the "IMF coup" that "settled the jinx over whether Nigeria should take the IMF loan."

In relation to a political settlement, scholars point to how Babangida's regime favoured various kinds of business groups and corrupt economic opportunists (see Lewis, 1996; Momoh, 1996). Lewis (1996, p.90) explains that "Petroleum smuggling was largely the province of senior military officers and a few civilian associates. Top officials sometimes arranged legal lifting contracts for companies in which they had an interest", but these were clandestine routes to National Petroleum Corporation terminals. Through this means, they siphoned hundreds of millions of dollars away from the national revenue. Momoh also notes that the international capitals and forces widely applauded Babangida's introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), which benefited them at the expense of national development (Momoh, 1996). According to Lewis (1996, p.90), in the late 1980s, there was an extensive network of international commercial fraud that originated from Nigeria, which was operated by independent groups, which took a variety of forms "from frankly illicit propositions for collusion in money-laundering, to seemingly legitimate business solicitation." Earlier, the World Bank (1994, p.7) noted a preexisting "tradition of administrative controls that had led to corruption and rent-seeking behaviour at the expense of productive activity." Lewis concludes that "the Government managed the adjustment programme through a mixture of domestic political orchestration, compensatory measures, and coercion. For elites, the state provided special access to nascent markets and illegal activities and manipulated key policies to provide opportune 'rents'" (Lewis, 1996, p.91).

The above socioeconomic milieu may be located within Levy's (2014) dominant/personalised political settlement system, in which the elite cohesion is high with power exercised in a top-down approach by leadership that enjoyed limited constraints. According to Lewis (1996, p.80):

The economic adversities fomented by the Babangida regime draw attention to a more fundamental change during this period, the shift from prebendalism, or decentralized patrimonial rule, towards predation, the consolidation of an avaricious dictatorship. The personalisation and concentration of power under Babangida reflected a new tendency in Nigeria's political economy, which may be regarded as a 'Zairanisation' of the military oligarchy. State economic tutelage moved from a pattern of diffuse clientelism under comparatively stable (though weak) institutional auspices, to more

arbitrary and debilitating control by a single ruler. Moreover, the military elite took steps to strengthen its hold on state power, employing a mixture of coercion and material inducement. This transformation, while not irreversible, was significantly consolidated under Abacha. The resultant erosion of central institutions and realignment of state patronage made the new dispensation more likely to endure.

The following section sums up the economic situation that emerged from this scenario and its impact on social policies, including education.

8.3 Economic Meltdown and Corruption

The Babangida era was characterized by an economic decline that affected the development of various sectors in the country, including education. Apart from massive corruption, secrecy associated with the military regime, and embezzlement of public funds, the severe decline in government revenue due to global recession and oil bust of the 1980s affected the financial capability of the government to effectively finance free education and other necessities in the sector (Momoh, 1996; Uwakonye, Osho and Anucha, 2006). Even when the recession abated, poor leadership and corruption contributed to preventing improvement in the education sector. Uwakonye, Osho and Anucha (2006) explain how education suffered between 1989 and 2001 and educational outcomes of learners fluctuated. While there were some improvements, the rate of improvement was inadequate. Uwakonye, Osho and Anucha (2006) also note that when the gross domestic product (GDP) began to increase, the country's literacy rate fell below what it had been in the recession period, possibly because the GDP proceeds were not being funneled properly into education. It was rather observed that "the money that should be put into education is being put elsewhere, and it is not infrastructure" (Uwakonye, Osho and Anucham, 2006, p.73-72). According to de Wit and Crookes (2013, p.8), there appears to be an association between the presence of oil and high levels of corruption; in the "case of Nigeria there is strong evidence for corruption and resource waste affecting economic fundamentals in the past."

Beyond the global economic meltdown and oil bust, in the literature, the incessant military interventions had been blamed for the economic woes of the country that affected education and other sectors. This did not begin in the second coming of the military junta but this era exacerbated the existing challenge. Momoh (1996, p.19) explains that "the Nigerian economic crisis has its origins in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) jumbo loan taken in 1978 by the Obasanjo regime. The civilian government of Shehu Shagari inherited this and was unable to control its squander mania."

8.4 Ethno-cultural Interests and Centralization

The ethnic dimensions of the political interruptions, particularly the coups, also need to be taken into consideration. Groups that feel underrepresented through the army make their demands through the political system, while those that are overrepresented tend to insist on merits as the basis of power and benefits sharing (Tibi, 1972; Nordlinger, 1977; Wiking, 1983). Wiking (1983) links the two military coups in Nigeria in 1966 to these types of demands. The survey data reveals an extensive north-south divide in the perception and experiences of the survey respondents,

which points to a differential treatment people in different parts of the country received following their geographic and social, and in relation to the political settlement and payoff system. The northern groups that are underrepresented in education and considered to be educationally disadvantaged achieved ascendancy through the army and influenced the direction of the nation's affairs. According to Joshua, Loromeke and Olanrewaju (2014), in the 1970s, Northern leaders were concerned about the region's backwardness in education and intensified their clamour for a quota system that accommodates the level of the region's educational development. They note that:

“This issue of quota system aggravated fear and distrust in the country, while the south resisted the idea with an argument that it negates international educational standards, the North insisted that the non-inclusion of this system creates a barrier to the western educationally weak northerners to be educated and become as competitive as the southerners” (Joshua, Loromeke and Olanrewaju, 2014, p.4).

In order to address the mounting tension, the Military Government of Gowon sought to address the barriers to education in the north in 1972, which was also one of the motivations for his proclamation of his intention to implement the UPE (Loromeke and Olanrewaju, 2014).

The Federal Government-run secondary schools often referred to as 'Unity Schools' represent a good example of where the military used its position to address the educational imbalance between the north and the south. The majority of the northern states were declared educationally disadvantaged states (Gershberg et al., 2016) that may not be able to effectively compete with their southern counterparts if admissions were based on merit. Thus, the military regime of Murtala/Obasanjo instituted an admission policy of the unity schools that allocated 40% of admission by merit, 30% by state quota, 20% by catchment zone and 10% by discretion (Loromeke and Olanrewaju, 2014; Gershberg et al., 2016). Subsequently, it was adjusted to only 15% by merit. The rest of the remaining spaces were to be given out based on state quota (40%), catchment zone/environment (30%) and discretion/ exigency 15% (Nwagwu, 1997). Recent information shows that the admission examination pass mark has also been politically allocated to mediocrity over merit. For example, while male and female candidates from Anambra state must score a minimum of 139 points to gain admission, male learners from Yobe need to score only two points to gain the same admission into the same school for the same study and to earn the same certificate (Premium Times, 2013; Loromeke and Olanrewaju, 2014)

Ubo (Delta), a retired school administrator, noted that the culture of the northerners does not promote education and this is not helping the education sector in the north: “if you mark the scripts from Northern schools and those from other parts, you will wonder if we are all in the same country.” Ozor (Anambra), a retired secondary school teacher, describes ethnic and cultural issues as a major bane of education in Nigeria. She argued that “policies are made to favour some ethnic groups to the detriment of others,” thus, ethnicity and tribalism make some groups enjoy some benefits in education while others are denied. Some ethnic groups tend to have access to federal colleges even when they do not qualify (Ozor). As Wiking observes, the dominant military

leaders from the north, right from Gowon, in pursuit of national unity and equal access to education (that involves helping the north to catch up with the south) created the unequal access system that in turn works in lowering the standards and quality of education. Ubi (Federal) explained that

“The military doesn't believe in policies; they give instructions which sometimes destabilises what's on the ground... The military does not believe so much in merit so just anyone was made to head schools and other positions regardless of whether they were qualified or not. Civil service is seniority-based. So, if you post a junior to head a school the senior colleagues in that school will not be willing to cooperate with that head and that would affect their performance.”

Wiking (1983, p.134) also observes that Gowon's emergence as the country's military leader was not based on his efforts. Instead, after the assassination of Ironsi, he was appointed by the other officers in the supreme council because "it was hoped that his ethnic background would help to calm the anger of the enlisted men." He expressed his loyalty to the dominant military block involved in his appointment, which is possibly evidenced by the respect he paid to the seat of the Caliphate by the announcement of such important decisions as to the UPE in Sokoto and also possibly in recognition of the tricky issues around regional imbalance in education which was in favour of the south.

During the interview, Nike (Oyo), a school administrator, explained that leaders play politics with education in Nigeria. The primary motivation behind most of the education policy was to bridge the gap in the educational level between Northern and Southern Nigeria. Nike further argued:

“We see no reason why NPEG [National Primary Education Commission], the NPEC were building so many schools and it is because of the North, if it is the south part here, we were already building schools on our own because we took education very seriously. Another one is school feeding also, it is not meant for Southerners because no parent can also anybody to feed his child or his children in the school, they will feed their child no matter how poor they may be.”

Pritchett's (2019) hypothesis on the use of education for nation building seems somewhat inverted in Nigerian education history (but not entirely out of place), which became messy in the hands of 'military politicians' seeking to make the whole nation 'easy to govern.' As far as educational development is concerned, the wrong side of Paglayan's (2018) argument on Western Europe and Latin American elites using national education to promote their political control of the citizens has historically played out in Nigeria. The centralization policy of the military that enabled it to govern the country with ease significantly affected educational development – although it contributed to improving access, the quality of learning suffered.

One of the major impacts of the political interruptions was the centralization of political and educational administration. The brief military regime of Aguiyi Ironsi in 1966 brought Nigeria under a unitary system of government. While the military subsequently created more states and

appears to have decentralized and deconcentrated power, in practice, its command structure has been likened to a unitary form of government (Nwagwu, 2000; Odinkalu, 2001; Elaigwu, 2005; Aremu, 2016; Babalola, 2019). The creation of states and even the return to civil rule in 1979 could not undo the impact of the centralization.

With regards to education, Nwagwu (2000, p.16) summaries that when the Federal Government introduced a free UPE scheme in 1976 and almost totally provided funds for both capital and recurrent expenditures it was in control of 80% of the revenue accruing to the country, but when the share of what it retained was reduced, it abandoned the scheme to States (states' shares had increased). Nevertheless, this did not produce an equitable adjustment and de facto decentralisation. Having laid the foundation for a centralized system, things did not return to normal after the military was handed over in 1979 and 1999. Obanya (2012) observed that the Shagari administration could not easily and speedily implement the policies handed over to it, such as the UPE, as they were hindered by political brickbats. State governors from opposition parties ignored the national policies and administered their states in their own ways. This was a different time and different governance framework. Under the military government, the establishment and management of primary schools was the responsibilities of the federal government, which provided the fund and dictated the rules (Ikoya, 2007). It took the return of the military in 1984 for the UPE programme to be centrally enforced across the country and from then, the "implementation has remained at best half-hearted, with more emphasis on the bare structure (6-3-3-4) rather than the real strategic focus areas of the policy" (Obanya, 2012, p.14).

Unlike the pre-1966 military intervention era, education management and funding have been decentralized de jure while de facto centralized. The revenue distribution formula instituted by the Federal Government reduced the state governments to Federal Government dependents. They depend on the Federal Government for most of their recurrent and capital expenditures in education (Nwuzor, 1983). The federal government's financial strength was emphasized by the average annual recurrent revenue it retained from the national public revenue between 1970 and 1975, which was over 71%. A major implication of this was the heavy reliance of many states on the federal government for their capital budget, including the funding of the education sector. Naturally, the one that pays the piper has the power to call the tune (Nwuzor, 1983). The management is currently within the concurrent list of the constitution, which allows all tiers of government to be involved. Despite the shared responsibility, the Federal tier exercises strong control through its funding of the basic education sector, and particularly through the control and allocation of 2% of the Consolidated Revenue Fund (CRF) as provided by the UBE Act (2004). Hence, states and LGAs are largely dependent on the Federal Government to fund their constitutional responsibility of managing schools – unlike in pre-1966 when the regions raised and allocated their funds, and took total control of the management of their free education programme. The Federal Government, through UBEC, stipulates the terms for states to access the funds and monitors the use of the fund. It also dictates what the fund may be used for (UBEC, 2013; Gershberg et al., 2016). This control may have not been there if the states were financially independent. The disruption of the regional structures without the requisite freedom for states engenders this dependency relationship. Orbach (2004, p.19) concludes that the imbalances in power and capacity among the three tiers of the government is very crucial but "the power is

now concentrated in the hands of the federal government. The federal government controls 75%-80% of the resources going to the states and more than 90% of the resources going to the local authorities.”

Further, the balkanization of the existing three regions contributed to weakening their capacity to deliver on education. Nwuzor (1983) observed that regional governments not only managed their education programmes (with a relative degree of success in the provision of free education), they also had some comparative financial strength. The creation of twelve states in 1966, and subsequently nineteen states in 1976 progressively weakened the powers of these states. It also led to a multiplicity of similar laws, without the commensurate capacity to implement them effectively. According to Fabunmi (2005, p5), when the Federal Military Government promulgated Decree No. 14 of 1967 that divided the existing four regions into twelve states and subsequently increased to 19 states in 1976:

“Each state promulgated an edict for the regulation of education, and its provision and management. Examples include the East Central States Public Education Edict No. 5 of 1970, Lagos State's Education Law (Amendment) Edict/No. 11 of 1970, South Eastern State's Education (School's Board) Edict/No. 20 of 1971 and Mid-Western State's Education Edict, No. 5 of 1973. Each state amended its education law when necessary. All the edicts had common features, such as state take-over of schools from individuals and voluntary agencies, the establishment of school management boards and a unified teaching service.”

Who benefits from centralization and balkanization? The northern military leaders used their leadership positions to create advantageous positions for their region (on the use of the military's dominant position to create preferential advantages for relatively underrepresented regions see Tibi (1972), Nordlinger (1977) and Wiking (1983)). Firstly, state creation is difficult in democratic Nigeria because of the constitutional conditions to be met but the military, which suspended the constitution had very limited challenges creating states and every state that has been created in Nigeria to date remains a product of the military and particularly military leaders of northern origin. The creation of states in the democratic era requires diverse categories of considerations, consensus and political bargaining. These considerations and bargains are largely ignored by the military (Alapiki, 2005; Adeniyi, 2014; Eze, Elinmian and Chinwuba, 2015).

The number of states each region has (the north has the highest number of states and local government) remains a political tool in the democratic era for parliamentary voting, resource allocation and other important national decisions. While this is slightly outside the scope of this study, its implications for the political settlements and educational development is worth discussing.

Suberu (2013, p.79) contends that “the fragmentation of Nigeria into a multiplicity of centrally funded, subnational state and local governments has vastly expanded and multiplied the access points and conduits for the individual and sectional appropriation of public power and resources.” Suberu also argued that the Nigerian federal system serves almost exclusively as a framework for the ethnopolitical appropriation of national wealth, which is enmeshed and

subsumed in prebendal and neo-patrimonial politics. “The problem is that prebendalism can represent a tenacious and self-reinforcing equilibrium when there are enough resources to sustain it through extraction by one means or another” (Diamond, 2013, p.x).

8.5 The Roles of Bureaucracy

Some scholars agree that certain elements in the civil service may directly be involved in the military usurpation of state power. Such elements cosset the military whenever it usurps power and help establish it within the first few hours of taking over, and contribute to ensuring its survival (First, 1970; Akinsanya, 1970). Akinsanya (1976, 118) points out that “the January coup led to the retirement of the politicians. Nevertheless, it created a political-power vacuum which the top bureaucrats were not slow in occupying.” When the military intervenes in politics, it naturally courts civil servants that share similar ideological perspectives with it to contribute to its stability and share in the spoils of power – the military needs that alliance of people in the civil service to govern (Luckam, 1970; Pinkley, 1973; Akinsanya, 1976).

Besides career civil servants, the military juntas also appear to have created some bureaucratic class that advanced their agenda. Lenshie (2013, p.27) posits that “the military nurtured a cabalistic class structure of intelligentsias from various academic institutions to promote their ingenuine philosophy and continues to stay in power.” Viewed from the PSA perspective, both the civil servants that stepped into the vacuum created by the coups, and the consciously recruited bureaucratic cabal that helped to create some internal stability, contributed to accelerating the advancement of what Kelsall and von Hau (2020) explains is an agreement of the most powerful that is aimed at creating stability and preventing the system collapse, political and economic disorder while yielding considerable benefits to the members of the groups of elites involved.

According to Koehn (1983, p.4), “in a further effort to centralize control over state government operations, military governors appointed a number of permanent secretaries to newly created posts within their own office.” Also, Adebayo (1979) observes that during 1966-1975, some State Governments had up to seven permanent secretaries that were stationed in the Military Governor's office and had the responsibility for almost the entire range of political, economic, administrative and industrial activities of the government. The military consciously drew top public servants deeper into policy-formulation responsibilities (Luckham, 1971; Koehn, 1983). According to Theo (federal), who was a retired school principal and Deputy Director at the Ministry of Education:

“They [bureaucrats] are the initiators of policies. Sometimes, their memos and discussions initiate policies. Members of the bureaucracy are vested interest groups and, overall, they did not like the changes. However, some of them positively supported the changes because it was either their interest group that proposed the change or it benefited them.”

According to Sade (Federal) who worked at the University of Maiduguri:

“The bureaucrats in the Ministry never undertook any study before arriving at formulating policies...A policy developed without appropriate data cannot work. That's why we have complaints about the failure of UPE. Bureaucrats were there; they strangulated the flow of education from the original one, by their various acts of corruption and have not succeeded in developing policies that will push education forward.”

The direct involvement of bureaucrats in the military junta's policy-making process was initiated by Ironsi and advanced by Gowon (Asiodu, 1970; Aliyu, 1979; Adebayo, 1979; Koehn, 1983). This was attributed to the military juntas' lack of experience, their unwillingness to appoint ousted politicians to positions of responsibilities and the relatively low level of education many military personnel had (Koehn, 1983). Adebayo (1979) and Koehn (1983) observe that the military governors of states did not mind travelling to Lagos (where federal permanent secretaries lived) to lobby them for support on issues that would be brought to the Supreme Military Council and the Federal Executive Council for consideration. Thus, it may be concluded that the military acted with the support of bureaucrats they co-opted or influenced to work with them. This does not imply that all bureaucrats who contributed or influenced policies during the military era fully supported the military or were either corrupt or compromised. According to Theo, some of the influential people were “innovative people, like Fafunwa, Jubril Aminu made remarkable impacts. I worked directly under them. They engaged in capacity building of teachers, innovation and anti-corruption.”

It is worth noting that the structure the military met on the ground, which was passed over from the colonial era and became entrenched when Nigeria adopted the parliamentary system, had a bureaucratic structure in which “most programs and policies are initiated at the top echelon. Every department is subdivided into branches, sections and subsections. The Permanent Secretary is the administrative head of the ministry” (Dibie, 1997, 144). The Ministry of Education, like other ministries, was organized hierarchically and “documents and memoranda are passed from subordinates to their superior officers, who in turn are content to issue orders accordingly, or to forward the documents to their own superior” (Dibie, 1997, 144). This possibly created opportunities for top bureaucrats that compromised, or were compromised by the military, to use their positions to develop education policies that worked for the military government in power. In response to a question that asked about particular people who influenced the education policy choices, Theo (federal), a retired school principal and Deputy Director at the Ministry of Education, said the ministers and head of state were critical.

9. The Positive Impacts of the Military Disruption of Political Processes on Education?

Successive governments in Nigeria have played one role or the other in educational development. In this section what may be described as the positive contributions of the military education programmes are summarized. These 'positives' largely depend on how each observer views them.

9.1 The explosion of School Enrolment


In contrast to the earlier argument on Pritchett's (2019) hypothesis on the use of education by state elites in developing countries as a tool for promoting nation-building agenda, we found that this is confirmed in the stated UPE objective but in practice, the hypothesis remains debatable in the UPE context. This is particularly because the UPE produced different experiences in the north and the south and generated differences rather than unified responses as discussed earlier. However, as discussed below, the UPE and other policies of the military (except SAP) contributed to catalyzing explosion in primary school enrolment.

Some of the major positive impacts of the political interruptions are the increase in enrolment, school facilities, and the increased number of teachers in primary and secondary schools (Osokoya, 2010; Duze, 2012). Generally, school enrolment in Nigeria experienced significant growth between 1960 and 2000, largely owing to the military. Generals Gowon and Obasanjo respectively initiated and launched the nationwide Universal Primary Education (UPE) in 1976, which produced unprecedented growth in school enrolment at various levels of education and created demands for teachers (Osokoya, 2010). Duze (2012, p. 40) observes that by 1982, when the initial graduates of the UPE programme emerged, "the pupil population had risen to 15 million, with enrolment figures jumping from 6 million in the preceding UPE year (1975/1976) to 8.7 million in the first UPE year (1976/1977) and 12.5 million in 1979/1980."

Available national-level data from the World Bank database (we could not gain access to similar state-level data) supports the information in the literature. The increase in enrolment is evident. Primary school enrolment stood at 4.7 million pupils in 1973 and was 4.9 million in 1976 when the UPE was introduced. After the UPE introduction, there was a sharp increase from 4.9 million in 1976 to 6.2 million in 1977, indicating over one million new enrollments. By 1978, nearly 2 million pupils enrolled within one year (see Figure 14). The figure also shows that after the Federal Government took over schools from private owners in the early 1970s, enrolment continued to rise until the Babangida era, when the SAP was introduced. Primary school enrolment began to fall from 14.6 million pupils in 1984 (Babangida came to power in August 1985) to 12.6 million pupils in 1988 before it slowly rose again and stood at 15.8 million in 1993 when Babangida was pressured out of office.

A similar upsurge in enrolment was observed after the Universal Basic Education (UBE) was introduced in 1999. The enrolment at the primary school level jumped from 17,994,620 in 1995 to 24,895,446 in 2000 (see Federal Ministry of Education, 1996; UNESCO, 2000; Akinwumi, 2006; Olaniyan, 2011). See also Annex 2.

Figure 14: Primary Education Enrolment (in million)



Data source: World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2021) <https://data.worldbank.org/topic/4>
 *1974 and 1975 are not available

A sharp decline is noted in the data progression in 1996 (which began in 1995), but it is not clear why this happened. This was a period when Nigeria's human rights record plummeted following the execution of notable human rights activists (popularly known as Ogoni nine). According to Ibekwe (2020⁹):

“Members of the “Ogoni 9”, as the group was known, were executed on November 10, 1995, after a military tribunal found them guilty of the killing of four pro-government chiefs in the Ogoni community. The execution of the activists elicited global condemnation as well as calls for sanctions to be imposed on the Nigerian ruling military junta.”


In this regard, the political bargain was largely about lobbying to evade sanction and to gain sympathy from the international community. According to Frankel (1997), “based on disclosure reports and other information, Nigeria's critics have estimated that the regime has spent more than \$10 million in the United States on lobbying and public relations efforts since the hanging”¹⁰. It is not clear what was spent elsewhere and it is also not clear how this may have directly or indirectly affected education.

⁹ <https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/370740-saro-wiwa-britain-resisted-sanctions-on-abacha-regime-for-commercial-reasons-documents-show.html>

¹⁰ <https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/nigeria/stories/mixes112496.htm>

A similar observation is made at the secondary level. Enrolment initially peaked at 3.5 million in 1985 and sharply dropped to 2.9 million in 1986 before it began to rise again; sustainable progress was made from 1999, which is when the UBE was launched. These noticeable fluctuations in enrolment, especially the trends in the rise and fall of the data, need to be taken with caution as we have limited information on other possible factors besides SAP that might have led to the sharp drop in both primary and secondary enrolment (see Figure 15).

Figure 15: Secondary Education Enrolment (in million)



Data source: World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2021) <https://data.worldbank.org/topic/4>
 *1995, 1996, 1997 and 1998 are not available

Alternative data slightly differ from the World Bank records, but both still point to a steady increase in school enrolment. For example, while the World Bank data indicates that enrolment stood at 4.9 million in 1976 and 14.3 million in 1983, Duze (2012, p.40) observes that by 1982 when the initial graduates of the UPE programme emerged, "the pupil population had risen to 15 million, with enrolment figures jumping from 6 million in the preceding UPE year (1975/1976) to 8.7 million in the first UPE year (1976/1977) and 12.5 million in 1979/1980". As Csapo (1983) observed, there was a tidal upsurge of pupil enrollment. Data compiled from different sources show that in 1975, there were over 6.1 million primary pupils and over 610,000 secondary school students in Nigeria (the World Bank data does not have a 1975 record of secondary school enrolment for comparison). The number of schools also increased (see Table 16).

Table 16: Primary and Secondary Schools Enrolment – 1960 -2003

Year	PRIMARY SCHOOL		SECONDARY SCHOOL	
	Total number of Schools	Total Schools enrolment	Total number of Schools	Total Schools enrolment
1960	NA	2,912,619	NA	135,434
1965	NA	2,911,742	NA	209,015
1970	21,223	3,515,825	1,513	310,054

1975	30,726	6.165,547	1,660	610,652
1980	35,281	13,760,030	5,181	2,342,701
1985	35,432	13,025,287	5,964	2,794,498
1990	38,254	13,607,249	5,959	2,893,918
1995		17,994,620	6,452	5,084,546
2000		24,895,446	8,275	6,359,449
2003		26,292,370	13,333	6,745,186

Sources: Federal Ministry of Education (1996), Akinwumi (2006), UNESCO (2000) and Olaniyan (2011)

It is noteworthy that pupils' dropout was also observed alongside the enrolment increase. Limited information exists on dropouts and factors surrounding them, however, available information shows that the dropout rate between the 1976/77 and 1977/78 academic years was about 25% in Benue and Plateau states, 20% in Ondo State, 17% in Gongola State, and 14% in Kaduna State (Csapo, 1983). In Kano State, one school in Kumbotso District registered 78 pupils in 1976, and 49 attended based on the register, but only 15 pupils were recorded as regular attendees at the end of the year (Csapo, 1983). Although this particular example may not be generalised, it gives an insight into the magnitude of school drop out that followed the massive uptake of UPE in some communities. From the 1980s, when SAP was introduced, UNESCO (2006) reports that dropout and wastage rates were very high in the 1980s and 1990s. Between 1986 and 1996, a UNESCO report shows that the primary school dropout rate was about 43.2%. In 1995, it stood at 43.7%. This may have possibly contributed to the sharp drop in enrolment rates during these periods in the World Bank data above.

While multiple factors can be attributed to the growth in primary school enrolment, two chief factors were UPE/UBE and the economic boom that reduced financial pressures on governments and households; population growth and global development dynamics that continuously demand human knowledge are also noteworthy (Akinwumi, 2006).

9.2 Teacher Policy and Management: Issues and Reactions

Our literature search yielded limited information on the teacher recruitment and management policies and practices at the federal level during the military era. Before the school takeover in the early 1970s and the launching of UPE in 1976, limited information existed on the direct government roles in teacher management. Similarly, teacher education was limited but progress was recorded after the schools' takeover and subsequent introduction of UPE. Dede (Federal) who was Former Minister of Education, explained: "I was taught by teachers, some of whom had 3 years of Teacher Training College. I didn't see any teacher who had more than higher elementary. They managed schools very well. Subsequently, NCE came and later degrees in education. This shows that the teaching profession has been progressive."

One positive action that greatly benefited teachers in the early 1970s is the outcome of the Public Service Review Commission headed by Jerome Udoji 1974, often referred to as the 'Udoji Commission' (Otobo, 1986; Setwat, 2002), which offered teachers some attractive conditions of service. It recommended the provision of similar fringe benefits to teachers and treating them the same way their counterparts in the civil service are treated (Nwagwu, 1981; Adelabu, 2005). The basis for this was the Commission's contention that "workers with the same or comparable qualifications and educational backgrounds should be treated equally in respect of salaries and promotions and such fringe benefits like housing allowance, car basic allowance, leave allowance, retirement benefits, and in-service training opportunity" (Nwagwu, 1981, p.82). The recommendation was implemented by the government, which also set up another Commission to review the teachers' conditions of service and those of other workers in the education sector. Thus, by 1977 teachers enjoyed relatively good conditions of service and this contributed to reducing teacher attrition. However, according to Adelabu (2005, p.4), while the Commission successfully re-graded teachers into nine levels, it could not harmonise their salaries and teachers' service conditions to fit into the mainstream public service professions. This was an important source of dissension among teachers because "the demand by the National Union of Teachers for a just and more equitable job evaluation, remuneration and grading of teachers were not therefore sufficiently reflected in the Commission's report" (Adelabu, 2005, p.4). Notwithstanding, teachers benefited from the recommendations of the Commission in terms of significant salary increase for teachers, and this contributed to boosting teachers' morale (Nwagwu, 1981; Adelabu, 2005).

The Nigerian teachers' council, known as Teachers Registration Council of Nigeria (TRCN), was established by the military with Decree (now Act) 31 of 1993. This came after many decades of demand for a regulatory agency for the teaching profession by teachers and concerned stakeholders (TRCN, 2005). Section 17(2) of the TRCN Act criminalizes teaching, earning rewards as a teacher and the use of teacher title and identity by anyone that is not registered by TRCN as a teacher (the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1993). Following the establishment of the TRCN, the Council produced a Teachers Handbook/teaching manual that guides the profession. The 1993 edition of the handbook posits that, for quite a long time, the profession was neglected to lead to the brain drain that gave room for unqualified persons to join the profession. It notes that "little attention was paid to critical issues such as entry standards into the profession, the scope and quality of teacher education programmes, continuous professional development of practising teachers, professional conduct, the welfare and dignity of teachers" and some of the major outcomes of this neglect is "a fall in educational standards, upsurge in vices among students, incompetent manpower in the various sectors of the nation, and loss of international respect and recognition for our graduates" (TRCN, 1993, p.ii).

From the literature, it appears that the direct impact of military intervention in politics began to be significantly felt in the process of teacher recruitment and management from the time the government took over schools from voluntary agencies in the early 1970s. This brought the Federal Government into direct involvement in teacher recruitment and management. Ahanotu (1983) observes that teachers particularly welcomed the government takeover because of their economic interests. One notable reason for this is the 1974 Udoji Commissions recommendation

that restructured Nigerian workers' salaries and recommended a new salary structure that was better than those paid by voluntary agencies and was at a scale which voluntary agencies could not meet. Supporters of state take over and control of schools contended that "by taking control of schools the military government of Nigeria was in a sense rescuing the missions from the repercussions of the Udoji Report, which offered more money and better conditions of service to all teachers" (Ahanotu, 1983, p.341).

Focusing on pre-and-post-Udoji Commission, Nwagwu (1981) examined the impact of different service conditions on teacher recruitment in Nigeria. The study drew samples from two cohorts (1972 and 1977) of final year secondary students in different states. Based on its findings, it concludes that:

"The first question to answer was the comparative interest of the two groups in the teaching profession. In 1972, only 23.3 per cent of the sample was positively interested whereas by 1977 about 50 per cent of the students showed interest. This latter figure is more than double that of 1972. We have no difficulty therefore in concluding that there has been a significant increase of interest in the teaching profession since the Udoji Commission recommendations were implemented" (Nwagwu, 1981, p.84).

Comparing the attitudes of secondary school students towards teaching in primary schools in Pre-Udoji and Post-Udoji Nwagwu (1981) explains that there conditions of service had improved, which had some significant and favourable influence on students' interest in primary schools.

It seems reasonable to briefly summarise the role and state of the Nigerian Union of Teachers (NUT), in this context. Specific roles played by teachers and their union during the Udoji reform processes is not very clear in the literature reviewed. However, according to Daj (Delta), a retired teacher and NUT Official, NUT is an age-long union that represents the teachers and makes sure that the welfare of teachers is protected and so they were never in the good books of the government because they always reacted against any policy that did not favour teachers. NUT also has a long history of struggle with the government. Hudu (2000) observes that in 1943, NUT organised a strike action that helped to secure a significant pay raise for teachers. In 1964, it organised another nationwide strike that facilitated the implementation of better working conditions for teachers but when the military came to power, their activities were curtailed along with those of the university teachers. Ike (Anambra), a retired school manager, notes that some regimes banned associations like NUT but this did not last. Ike adds that "today, professional bodies are incorporated into policymaking unlike before." Chay (Anambra), who worked with the Anambra State Ministry of Education, also observes that NUT "currently insists on being part of policy formulations in the education sector. I had gone to Abuja severally as an executive of NUT on this purpose." These highlight the stark difference between the military era and the current democratic dispensation. Notwithstanding, Nike (Oyo) argued that teachers' reactions to the policy that made National Certificate in Education (NCE) the minimum qualification for teaching was not uniform. The NCE holders welcomed the policy because they were made headteachers while headteachers with Grade II disliked the policy because they were made to return to the

classrooms to teach while their juniors with NCE were made headteachers. This affected some of them and they resigned from the education sector.

10. Negative Impacts of the Military Disruptions of Political Processes on Education

Along with the positive impacts of military disruption of political processes on education, there are also numerous negative impacts. In this section, we attempt to summarise these negative impacts as observed in both the literature and our study data.

10.1 Disruption of democratic policy-making processes

The damages done by the military interruptions to the education sector began with the disruption of the political and policy processes upon which the education sector rested. President Obasanjo's administration admitted this rot in his address in 2000 at the World Education Forum, Dakar:

“In Nigeria, our administration is fully conscious of the decline of our educational standards and the decay of the whole system within the last couple of decades. Our educational system is as it stands a living proof of the damages that bad governance can do to our society and social structure” (FME, 2000, p.12).

One of the first implications of the military disruptions of the political processes, right from the first coup in 1966, was the disruption of the policymaking processes and policy-making power of the elected governments. Section 4(1) of Decree Number 1 of 1966 states that "the power of the Federal Military Government to make laws shall be exercised by means of Decrees signed by the Head of the Federal Military Government. (2) The power of the Military Governor of a Region to make law shall be exercised by the means of Edicts signed by him." This decree removed the power to make law by people democratically elected to do so. During the interview, Theo (federal), who was a retired school principal and Deputy Director at the Ministry of Education observed that:

“In the military era, the armed forces ruling council, who were like 15 -25 people, sat and represented the entire nation on any policy without any consultation. They did not take cognizance of the sensitivities of the people. Since independence, the military era set the country back, particularly in education”.

Before the first military intervention, “the legislature of each region was empowered to make laws for peace, order and good government of the region, with respect to certain enumerated subjects, of which education was one” (Ajayi, 2008 p.3). According to Akinsanya, (1976, p.131),

unlike in the democratic governance where the President or the Governors acted on the advice of the Executive Council, “the Head of the FMG and the Military Governors [were] neither bound nor even required to consult or act on the advice of their councils,” consequently, “neither the Federal nor the regional Executive Council occupied a key position in policy-formulation and execution.” While the Executive Council remained an important government organ, exercising functions and duties of the Council of Ministers and providing general direction and control of the ministries, it was the military head that exercised general direction and control over ministries and departments. At the state level, for example, it appears that the Executive Council in the military regimes existed only without executive portfolios, and only gave advice to the military head whenever he needed or asked for it (Akinsanya, 1976).

The Military is also not trained to make democratic and representative laws. Theo (Federal) said during the interview that “most of the military people did not value education, they dropped out of school but somehow, they became elites by default and, even in the selection of education administrators or ministers, stakeholders were not consulted.” He also notes that the military could appoint anybody as a minister of education irrespective of the person’s capacity, education and experience and nobody would be able to question their rationale and actions. The military decrees and edicts, which were more like orders of the Military government, introduced a shift in the way education policies were introduced in Nigeria. Adigun (Federal), who had held the position of the Registrar and Chief Executive Officer of the Nigerian Teachers’ Registration Council, observed during the interview that the general public was at the mercy of the bureaucrats and the various political leaders who prescribed the education policies and the quality of education without due consultation.

The UPE represents an example of a military law without sufficient consultations. It was announced without proper consultation or preparation in Sokoto by Gowon and subsequently implemented by Obasanjo in 1976, despite warnings from an expert committee raised to implement the National Policy on Education (Ogbaji, 2013). Similarly, Obasanjo launched the UBE without proper consultation or due democratic policy-making process, following the military precedent. Obasanjo launched the UBE scheme on September 30th, 1999 in Sokoto but the government organised a mini-summit on UBE between 29 November and 1st December 1999 to canvass national stakeholders and international communities’ support to review the UBE blueprint and facilitate smooth UBE programme implementation (FME, 2003). On the contrary, and some years earlier when democratic processes were in place, historical reports indicate that in July 1952, the Western Region’s minister for education, Chief S. O. Awokoya, presented proposals for UPE in the region by January 1955, which gave about three years’ space for planning for the proposed policy (Ajayi, 2008). The proposal included strategies for ensuring that the quality of education is maintained through a massive teacher-training programme and the expansion of training and schools’ facilities. There were actual preparations ahead of the policy introduction that began in July 1952 up to December 1954, which aimed at meeting the January 1955 deadline that enabled the scheme to be formally launched on 17 January 1955 (Ajayi, 2008). These democratic legislative processes were eroded by the military intervention and continued

to manifest in different ways right into the democratic era as exemplified in Obasanjo's UBE approach (Ogbaji, 2013; Obanya, 2014).

In 1979, politicians attempted to reactivate the ideology system during electioneering campaign that also contributed to boosting the provision of schools' facilities when they won elections and began to fulfil their electoral promises (Etim, 1976; FME, 2005). But, this did not last as the military struck again and terminated the learning process.

10.2 The Impact on the Curriculum

Findings from the interviews indicate that political turnovers particularly affected the curriculum's efficacy. Rothan (Adamawa), who was the Adamawa State NUT chairperson, explained that the instability in the government affected the standard of education by bringing about various changes in the school curriculum. Osho (Oyo) who was a school administrator, noted that the school curriculum was changed but personnel and teachers to implement the changes were not trained or equipped to do so. Onu (Anambra), who was a retired NUT Chairman and head of a primary school, linked the policy and curriculum failure to prebendal politics and corruption and noted that the policymakers were always selfish and used the school system to promote the benefits of their cronies and relations. This suggests that policies, curriculum and other changes in the education sector might have been inspired by the desire of those in power to pay off their cronies (as part of the bargains) and/or provide an avenue for economically enriching themselves and their cronies. Thus curriculums were changed, as Onu (Anambra) and Osho (Oyo) noted, by regimes that wanted to claim ownership of the new policy and also pave the way for making money.

Nike (Oyo), who was a school administrator, notes that in 1982, the school curriculum changed, and 'Introductory Technology' was introduced in secondary schools. Workshops were built and equipped with imported moribund machines and teachers were also trained. However, this was not sustained by the next government. Nike (Oyo) also observed that pupils were doing well but things changed when funding of the schools was cut and pupils started paying school fees and buying school materials. Oye (Oyo), a teacher, described that the 6-3-3-4 educational system was initiated around the time of Babangida with high hopes but failed when it came to implementation.

"The 6-3-3-4 had a lot of promises without achievement, a lot of dreams as it was supposed to run 6 years in primary school, 3 years in Junior Secondary School but it was like we were still running everything together as it used to be" – Oye.

Oye also mentioned that the 6-3-3-4 was supposed to encourage students with poor academic performance to divert into technical trades and move away from traditional schooling. However, the system was just promoting all the students, irrespective of their academic performance, defeating the purpose of the system. The 6-3-3-4 increased access to school but made the standard and quality of education further deteriorate.

10.3 Financial Irresponsibility and Introduction of Patronage and Rent-Seeking Tradition

Military regimes in Nigeria stimulated an excessive centralisation of power and supervised the development of persistent patronage and rent-seeking traditions (Amundsen, 2010; Martini, 2014) whereby anyone that has been favoured by the political patronage system received some degree of immunity and could essentially escape most crimes, some of which involved money laundering and unbridled theft of public funds (Okekeocha, 2013). Each military regime exhibited a distinct abuse of power, accountability and transparency because the military which controlled the government had no checks and balances in the system. Ubi (Federal) observed that:

“One terrible thing under the military regime is that there is no accountability. Accountability in financing and anything; they only work with instructions from the head. If you check the education budget, rarely would you be able to account for money spent then on education. There was nothing like a national assembly that would ask them to come and explain their spending.”

This contributed to creating a centralization of government marked by a culture of corruption, a system that did not require accountability from public officials and protected such officials from citizens that might demand accountability (Okekeocha, 2013). As noted earlier the same protected public officials were also friends and cronies of the military top brass who were appointed without regard to qualification, experiences and employment standards (Jegede, 2013; Muhammad and Liman, 2018).

Thus, the military laid the foundation for an opaque financial system in Nigeria, including the education sector’s financing framework. Military ruled during the oil boom and the oil doom as well, and managed the education financing the way it wanted. Because it was neither responsible nor accountable to anyone, it became difficult for citizens to understand what was happening in the education finance system and demand accountability (Chikwendu, 1977; Bienen, 1978; Ukaegbu, 1997; Akinbuli, 2013). Many scholars (e.g. Ukaegbu, 1997; Jegede, 2013; Muhammad and Liman, 2018) point to the corruption in the military system and nepotistic nature of the military, which provided an opportunity for the military finance managers to engage in humongous financial misappropriation and how the military did not care much about public opinion because it does not affect its opportunity for re-election. “In the military regime there is no constituency whatsoever...there is no question of being affected in judging cabinet members by how many people vote for them” (Bienen, 1978, p.214). This military mindset on financial irresponsibility to the citizens has continued to plague the Nigerian system even in the democratic dispensations (Bienen, 1978; Muhammad and Liman, 2018; Okafor and Obiora, 2015). Bienen (1978, p.217) explained that the military-appointed Sole Administrators that were not usually from the locations they administered and frequently did not have contact with local people and worked with an ad-hoc team that had no official accountability. During this time, financial accountability seems to have suffered a significant setback. FME (2005, p.31) reveals that:

“There is no reliable information on the total annual expenditure on education by each tier of government in the last 40 years. The dearth of reliable records of expenditure,

especially at the state level and the multiplicity of accounting systems across 36 states would make nonsense of any effort at collecting, collating and analyzing financial records. “

This hiddenness of the financial processes and actual records of processes that marked the military system was introduced into the UBE system. According to the World Bank (2003, p.4), “there are no accurate estimates of total public expenditure on education in Nigeria because of a lack of information on state government sectoral expenditures.” Other studies also observed that the federal government and states rarely make public their complete and actual expenditures on education (Bennel, et al, 2007; Anibueze and Okwo, 2013; Gershberg, et al., 2016). Corruption is particularly marked in the system (Human Rights Watch, 2017; Gershberg, 2016). A comment attributed to an official of Rivers State Universal Basic Education Board (SUBEB) claimed that:

“In general, all over the state, it is fair to say that the LGAs are doing almost nothing to support UBE. What they are supposed to do, they don't do. So what do they do with the money that is provided to do these things? I don't know what happens”
(Rights Watch, 2007: 47).

It is also observed in the literature that out of 3,096 classroom blocks that were planned to be constructed with 21 billion naira during the Obasanjo regime, less than 300 were completed by 2001 and nearly two-thirds of the amount budgeted for the construction had been released; the government report indicated in 2003 that about half of the number of classroom blocks planned were completed and about 95 projects were abandoned (LeVan, 2008; Gershberg, et al., 2016).

10.4 Alteration of teacher training and recruitment norms

Another impact of the interruptions and approach is the alteration of teacher training and recruitment policies. As Daj (Delta) observed during the interview, the UPE policy opened doors for more teacher recruitment and because the teachers were not readily on the ground, anyone with some level of education that showed interest was enlisted. This altered and affected the quality of recruitment. In the literature, one of the major challenges of the UPE was related to the explosion in the school enrolment and high demand for teachers to meet the enrolment needs (Pakata, 1977; Moja, 2000; FME, 2005; Osokoya, 2010). According to Pakata (1977, p.6-7), “there was an acute shortage of teaching staff” on the one hand and, on the other hand, “the number of untrained teachers in schools shot up sharply and the number of trained teachers per school went down as the available trained teachers had to be re-distributed for staffing the new UPE schools.” With the increase in class sizes, pupils' enrolment and a limited number of qualified teachers, one may not expect much from the school system in terms of quality and sound primary education. Pakata (1977) contended that there was a convincing indication that the situation would continue for some time because, firstly, based on available evidence, even if the government was able to raise funds to expand the system and provide everything needed for quality teacher education, it was “not possible to produce good teachers in one or two years let alone producing an adequate number of such teachers for the scheme” (Pakata, 1977, p.7). And, secondly, Pakata observed that the emergency framework established to produce and recruit

teachers for the UPE was already filled with people that he believed were not qualified to be teacher educators (lecturers) because they lacked requisite capacity and spent most of their limited academic time on theories of the subject and teaching tradition. Pakata was concerned that trainee teachers that pass through them will be deployed to teach in primary schools in the coming years and "one can imagine the sort of effect this could have on the schools" (Pakata, 1977, p.7). Okoro (Anambra, who was a Director at the Ministry of Education, explained that the "teachers trained for UPE were offered crash programs. Many of the trained teachers came out and couldn't write well on the board. The cheating going on today in schools started from teachers." More recent scholars have also echoed the persistent teacher quality challenges despite numerous interventions in teacher education, supply and management (see Johnson, 2008; Adefeso-Olateju, 2013; Dunne et al 2014; Gershberg, et al., 2016; Unterhalter et al., 2018).

The position of the National Policy on Education (NPE) on teacher quality is worth noting. The 1977 NPE, which was subsequently revised in 1981 and 1995, provides that the National Certificate of Education should be the minimum teaching qualification in schools (NPE, 1981). The policy also gave attention to curriculum, methodology and teachers' in-service training (NPE, 1981; Abe, 2002). It provides for a uniform teacher status, conditions of services and promotion, and professionalism of teacher practice (NPE, 1981, 1995; Abe, 2002). In 1976, the National Teacher's Institute (NTI) was established by Decree No. 7 of 1976 to provide a distance learning programme for teachers (Osokoya, 2010). Also, the chain of change that followed the launch of UPE also included taking over the funding of Grade II teachers' Colleges, provision of bursaries to pre-service teachers in the country's Colleges of Education and Universities and establishing additional teacher training institutions (Osokoya, 2010). Batuk (Adamawa) noted that incentives were provided to encourage people to undertake teacher training courses.

Various studies in the 1980s and 1990s (e.g. Ejiogu, 1998; Ajayi, 1997; Abe, 2002) indicate that teacher motivation and job satisfaction were low and many that found themselves in the teaching profession were not interested in it, but were pushed into it by their socioeconomic circumstances. A similar observation is also made in recent literature (see Dunne et al., 2014; Unterhalter et al., 2018). Teacher recruitment and retention thus became a challenge. The image of the profession became so bad that "in some states in the Federation, landlords do not let apartments to teachers for fear of inability to pay rent; they are neither the best of suitors too" (Abe, 2002, p.7-8). Ekeke (Federal) also noted that landlords would not want to rent out their houses if they felt you were a teacher. As Daj (Delta) noted, "in the Military era anyone can be a teacher and it affected professionalism." That was a total deviation from how teachers were perceived and treated before then. Some of the respondents noted these:

"I lived with my uncle who was a headmaster when I was finishing primary school then. Looking back, he was the richest in my community. He was just paid teachers' salary but he was considered the richest. The salary he earned then had meaning though, not necessarily the highest" – Dede (Federal).

"Teachers of that period were quite different from the ones we have today. When there was an issue in the community, the community went to the headmaster to settle

it. They saw teachers as custodians of knowledge so they respected them. Today, teachers are not respected, motivated and regarded. Before you became a teacher then, you must have graduated from teachers' college or NCE but today, everybody is a teacher. They were better motivated in those days. 6 months to your graduation, the local government officials showed up to offer you a job. Students then wanted to be a teacher, unlike today. They were in school to learn and gain the knowledge but today students are in school to get the certificate.” - Dukare

Daj (Delta) explained that initially the teaching profession was held in high regard and many people desired to be teachers but when teachers were massively employed to fill up the gaps created by the UPE, its professionalism dropped as many of those employed did not have sufficient teacher training. Although teacher professionalism gradually began to regain its glory when minimum standards were instituted, the damage done to the profession was never fully addressed.

10.5 Inspections, Monitoring and Evaluation of Basic Education

One of the victims of the military creation of states is education laws, particularly the school inspectorate laws. After more than 15 years of the military take over and creation of the first set of states by the military, Palmer (1983, p.352) reports that "despite all the development since the mid-60s, current educational laws are often still based, in many states, on the former Educational Law of the Regions." This created some confusion in the inspectorates of education because it introduced some complex combination of education laws across the states, some of which were "based on the laws of the Regions from 1960-67, sometimes on the laws of the larger states of 1967-1975 and sometimes on the legislation relevant to the needs of the individual states after 1975" (Palmer, 1983, p.352).

The impact of the earlier observed complications and complexities that are associated with military interventions, decrees and counter decrees, reforms and centralization has been evident in the inspection, monitoring and supervision structures of the Ministry of Education. For example, the centralization of political administration under the military and subsequent creation of states contributed to weakening the state's capacity and independence. Pritchard (1975) reveals that two major factors informed the establishment of a Federal Inspectorate. These were the level capacity and concern over self-sufficiency of each of the twelve states to supply manpower and adequately fund for inspection and supervision activities of the inspectorate and, a need to strengthen the State Inspectorates. Pritchard (1975, p.125) reveals that the states were mostly "unable to provide a fully adequate service of inspection and supervision, particularly of their post-primary institutions, but also, as this study has shown, of their primary schools". UNESCO (1981) observed that in 1975 the FME inspectorate division had only five occupied positions out of its twenty-five professional posts that needed to be filled. It was around 1979 that the inspectorate became fully staffed. About eighty per cent of the post-primary school population was lumped together under the teacher education sector. The monitoring and inspection frameworks also missed curriculum and instructional materials

development. Similar planning and staff inadequacy was observed in the state teacher training institutions in 1975 (UNESCO, 1981). Here are what some interview respondents observed:

“One bad thing that happened then was the watering-down of monitoring and supervision. Before, when inspectors were going to visit schools, everyone was on their toes. Gradually, over time, the inspectorate Division became like a punishment ground. They did not provide them with vehicles to carry out their work; people who were transferred to the Inspectorate were those that the management wanted to make redundant. The major difference between public and private schools in monitoring and supervision.

In the early days, the inspection was done to keep a standard. Schools were worried about an inspection to maintain a standard. Any time schools heard inspectors were coming, they tried to put things to meet the expectations of the inspectors. When the population increased and was not backed by adequate financing, people came from outside to inspect schools. The education sector passed through a period where there was almost no inspection as a result of no vehicles, no funding, increase in the number of schools to be inspected.” – Ekeke (Federal).

Although the school inspectorate, which has now been recycled as quality assurance department, have gone through series of transformations, from very simple (without sufficient staff) to very complex with excess staff, the report of the Nigeria Education Sector Diagnosis (FME, 2005) shows that despite the UPE-related reforms and the establishment of the Primary Education Commission, supervision of primary and junior secondary schools had been very weak. The report shows that school inspections and supervision had not been very effective and their capacity to do so was not as it ought to be. “The fact that some schools have not been inspected in over ten years was revealed as realities that must be redressed for improved quality” (FME, 2005, p.94). At the secondary level, while it was observed that some schools were visited weekly (3.6%), monthly (16.4%) and quarterly (57.7%), some schools had never been visited by inspectors (0.7%) while those visited once a year and once every four years constituted 10.7% and 1.6% respectively (FME, 2005).

It is not clear if the recycling of the inspectorate contributed to weakening it further. Adigun (federal) argued that:

“I am of the opinion that the education sector goes back to the inspectorate division system. This is where I disagree with the people who changed the Inspectorate Division to Quality assurance. There must be quality on the ground before you can assure it. Inspectorate Division used to be very efficient and effective in that the inspectors would move around the school, write their reports and ensure that quality education was being delivered. Now, with Quality Assurance, one can neither see the 'Quality' nor the 'Assurance'.”

Arun (federal), a retired director at the Federal Ministry of Education, maintained that “before now, inspectors did their work, debrief with the schools inspected and writes a report and follow it up to ensure that things are put right in the schools. It is not what it used to be.” Ugowe (Delta), a retired teacher and principal, explained that “right now when inspectors are sent, they end up at the gate and go back with envelopes. The missions handled schools better promoting morals.” The current situation observed by Ugowe contradicts the previous situation observed by Sabin (Adamawa), parents interviewed in Adamawa, who noted that there were select inspection teams, to monitor, inspect and report back to the head office. Misa (Adamawa), a retired Director at the Ministry of Education, also said that in the past, inspectors were sent from the local education authority to inspect and monitor the teachers while lessons were on. Chay (Anambra) differed from these observations and argued that inspection was replaced by supervision “which was the policy between 1973 and 2003. Inspection is punitive. Inspectors made teachers jittery. But supervision is corrective.” Slightly different views were presented by Osho (Oyo) and Tunde (Oyo). According to Tunde (Oyo), a school administrator, school inspection was effective before and after school takeover but was not continued by subsequent governments. Osho noted that inspections were effective in the 1970s and the teachers are always ready for inspection. In the 1980s, the Teaching Commission (TESCOM) and State Primary Education Board (SUPEB) were established at the state level to monitor schools and teachers in secondary schools. Recently, there are too many schools for the number of supervisors, thus making it difficult to monitor and supervise schools (Osho).

Notwithstanding, both information from the literature and interviews indicate that the current state of school inspection/supervision is not what it ought to be. Duplications and variations across agencies and states might have contributed to shaping the respondents' experiences and perspectives as observed above. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, Orbach (2004), Humphreys and Crawford (2014) and Gershberg et al. (2016) observe that the inspectorates have not only advanced in terms of a number of staff, but the number of agencies performing quality assurance roles has increased, with some duplicated roles within and across the Ministry of Education agencies. For example, the FME had up to 24 agencies and parastatals that were saddled with diverse responsibilities some of which are unclear, duplicated and conflicting across some agencies. This included school supervision and monitoring roles by some agencies (Orbach, 2004; Humphreys and Crawford, 2014; Gershberg, et al, 2016). According to Orbach (2004, p.20):

“At the federal level, there is a Federal Inspectorate Service with 1,296 staff that supervises the schools and also grants accreditation and certification. UBEC has a fully-fledged Monitoring & Evaluation department, responsible for monitoring all aspects of the primary education programs. Ten zonal offices across the country aid this department, each supervising 3 to 4 states. Monitoring officers at these zones visit the SPEBs as well as the primary schools. SPEBs have School Services Departments whose officers too inspect the schools... it is common for the permanent board members of SPEBs to visit the schools and/or to go over the visitation reports of other officers who visit the schools and report to the chairmen of the boards. Most, if not all, SMOEs [State Ministries of Education] too conduct inspections in the primary schools.”

Despite these complex and multiple supervision and monitoring frameworks, the report of the Nigeria Education Sector Diagnosis (FME, 2005) shows that supervision of primary and junior secondary schools remained very weak. Orbach (2004, p.19) proverbially captures a major underlying problem of the system:

“When a function does not have a clear unified organizational home it often happens that everybody is doing something about it, but none is taking the lead. There is a tendency for nobody to assume full responsibility and manage the function as a whole. Thus, nobody formulates vision, policies and strategies for it, fights for resources and monitors implementation. This is what happened in the Nigerian case: a large number of functions were left within the basket of concurrent areas, without a clear division of labour among all the players. “

The military is implicated in the excessive focus on numbers to achieve the national unification objective while neglecting quality elements. Two levels of problems emerged. Firstly, there has been some negligence of the capacity strengthening needs of the inspectorates over time. While the military created the Federal Inspectorate of Education Service (Nwuzor, 1983), limited attention was given to its capacity building. In UBE, while multiplicity and duplicated structures were created, the capacity challenge persists and effective coordination of the functions for meaningful results remains a critical challenge. The second level is the resultant negligence of the school quality issues because the inspectorates do not live up to the expectation. The federal minister of education, in 1997 toured schools across Nigeria and "stated that the basic infrastructure in schools such as classrooms, laboratories, workshops, sporting facilities, equipment, libraries was in a state of total decay. The physical condition of most schools was reported to be pathetic" (Moja, 2000, p.1). Quality assurance may produce little or no result if quality markers themselves are lacking in the education system.

10.6 Assessment and Quality of Education

A literature search revealed scarcity of information on schools, performances, outcomes and learners' examination results. The limited information available shows that the National Policy on Education (1981 and other subsequent editions) provided for the use of Continuous Assessment as a means of evaluating pupils' learning in schools. It became operational in 1982 and seeks to curb fraud, malpractice and other evaluation-related challenges but while it gained some wide acceptance the government and its agencies failed "to ensure that teachers are provided ways and means of adequately and effectively addressing the problems that confront schools in their efforts at carrying out CA [continuous assessment] in schools" (Ali and Akubie, 1988, p.634). The continuous assessment replaced a single end-of-session examination as a major means of evaluating learners. Continuous assessment was initially introduced at the 6-year primary and 3-year junior secondary school levels and was combined with the end-of-programme national examination for the senior secondary level (Ali and Akubie, 1988).

A study in nine randomly selected states (Anambra, Bendel, Benue, Gongola, Kano, Niger, Lagos, Oyo, and Sokoto) indicates that the programme suffered from limited funding, "large class sizes, lack of standardized tests and non-testing instruments for use in measuring psychomotor and

affective learning outcomes, besides cognitive outcomes alone” (Ali and Akubie, 1988, p.636). FME (2005, p.157) revealed that “the most widely applied continuous assessment procedures were class assignments, homework and class tests” and only 13.92% of teachers studied had received some training on the application of continuous assessment practice. The report also points to a need for orientation and training of teachers for proper application of the procedure, and if the teachers lacked this knowledge, then the effectiveness of continuous assessment policy implementation could be said to have been weak.

It may be argued that the political expediency underlying popular education policies like the UPE and UBE appears to have missed the quality elements. Achinewhu-Nworgu (2019) believed that the military government takeover of schools from the missionaries in the early 1970s marked the beginning of the weakening of the standards of education in Nigeria. The restructuring of education ended the existing pattern that accommodated individual learners’ abilities. The new normal is one that inspires everyone to struggle to reach the peak and inspires deadly competitions (Achinewhu-Nworgu, 2019). The citizen's response to this inspiration was to engage in examination malpractices to help them reach the apex and to gain admission into universities. The struggle negatively affected the standard and outcome of education in Nigeria. The group of 'educated' Nigerians that emerged from this process also did not see anything wrong in aiding and encouraging corruption and different kinds of malpractices in schools, the education sector and national institutions at large. The cycle continued and became a norm (Achinewhu-Nworgu, 2019, p.169).

A number of challenges arise from the struggle to reach an apex in line with the UPE approach. The first is admissions-related malpractices. According to Nwagwu (1997) the limited spaces and high demand for admission into secondary and tertiary institutions, which naturally followed the increased awareness from the UPE grassroots mobilization, possibly led to some admissions crises and ultimately affected the standards and outcomes of education. On the one hand, the quota system the government initiated, especially in unity schools, caused even some bright learners to be rejected while admitting weak ones that meet the quota criteria – such as place of origin and family connections with important personalities (Nwagwu, 1997). On the other hand, and arising from the lowering of the admission standard, parents are drawn into deep racketeering exercises during admissions periods, with bribery, nepotism and corruption being principal instruments for ensuring admission of candidates with weak intellectual and mental capacity (Nwagwu, 1997; Moja, 2005). Nwagwu notes that the loss of faith in merit, justice and fair play by bright pupils further eroded the societal value, belief in merit and increased acceptance and value for all kinds of corrupt practices in the education sector. Consequently, mediocrity and economic power now take precedence over merits and academic standards (Nwagwu, 1997). Examinations that ought to be used to determine access “are fraught with cheating which has become embedded in many parts of the system,” Moja (2000, p.5). Due to the desperate need to obtain certificates from the already corrupted system, various kinds of cheating strategies are advanced by parents, teachers and learners to ensure that weak students are certified as graduates (Nwagwu, 1997).

While examination malpractices have a long history in human society and were reported in Nigeria as early as 1914 when the Senior Cambridge Local Examination was leaked in Nigeria (Oniye and Alawaye, 2008; Adekunmisi, 2017), a massive expansion of the practise appears to have made critical inroads into the school system during the military era. Adekunmisi (2017, p.55) notes that there was a massive leakage in 1967 of the School Certificate Examination "which made the Gowon Administration constitute a panel of inquiry led by retired Chief Justice Sir Danley Alexander. Similarly, in 1977 another mass leakage was probed by the Justice S. O. Sogbetun Panel." During the interview, Chay (Anambra) said that "poor quality started after EXPO 79 [a code name given to widespread examination malpractice in Nigeria in 1979]. That learners are no more serious. Teachers aid exam malpractice to create the impression that their schools are best."

In the literature, scholars link the various issues and challenges at the school level to political influences and state power factors. The appointment of heads of schools by education ministries, education ministers, and commissioners who are politicians with respective party, ethnic and religious interests has continued to impact schools' performance (Ikegbusi, Chigbo-Okeke and Modebelu, 2016). For example, religious affiliation and quota system are critical considerations in the appointment of school heads. The quota system introduced by the military tends to ignore qualifications and experiences in favour of religious and regional backgrounds. The relegation of quality factors in favour of religious and regional backgrounds creates an opportunity for mediocre individuals to be appointed as schools' heads which ultimately affects the leadership, schools' performances and students' outcomes. Thus, the federal character that aims to promote national unity contributes to weakening the educational standards and outcomes (Ikegbusi, Chigbo-Okeke, and Modebelu, 2016). During the fieldwork, Lizzy (Anambra), a retired principal, mentioned that "everything is politicized in the education sector. Wrong principals are posted to run big schools and make returns which kills such schools and water quality."

11. Conclusion

Our quest for an understanding of how various political breaks and interruptions, particularly the repeated coups and other government transitions, contributed to altering existing administrative norms in the education sector, with particular attention to issues around access and quality of education led towards several findings below that provide some insight into why different military regimes since Nigeria's independence produced different outcomes for people in different locations of the country. An analysis of political settlements during the political intermissions as well as responses of various education sector stakeholders also goes some way to expose the contending interests that existed over the years that have contributed to impacting on the educational development of the country, especially in terms of access and quality.

Polarised perspectives

The literature and the qualitative data relatively create an impression of a unified perspective on the impact of military interruptions on access and quality of education but the survey draws our attention to perspectives polarised along religious lines and between the north and south. Survey data revealed that the military governments' education policies generated different responses and possibly different support from northern and southern states and states with dominant Muslim and Christian populations respectively. In this way, education policies may have exacerbated divides rather than uniting the country. Northern populations were more likely to project favourable views of the military government actions and programs.

Promotion of enrolment without quality

The survey data suggests that government programs may have been more focused on enrolling students rather than improving the quality of education. This may be a sign that the government used education policy as a tool to build a wider support base and was not focused on maximizing educational outcomes.

Centralisation

The military used its command structure to centralize control of education. While this appears to have been remedied in the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the centralized resource mobilization and allocation frameworks remain a critical means of control over other tiers of government. Federal ascendancy is evident in the dominant roles the Federal Government plays in funds mobilization and allocation (to other dependent tiers of government).

Opaque Financial Framework

The military largely created and operated the federal education structures for many years before handing over to civilians in 1999. Throughout this period, the operating system these structures have become used to the opaque financial framework it learnt from the military. Accountability that ought to have been gained through democratic accountabilities and checks were lacking.

The opaque system was inherited by the UBE structure which existing information in the literature shows that financial transparency had been lacking.

Prebendal Tendency and Lack of Accountability

The military was committed to the political settlement of its cronies, allies and advancement of ethnic politics. These contributed to eroding accountability as well as collective and individual responsibility of officeholders to the people. They were neither responsible to anyone nor accountable to any laid down processes.

Politicization of Education

Some policies, like UPE and unity schools, had political undertones, which have been weakening their impacts and introducing negative precedents in Nigeria's education system. The politics of states of origin that the government has subjected unity schools to represents an example of how not to plan and run education programmes. It became a cover and tool for the advancement of various kinds of malpractices and corruption and contributed to the collapsing of quality, belief in merit and entronement of mediocrity. The conversion of the UPE as a tool for the promotion of national unity and public acceptance of military regimes served to dislocate and blind the focus of education. The focus on numbers in ways that contributed to causing an implosion of the whole UPE is an example of what should be avoided in the planning of an effective and result-oriented education system.

Instability in Education Policies and Processes

Leadership changes produced changes and shifts in policy and programme focuses. Different regimes had different interests, challenges and political approaches. Military-led political changes did not evolve but were imposed and lacking in responsibility and accountability. Such changes contributed to eroding the structure, processes and quality of education. Thus, it may be concluded that political instability also produced instability in the education policies, approaches, management, processes and outcomes. The frequent changes and hastily introduced regimes, programmes and political appointments did not give room for in-depth programme planning, execution and learning.

Structural and Functional Confusion

The military set a precedent that confused the constitutional roles of various tiers of government and within the Ministry of Education it created some institutional, structural and functional mix-ups. The military regime operated a kind of unitary system in which authority flowed from the head of state. Different tiers of government, ministries, departments and agencies funnelled their loyalty to the head of state. When the binding authority gave way for each level to operate according to its constitutional authority, some were unleashed into the education sector such as complicated duplication, but less effective school supervision and monitoring systems that currently bedraggle the system. The frequent changes in government also produced some level of crises in Nigeria's education system and particularly some inconsistencies and contradictory educational policies and practices

Duplication of efforts and negligence of some essential quality markers

The constitution puts education in the concurrent list that allows different tiers of government to be involved in the provision and management of education. However, in practice, both federal and state governments worked against this and did not work in line with the spirit of the provisions of the constitution. Along with the local governments, they established and operated education at all levels, from pre-primary to tertiary education levels. They made their laws and policies, some of which failed to recognize that education is a shared responsibility or considered other levels of the government doing the same thing. This leads to overconcentration of efforts in some areas like school monitoring and inspection while neglecting other areas like staff development and training.

Summary analysis of the impacts of the political disruptions using Levy's (2014) Classification of four ideal types of political settlement

Table 1 below diagrammatically summarises the observation of the study on the issues around political bargaining and settlement and how these contributed to impact on Nigeria's education system.

Table 17: Summary analysis of the impacts of the political disruptions using Levy's (2014) Classification of four ideal types of political settlement

	Dominant	Competitive
Personalized	<p>Elite cohesion is high, power exercised top-down by leadership, limited constraints on political actors.</p> <p>Exemplified by most military regimes (where there were some levels of differences among them, the military constituted a political block that decreed laws and policies with some degree of consultation with the non-military elites and almost no consultation with the masses)</p> <p><u>Impact on Education</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Parents did not have any alternative but to yield to the government policies but when quality began to wane the wealthy ones withdrew their children from public schools ● Religious groups and private owners of schools were restrained from going to court and courts were barred from hearing about school takeovers; they accepted whatever government gave as compensation and continued to complain to whoever cared to listen; some of them devised a means of partitioning their lands and giving out some to the government as schools while retaining some on which they had their schools 	<p>Elite cohesion is low, settlement demands power changes hands on an electoral competitive basis, but "rules of the game" are personalized (this is also called "competitive clientelism").</p> <p>This was the situation of Nigeria in the Second Republic where regionalism and party interests polarized the elites, the regime was marked by corruption and elite rivalries.</p> <p><u>Impact on Education</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Education was not given very much attention b. Dwindling funds and corruption weakened state capacity to support education c. The state could not manage the UPE leading to its collapse (finally abandoned to states when the military overthrew the government) d. Incessant strike actions owing to the government's failure to provide social services.
Rule-of-law	<p>Elite cohesion is high, power is top-down, but actions are anchored in rules which institutionalize how power is to be exercised.</p> <p>In the fourth republic, although there were regional and party differences, politicians were united by the concerns whether the military would hand over power (before the handover)</p>	<p>Politics is competitive, impersonal rules govern the exercise of power.</p> <p>Not very applicable to the study period.</p>

or intervene if politicians misbehaved (after the handover). Hence there were minimal elite rivalries. A second factor was the heavy presence of ex-military men in the government of Obasanjo in the early days of the fourth republic; with there, they played some roles as guardians of democracy (this perhaps contributed to work against self-perpetuation attempt by Obasanjo in his third term agenda) and also it served their settlement.

Impact on Education

- a. The self-styled military system was still evident in the way UBE was introduced without due consultation.
- b. A high level of corruption and embezzlement of the UBE fund was observed.

12. Implications of the Study

In this section, we summarise key implications and recommendations we make in relation to the key study findings that are summarised in the conclusion section.

12.1 Implications for Research

12.1.1 Functional Decentralisation

The centralization of the education system by the military is entrenched, widespread and not limited to the education sector. Federal ascendancy is observed in the political, economic and other spheres. As the country has tested both regionalism and unitary-federalism, scholars are challenged to explore functional and workable frameworks that would promote inclusive participation and advance holistic development of the country for which educational development is an important tool.

12.1.2 Breakthrough Research on Prebendial System, Unaccountable and Opaque Financial Framework

The military largely created and entrenched an opaque financial and prebendal system in the country that demands multi-dimensional interventions to unbundle. Considering that many countries that are seen as developed today (including Russia, France, Italy and Spain) were previously ruled by strong military dictators, scholars have an important role to play in this regard. Some of the key questions begging investigations and answers are: how did countries that passed through strong military and opaque systems in the past become decentralized? How did such countries that have succeeded in building strong structural accountability frameworks achieve it and evolve an open, transparent, and accountability framework; what pathways and strategic actions did they take and what were key internal and external enablers that contributed to making these work for them? Are there key lessons to be learnt from such countries, what are peculiar Nigerian challenges and how might the country overcome them in their effort to break down the opaque frameworks instituted by the military and oiled by the beneficiaries of the status quo?

12.2 Implications for Policy and Practices

12.2.1 Need for Inclusive Policies and Interventions

To build a unified Nigeria, there is a need to explore and pursue policies and interventions that seek to forge unity in diversity while providing bespoke support to help the educationally disadvantaged zones. Such policies and interventions need to evolve from a common dialogue and shared understanding of different needs of different locations of the country. It needs to bring together different voices and perspectives, including the likes of those that were heard during this study.

12.2.2 Promotion of quality education

The observed challenges created by the historical focus on the promotion of access without adequate planning and mobilization of adequate resources for high-quality infrastructure and qualified manpower need to be addressed through conscious investment in quality markers, such as teacher quality issues, relevant and adequate infrastructure and training facilities in schools. But in a society polarized by its history (such as civil war experience and related feelings of marginalization), ethnic and religious differences, participatory dialogue that transcends elite bargains and payoff may be needed to promote inclusive and participatory actions. Such approaches are needed to accommodate differential investment where they are needed without producing acrimony in other locations.

There is a need to deepen democratic practices at all levels to take back power from dominant elites that benefited from the historical corruption and have used their position to dominate the political space (it is noted that they continue to dominate the political space and political appointment as their share of the bargain) and catalyze mass participation in ways that will increase accountability, promote need-oriented interventions rather than those designed to pay off political investors and, ultimately promote sustainable, equitable and industry-relevant education system.

12.2.3 Dismantling of the Prebendal System, Unaccountable and Opaque Financial Framework:

Dealing with the opaque financial framework requires both political will and civil participation. The political leaders must be prepared and be brave enough to take up the challenge of creating an open and accountable system. Mere policy proclamation may not be enough because the current UBE framework has a seeming accountability framework that does not fully work to ensure accountability. Political will is required to make it work for the country. Civil society also needs to explore ways to force an open system, possibly with the aid of information communication technology that can expose unethical practices and failures to adhere to the laid down rules in the system.

12.2.4 Structural and Functional Confusions, Duplication of Efforts and Negligence of Essential Quality Markers

The existing confusions in the structures and functions of various agencies of the Ministry of Education need to be addressed, not by creating another structure but by merging, adjusting and restructuring the existing ones. Possibly, there may be a need to learn from other agencies within and outside the country that is considered to be working. The current confusions do not only lead to less effectiveness of the agencies, but they also enhance resource wastage. There is a need to prioritize attention given to various departments and agencies that have the responsibilities for ensuring quality and standards in education.

12.3 Implications for International Development Interventions in Nigeria's Education

Before highlighting some important implications of our findings to international development interventions in Nigeria, it is important to note that there were varied external interventions in the Nigerian education sector. In a UNESCO publication, Nwagwu (2000, p.17), notes that much of the external financial support for the country's education came from international bodies like UNESCO, UNICEF, UNDP, UNFPA and the World Bank. There were also bilateral agreements between Nigeria and other countries (including Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States of America) that were directed towards supporting the country's education. In the literature, the outcome has been mixed: while they have contributed to the country's educational development, the actual change and needed transformation has been slow and some of the country's educational woes persist. Access to education, for example, has worsened. Some of the reasons for these include the general shortcomings discussed above. Others include population explosion, insurgency and corruption (Nwagwu, 2000; Mukaddas, 2020).

From this study, the following notes and recommendations are made in relation to international development support to Nigeria's education sector development:

- a. **Beware of polarised perspectives instituted by military education development approaches that may be exacerbated by differential interventions:** the need to support educational development in the north to help the region catch up with the south is evident but development partners need to take cognisance of divided views it may produce or exacerbate. Hence, interventions need to be based on evidence-based needs and the justifications for choosing intervention locations need to be made clear on the project website, documents and other public engagement frameworks, including social media in order not to harm the image of the funders and implementers of such projects.
- b. **Impact of Centralisation:** Development agencies are working in a country where there is a relative administrative decentralization on the one hand and relatively federal ascendancy in resource mobilization and allocation frameworks. Interventions that seek to promote good governance, civil participation and even development need to study this somewhat centralization of the seemingly decentralized governance framework to understand how it impacts their programmes and how to mitigate its impact in the programme implementation and outcomes.
- c. **Opaque Financial Framework:** Some of the key barriers to development in Nigeria, including the development of the education sector, is corruption, mismanagement of funds and nepotism. These barriers thrive in opaque financial systems. Hence, interventions need to incorporate policy, public participation and open fund management frameworks into their funding criteria and ensure adherence to these guidelines so that funds may be effectively utilized. The guidelines will also help to open up the entrenched opaque financial practices that pervade the Nigerian public system, which the military created and helped to sustain.

- d. **Prebendal tendency and patronage networks** were observed to exist in the employment and value allocation processes. These have a strong capacity to weaken development efforts and grossly misappropriate development funds and cover up the crimes. As noted above, these demand that development assistance should come with frameworks that address the prebendal tendencies and operations of patronage networks in the funded programmes. This effort might help to break down these practices over time.
- e. **The Structural and functional confusions** created by the military still exist in some of the education sector structures and processes. Ministries and agencies of the government that have duplicated functions, as have been observed in the Universal Basic Education and its parent body, the Ministry of Education, may be involved in power plays, conflict and compete among themselves in ways that may affect programme implementation and effectiveness.
- f. **In relation to the political settlement perspective and impacts of the political disruptions**, the pattern of elite cooperation and conflicts needs to be taken into account and its potential impact on education programmes need to be planned for before the commencement of intervention programmes. Recent evidence suggests that this is very potent. For example, President Goodluck Jonathan's effort towards the provision of formal education to Almajiris in northern Nigeria was weakened by elite suspense and non-cooperation and the project failed (see Gershberg et al., 2016).
- g. On the contrary, when **elite cohesion is high, power exercised top-down by leadership**, due to elite conspiracy and cooperation, the masses would likely devise means of bypassing the rules and directions emanating therefrom as observed during schools' takeover. The missionaries were not given any choice and were restrained from going to court and courts were barred from hearing about school takeovers. While some acquiesced, others devised a means of partitioning their lands and giving out some to the government as schools while retaining some on which they had their schools. Intervention programmes designed under what the masses consider as high elite oppression (due to high cohesion) may be sabotaged.
- h. Also, in the situation of high **elite cohesion and top-down policy flow**, check and balances may be weak, which will encourage a high level of corruption and programme fund embezzlement.

References

- AAAS (2011). Eyes on Nigeria: Technical Report. Geospatial Technologies and Human Rights Project. New York: American Association for the Advancement of Science
- Aaronson, M. (2013). The Nigerian Civil War and 'Humanitarian Intervention'. In: Everill B., Kaplan J. (eds) *The History and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention and Aid in Africa*. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137270023_9
- Abati, R. and Ajayi, S. (1995). Odotola: The Biography of T. Adeola Odotola. Abeokuta: ALF Publications.
- Abdulkareem, A. & Muraina, M. (2015). Historical Analysis and Challenges to Effective Control of Education in Nigeria. *Historical Research Letter*, 22, 1-9
- Abe, I. (2002). Problems of Teacher Recruitment and Retention in Nigeria. 47TH World Assembly of International Council on Education for Teaching, Amsterdam, Netherlands, 3 July 2002
- Abel, O. & Amenger, H. (2006). PRIMARY EDUCATION IN NIGERIA: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS. *Journal of Teacher Perspective*, 8(4), 1-7
- Achinewhu-Nworgu, E. (2019). An Overview of Nigerian Education Law and Policy: A Case Study of University Admission Policy (JAMB) and Impact on Youth Educational Development. *Glocal Education in Practice: Teaching, Researching, and Citizenship BCES Conference Books, 2019, Volume 17*. Sofia: *Bulgarian Comparative Education Society*, 167-174
- Adamolekun, L., Erero, J., & Oshionebo, B. (1991). "Federal Character" and Management of the Federal Civil Service and the Military. *Publius*, 21(4), 75-88.
- Adaralegbe, A. (ed., 1972). *A philosophy for Nigerian education*. Ibadan, Nigeria: Heinemann Educational Books (Nigeria) Ltd.
- Adebayo, A. (1979). Policy-making in Nigerian public administration, 1960-1975. *Journal of Administration Overseas*, XVIII (January), 4-14
- Adefeso-Olateju, M. (2012). A Critical Inquiry into the Effectiveness of Public and Private Schools in Nigeria and Implications for Public-Private Partnership. Unpublished PhD Thesis, Institute of Education, University of London
- Adekunmisi, S.R. (2017). Examination Malpractices and Roles of Librarians in Nigeria. *Journal of Education and Practice*, 8(27), 53-64
- Adelabu, M.A. (2005). Teacher motivations and incentives in Nigeria. Country case study report. Available at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a08c53e5274a27b2001115/3888Teacher_motivation_Nigeria.pdf (received 25 February 2021)
- Adelogbe, R.A. (1974). Curricula and Methods in Education of the Deaf in Nigeria. Paper presented at the UNESCO expert meeting on education of the deaf. UNESCO headquarters, Paris, 30 September - 4th October 1974
- Adeniyi, A. (2014). Quest for State's Creation in Nigeria: An Harbinger of Development Or Underdevelopment? *Journal of Culture, Society and Development*, Vol 4,68-71
- Adeoye, A. (1991). Of Economic Masquerades and Vulgar Economy: A Critique of the Structural Adjustment Program in Nigeria. *Africa Development / Afrique Et Développement*, 16(1), 23-44.
- Afigbo, A. (1991). Background to Nigerian Federalism: Federal Features in the Colonial State. *Publius*, 21(4), 13-29.
- Afigbo, A. (1991). Background to Nigerian Federalism: Federal Features in the Colonial State. *Publius*, 21(4), 13-29.
- Agbese, P., & Kieh, G. (1992). Military Disengagement from African Politics: The Nigerian Experience. *Africa Spectrum*, 27(1), 4-23.

- Aghedo, I. and Eke, S. (2013). From Alms to Arms: The Almajiri Phenomenon and Internal Security in Northern Nigeria. *The Korean Journal of Policy Studies*, 28(3), pp. 97–123.
- Ahanotu, A. (1983). The Nigerian Military and the Issue of State Control of Mission Schools. *Church History*, 52(3), 333-344.
- Ahmed, A. (1989). The Asquith Tradition, the Ashby Reform, and the Development of Higher Education in Nigeria. *Minerva*, 27(1), 1-20.
- Ajayi, K. (1997). 'Production and Retention of Teachers in a Period of Economic Recession' In Aloy Ejiogu and Kayode Ajayi (eds.) *Emergent Issues in Nigerian Education*. Lagos: UNILAG Consult. Pages 13 - 34.
- Ajayi, S. A. (2008). The development of free primary education scheme in Western Nigeria, 1952-1966: An analysis. *OGIRISI: A New Journal of African Studies*, 5(1), 1-12
- Ajuzie, M. V. (2003). *A Concise History of Education in Nigeria: Issues And New Challenges*. Lagos, Nigeria: T-Excel
- Akanbi, G. & Abiolu, O. (2018). Nigeria's 1969 Curriculum Conference: a practical approach to educational emancipation. *Cadernos de História da Educação*, 17(2), 479-490
- Akani, C. (1990). *Deepening Crisis in Nigerian Educational System*. Port Harcourt: Pam Unique Publishing Company
- Akinbuli, S. (2013). An Assessment of Accountability in the Public Sector in Nigeria. *Arabian Journal of Business and Management Review*, 1(3), 1-11.
- Akindutire, I., Ayodele, J. & Osiki, P. (2011). Political Leadership and the Development of Education Programme in Nigeria: Lessons for African Nations. *Journal of Education and Practice*, 2(8), 19-27
- Akinsanya, A. (1976). The Machinery of Government During the Military Regime in Nigeria *Journal of the Indian Law Institute*, 18(1), 115-133.
- Akpofure, R.E.O & N'dupu, B.L. (2000). National Standards & Quality Control in Nigeria Education. In UNESCO, *State of Education in Nigeria*. Abuja: UNESCO, p.119-131
- Akresh, R., Bhalotra, S., Leone, M., & Osili, U. (2017). First and Second Generation Impacts of the Biafran War. IZA Institute of Labor Economics
- Akuma, N. (2014). Education For All (EFA) Problems and Prospects in Nigeria. *Journal of Resourcefulness and Distinction*, 7(1), 1-12
- Alapiki, H. (2005). State Creation in Nigeria: Failed Approaches to National Integration and Local Autonomy. *African Studies Review*, 48(3), 49-65.
- Ali, Anthony & Akubie, Auhustine (1988). Nigerian primary schools' compliance with nigeria national policy on education. *Evaluation review*, (6), 625-637
- Aliyu, A. Y. (1980a). The involvement of local government in the administration of social services. *Nigerian Journal of Public Affairs*, IX (May), 79-110
- Amadioha, S. (2008). Politics and Education in Nigeria: A study of Disunity in Unity. *Nigerian Journal of Education, Planning & Finance*, 1(5 & 6), 86-92
- Amale, S. (2006). Nigerian Traditional Education. In G. Akanbi (ed.) *History of Education in Nigeria*. Lagos: National Open University of Nigeria
- Amaje, S. (2012). The Impact of Public Policy on the Education Sector in Nigeria: A Study of Kogi State, 1992-2011. Dissertation. Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria, Nsukka.
- Amnesty International (2013) 'Keep away from schools or we'll kill you: Right to education under attack in Nigeria'. Amnesty International October 2013, London.

- Amundsen, I. (2010). *Good Governance in Nigeria. A Study in Political Economy and Donor Support. Norad Report 17/2010 Discussion*. Oslo: Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation - NORAD (NORAD)
- Amuwo, ‘., Bach, D. C., & Lebeau, Y. (Eds.) 2001. *Nigeria during the Abacha Years (1993-1998): The Domestic and International Politics of Democratization*. IFRA-Nigeria. doi:10.4000/books.ifra.623
- Anero, N. (2014). Relevance and Challenges of Primary Education to the Overall Development of the Child and the Nigerian Society. *Global Journal of Educational Research*, 13, 55-82
- Angerbrandt, H. & Themnér, A. (2021). Above politics? Ex-military leaders in Nigerian electoral politics, Democratization, DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2020.1866552
- Anibueze, U. and Okwo, F. (2013). Counterpart funding of the Universal Basic Education in Nigeria: Implication for Counseling. *IOSR Journal of Humanities And Social Science*, 17 (2), 11-16
- Anikwenwa, M. (1999). “Root Causes of Low Male Enrolment in Schools and Solutions to Them”, in P. Ejiolor (ed.) *Fighting A Monster: Declining Males in Schools*. Enugu: Nolix Educational Publications
- Animasahun, R. & Ogunniran, J. (2018). Correlates of examination malpractices among secondary school students in Oyo state, Nigeria. *International Journal of Administration and Policy Studies*, 6(9), 181-189.
- Anosike, C. N. (1996). Improving primary science teaching in Nigeria: A workshop Approach. PhD Thesis, Department of Science and Technology, Institute of Education, University of London.
- Aremu, J. & Buhari, L. (2017). Sense and Senselessness of War: Aggregating the Causes, Gains and Losses of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967–1970. *IAFOR Journal of Arts & Humanities* Volume 4 – Special Issue, 61-79
- Aremu, J. (2016). Unitary government and the challenge of political instability in Nigeria, 1966-1970. *World Scientific News* 40, 124-134
- Asiodu, P. (1970). The future of the federal and state civil services in the context of the twelve states structure. In: Tukur, M. (ed.), *Administrative and Political Development; Prospects for Nigeria*. Institute of Administration, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, pp 124-146.
- Asiwaju, A. (1972). Ashby Revisited: A Review of Nigeria's Educational Growth, 1961-1971. *African Studies Review*, 15(1), 1-16. doi:10.2307/523532
- Austine, E., Charles, M. & Raymon, A. (2013). Corruption in Nigeria: A Historical Perspective. *Research on Humanities and Social Sciences*, 3(16), 19-26
- Azuma, J. (2014). Responding to the Challenge of Boko Haram. *Lausanne Global Analysis*, 3 (6), 5-9
- Babalola, D. (2019). *The Political Economy of Federalism in Nigeria*. Palgrave Macmillan
- Babalola, J., Lungwangwa, G. and Adeyinka, A. (1999). Education under Structural Adjustment Programme in Nigeria and Zambia. *McGill Journal of Education*, 34(1), 79-98
- Bennell, P., Anyanwu, S., Ayara, N., Ayuba, A., Aigbokhan, B., Bashir, Y., Chete, L., Dandago, K., Jimoh, A., Muhammed, M., Oladeji, S., Onyukwu, O., Sagagi, M. and Tella, S. (2007). *Nigeria: Education Public Expenditure Review. A Synthesis of the Main Findings and Recommendations from Nine State Reports*. Brighton, UK, University of Sussex, Sussex School of Education, Centre for International Education.
- Bienen, H. (1978). Military Rule and Political Process: Nigerian Examples. *Comparative Politics*, 10(2), 205-225. doi:10.2307/421646
- Boniface, M. & Rashmi, M. (2012). Interest-based Bargaining: Innovating from the Basics. *International Journal of Selection and Assessment*, 3(9), 40-48.
- Boniface, M. & Rashmi, M. (2013). Interest-Based Bargaining: Efficient, Amicable, and Wise? *Employee Relations*, 35(5), 460 – 478

- Bourke, V. (1978). The Ethical Role of the Impartial Observer. *The Journal of Religious Ethics*, 6(2), 279-292.
- Bray, T., & Cooper, G. (1979). Education and Nation Building in Nigeria since the Civil War. *Comparative Education*, 15(1), 33-41.
- Callaway, A. & Musone, A. (1968). *Financing of education in Nigeria*. UNESCO International Institute for Educational Planning
- Campbell, J. (2011). Return to an Open Ballot? Council on Foreign Relations Blog, January 28, 2011. Retrieved from <https://www.cfr.org/blog/return-open-ballot>
- Cheng, C., Goodhand, J. and Meehan, P. (2018). Elite Bargains and Political Deals Project: Synthesis Paper: Securing and Sustaining Elite Bargains that Reduce Violent Conflict. London: Stabilisation Unit, UK Government
- Chikwendu, E. (1977). Consideration of the Freedom Value in a Military Regime: A decade of Military Rule in Nigeria. *Verfassung Und Recht in Übersee / Law and Politics in Africa, Asia and Latin America*, 10(4), 531-541.
- Chuta, E. (1986). Free Education in Nigeria: Socioeconomic Implications and Emerging Issues. *Comparative Education Review*, 30(4), 523-531.
- Corely, I., Fallon, H. and Cox, L. (2014). *Silence Would be Treason: The Last Writings of Ken Saro-Wiwa*. Daraja Press.
- Csapo, M. (1983). Universal Primary Education in Nigeria: Its Problems and Implications. *African Studies Review*, 26(1), 91-106. doi:10.2307/524612
- Daniel-Kali, B. (2018). Historical Analysis of Educational Policies in Nigeria: Trends and Implications. *International Journal of Scientific Research in Education*, 11(2), 247-264
- de Wit, M. & Crookes, D. (2013). Oil Shock Vulnerabilities & Impacts: Nigeria Case Study. Prepared for United Kingdom Department for International Development, 30 June 2013, Available at <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a08a4b40f0b6497400051e/61062Case-Study-Nigeria.pdf> (accessed 18 February 2021)
- Deji, A. (2013). Historical Background of Nigerian Politics, 1900-1960. *IOSR Journal Of Humanities And Social Science*, 15(2), 84-94
- Deng, E. I. (2015). The Impact of Nigerian Universities Enrolment and the Unemployment Situation in Nigeria (1980 – 2014). *Journal of Social Sciences and Public Policy*, 7(1), 124 -136
- Diamond, L. (2013). Forward. In W. Adebani & E. Obadare (eds). *Democracy and Prebendalism in Nigeria: Critical Interpretations*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan
- Diamond, S. (2007). Who Killed Biafra? *Dialectical Anthropology*, 31(1/3), 339-362.
- Dibie, R. A. (1997). The Military-Bureaucracy Relationship in Nigeria: A Study of Public Policy Making and Implementation" (1997). Dissertations. 1639. <https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/dissertations/1639>
- Domike, G. C. & Odey, E. O. (2014). An Evaluation of the Major Implementation Problems of Primary School Curriculum in Cross River State, Nigeria. *American Journal of Educational Research*, 2(6), 397-401
- Dooga, T. (2012), Nigeria Languages: Failing Health and Possible Healing. *AfrrevLaligens*, 1(1), 76-95
- Doron, G. & Sened, I. (1995). Editors' Introduction: Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Bargaining Models in Political Science. *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 7(3), 235-243
- Dummar, F. (1989). The History of the Nigerian Army and the Implications for the Future of Nigeria. Thesis. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
- Dunne, M., Humphreys, S., Dauda, M., Kaibo J., Garuba, A. (2013). *Adamawa State primary education research: Access, quality and outcomes, with specific reference to gender*. Yola/ Brighton, UK:

- Adamawa State Universal Basic Education Board, Yola/ Centre for International Education, University of Sussex, UK.
- Duze, C. (2012). Educational policies/programmes' effect on attrition rates in primary schools in Nigeria. *International Journal of Education Administration and Policy Studies*, 4(2), 38-44
- Dyke, V. (1960). *Political Science: A Philosophical Analysis*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press
- Easton, (1953). *The Political System*. New York: Knopf
- Easton, D. (1965). *A framework for political analysis*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Eaton, S., Fonstad, N., & McKersie, R. (2004) Interest-Based Negotiations in a Transformed Labor-Management Setting. *Negotiation Journal*, 20(1), 5-11
- Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (2017). Zamfara UBEC Chairman Jailed for Corruption. Media & Publicity, 13th May, 2017. Available at https://www.efccnigeria.org/efcc/news/2530-zamfara-ubec-chairman-jailed-for-corruption?__cf_chl_jschl_tk__=pmd_22c61dc48120244134c657c78d77eee36706afe1-1627440588-0-gqNtZGzNAiKjcnBszQa6
- EDOREN (2016). *Developing Effective Private Education Nigeria project (DEEPEN) Baseline Report*. Abuja: EDOREN
- Education Sector Support Programme in Nigeria (ESSPIN, 2008). *An Assessment of the Development Needs of Teachers in Nigeria - Kwara State Case Study*. Report No. KW 301
- Ejiogu, A. (1998). *Teachers' Reward is in Heaven: A misplaced Euphemism*. University of Lagos Inaugural Lecture Series. Lagos: University of Lagos Press.
- Ekeh, P. (1999). Obasanjo and the Burden of Civilianization. *Issue: A Journal of Opinion*, 27(1), 73-76. doi:10.2307/1167012
- Ekuban, E., Olaniyi, A. & Callaaway, A. (1978). The Mobilisation of domestic resources to ensure coordinated developmen tof formal and non-formal edcation: experiences from Ghana and Nigeria. Paper presented at the UNESCO Seminar on Moblisation of domestic resources for formal and non-formal education, UNESCO, Paris, 19-28 June 1978
- Ekundayo, W. (2015). National Development in Nigeria and the indispensable Lessons for Nigeria to Learn from The Asian Tigers. *Journal of Good Governance and Sustainable Development in Africa (JGGSDA)*, 2(4), 10-16
- Elaigwu, J.I. (2005). *Nigeria: Yesterday and Today for Tomorrow*. Jos: Aha Publishing House.
- Elechi, C. (2016). Policy Summersault and the Challenge of Educational Development in Nigeria: Charting a Course for the Future. *International Journal of Education and Research*, 4(9), 77-88
- Elsner, W., Heinrich, T., Schwardt, H. & Gräbner, C. (2014) (Eds.). *Game Theory and Institutional Economics*. Basel: MDPI
- Eribo, F. (1996). Higher Education in Nigeria: Decades of Development and Decline. *Issue: A Journal of Opinion*, 24(1), 64-67.
- ESSPIN (2009). Approach to monitoring learning achievement – Position Paper. Doc. No.: ESSPIN 027
- ESSPIN (2009). Approach to monitoring learning achievement – Position Paper. Doc. No.: ESSPIN 027
- Etim, James Edem (1976). A comparison of education systems in Nigeria and the United States of America. Dissertations and Theses, Portland State University
- Eze, O., Elimian, A. and Chinwuba, U. (2015). The Politics of State Creation and National Integration in Nigeria. *Journal of Politics and Law*, 8(1), 113-121

- Ezeanya, S. (2016). Increased Establishment of Private Secondary Schools and Quality Education Delivery in Rivers State, Nigeria. *Teacher Education and Curriculum Studies*. 1(2), 33-38.
- Ezegwu, C. (2012). Masculinity and Low Male Secondary School Enrolment in Anambra State, Nigeria. MA Dissertation. The University of London, Institute of Education
- Ezegwu, C. (2015). Home-grown initiatives for local challenges on gender inequality in basic education in Nigeria. Published as EDOREN Blog www.edorennigeria.wordpress.com/2015/03/04/home-grown-initiatives-for-local-challenges-on-gender-inequality-in-basic-education-nigeria
- Ezegwu, C. (2020). Masculinity and Access to Basic Education in Nigeria. Lancaster University . <https://doi.org/10.17635/lancaster/thesis/1072>
- Ezegwu, C., Adedokun, A. and Ezegwu, C. (2017). "Street Children, Integrated Education and Violence in Northern Nigeria". In Panjwani, F., Revell, L., Gholami, R. and Diboll, M. (Eds.) *Education and Extremisms: Rethinking liberal pedagogies in the contemporary world*. London: Routledge
- Fabunmi, M. (2005) Historical Analysis of Educational Policy Formulation In Nigeria: Implications For Educational Planning And Policy. *International Journal of African and African American Studies*, 4(2) 1–7
- Fabunmi, M. (2005) Historical Analysis of Educational Policy Formulation In Nigeria: Implications For Educational Planning And Policy. *International Journal of African and African American Studies*, 4(2) 1–7
- Fadakinte, M.M. (2019). Politics and the Struggle for Power: The Roles of the State and Hegemony. *Journal of Power, Politics & Governance*, 7(2), 15-24
- Fafunwa, A. B. (1991). *History of education in Nigeria*. (New Ed.). Ibadan: NPS Educational.
- Fafunwa, A. (1974). *History of education in Nigeria*. London: George Allen and Unwin
- Federal Military Government of Nigeria (1966). Decree No1, 17 January 1966.
- Federal Military Government of Nigeria (1966). Decree No1, 17 January 1966.
- Federal Ministry of Education (2003). *Education Sector Status Report*. Abuja: FME
- Federal Ministry of Education (2005). *Nigeria Education Sector Diagnosis (A Condensed Version): A Framework for Re-engineering the Education Sector*. Federal Ministry of Education
- Federal Republic of Nigeria (1970). Second National Development Plan, 1970-1974. Federal Ministry of Information, Lagos
- Federal Republic of Nigeria (1979). The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979. Lagos: Federal Ministry of Information.
- Federal Republic of Nigeria (1993). Teachers Registration Council of Nigeria Act No. 31, Supplement to Official Gazette Extraordinary pp. A285-A302. Lagos: Federal Government Press.
- First, R. (1970). *Power in Africa*. New York: Pantheon Books
- Forrest, T. (1986). The political economy of civil rule and the economic crisis in Nigeria (1979–84). *Review of African Political Economy*, 13:35, 4-26, DOI: 10.1080/03056248608703664
- Frankel, G. (1996). Nigeria Mixes Oil And Money. The Washington Post, Sunday, November 24 1996; Page C01. Available at washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/nigeria/stories/mixes112496.htm
- Garba, G.P. (2005). The Nigerian Civil War: Causes and the Aftermath. In: Fosu A.K., Collier P. (eds) *Post-Conflict Economies in Africa*. International Economic Association Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230522732_6
- Gayawan, E. (2014). Possible determinants and spatial patterns of anaemia among young children in Nigeria: a Bayesian semi-parametric modelling. Available at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/260023562_Possible_determinants_and_spatial_pa

tterns_of_anaemia_among_young_children_in_Nigeria_a_Bayesian_semi-parametric_modelling/figures?lo=1

- Gershberg, A., Rai, S., Ezegwu, C., Nnodu, I., Ojo, A., Panguru, A. Nugroho, C., Elacqua, G. and Alves, F. (2016), *Comparative Review of Basic Education Reforms: Part 1 Synthesis of Findings*. Abuja: EDOREN and UBEC
- Global Education First Initiative (2013). Accelerating progress to 2015: Nigeria, Working Paper. A Report Series to the UN Special Envoy for Global Education. New York/Paris: Global Education First Initiative/Good Planet Foundation
- Global Education First Initiative (2013). *Accelerating progress to 2015: Nigeria, Working Paper*. A Report Series to the UN Special Envoy for Global Education. New York/Paris: Global Education First Initiative/Good Planet Foundation
- Härmä, J. (2011). *Study of Private Schools in Lagos*. ESSPIN. Report No. LG 303.
- Hickey, S. & Hossain, N. (2019). *The Politics of Education in Developing Countries*. Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Hoechner, H. (2011). Striving for knowledge and dignity: how Qur'anic students in Kano, Nigeria, learn to live with rejection and educational disadvantage, *European Journal of Development Research*, doi:10.1057/ejdr.2011.39.
- Hudu, A. (2000). Working and Living Conditions of Academic Staff in Nigeria: Strategies for survival at Ahmadu Bello University In The Dilemma of Post-Colonial Universities: Elite Formation and the Restructuring of Higher Education in sub-Saharan Africa [online]. Ibadan: IFRA-Nigeria, (generated 24 Mars 2021). Available on the Internet: <<http://books.openedition.org/ifra/1022>>. ISBN: 9791092312171. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.4000/books.ifra.1022>.
- Human Rights Watch (2007). *Chop Fine: the Human Rights Impact of Local Government Corruption and Mismanagement in Rivers State, Nigeria*. Ed. Albin-Lackey, Chris. New York: Human Rights Watch.
- Humphreys, S. and Crawford, I. (2014). *Review of the literature on Basic Education in Nigeria: Issues of Access, Equity and Impact*. Abuja: EDOREN.
- Ibekwe, N. (2020). Saro-Wiwa: Britain resisted sanctions on Abacha regime for commercial reasons, documents show. Premium Times, January 1, 2020. Available at <https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/370740-saro-wiwa-britain-resisted-sanctions-on-abacha-regime-for-commercial-reasons-documents-show.html>
- Idachaba, E. (2001). Chronology of Major Political Events in the Abacha Era (1993-1998). In Amuwo, '., Bach, D. C., & Lebeau, Y. (Eds.), *Nigeria during the Abacha Years (1993-1998): The Domestic and International Politics of Democratization*. IFRA-Nigeria. doi:10.4000/books.ifra.653
- Igwe, S. O. (1977). Church, State and Education in Eastern Nigeria (1847-1975). Doctoral thesis. Faculty of Educaiton, Institute of Education, University of London.
- Ihonvbere, J. (1987). Economic Contraction and Foreign Policy in the Periphery: A Study of Nigeria's Foreign Policy towards Africa in the Second Republic (1979-1983). *Africa Spectrum*, 22(3), 267-284.
- Ijaduola, K., Odunaike, O. and Ajayi, V. (2012). The Interplay between Politics and Education in Nigeria: Any Symbiotic Relationship? *Journal of Education and Practice*, 3(9), 124-129
- Ijeomah, B. (2000). Nigeria's Transition from Military to Civilian Rule: An Overview. *Journal of Political & Military Sociology*, 28(2), 293-310. doi:10.2307/45292816
- Ijov, T. M. and Sar, A. (2015). The Concepts of Politics, Education and the Relationship between Politics and Education in Nigeria. *Danish Journal of Sociology and Political Sciences*, July, 15-18

- Ikegbusi, N. , Chigbo-Okeke, U. and Modebelu, M. (2016). Politics and Educational Leadership in Nigerian Schools: Issues and Challenges. *Open Access Library Journal*, 3, 1-7. doi: 10.4236/oalib.1102741.
- Ikoya, P. O. (2007). Decentralization of educational development reforms in Nigeria: a comparative perspective. *Journal of Educational Administration*, 45(2), 190–203. doi:10.1108/09578230710732961
- Ikpe, U. (2000). Patrimonialism and Military Regimes in Nigeria. *African Journal of Political Science / Revue Africaine De Science Politique*, 5(1), 146-162.
- Imam, H. (2012), Educational Policy in Nigeria from the Colonial Era to the Post-Independence Period. *Italian Journal of Sociology of Education*, 1, 2012, 181 - 204
- International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (1965). *Economic Growth of Nigeria: Problems And Prospects*. Volume II. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, African Department
- Isumonah, V. (2012). Imperial Presidency and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria. *Africa Today*, 59(1), 43-68. doi:10.2979/africatoday.59.1.43
- Itugbu, S. (2011). Obasanjo, Nigeria and the World, *The Round Table*, 100:416, 564-568, DOI: 10.1080/00358533.2011.609702
- Iwuanyanwu, C. N & Anene, J.E (2001), Basic issues in the accomplishment of primary education objectives on the UBE programme. Asaba: Mar Press Publishers Ltd.
- Jackson, L. (1972). Nigeria: The Politics of the First Republic. *Journal of Black Studies*, 2(3), 277-302.
- Jayeola-Omoyeni, M.S & Omoyeni, J.(2014). Contributions of Western Education to the Making of Modern Nigeria During and After the First World War. *European Scientific Journal*, 10(31), 268-279
- Jibril M. (2007) Nigeria. In: Forest J.J.F., Altbach P.G. (eds) *International Handbook of Higher Education*. Springer International Handbooks of Education, vol 18. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-4012-2_48
- Jibrin, I. (2006). Legislation and The Electoral Process: The Third-term Agenda and the Future of Nigerian Democracy. *Journal of African Elections*, 5(1), 36-59
- John, J. and Putzel, J. (2009) *Political Settlements: Issues Paper*. Birmingham: GSDRC
- Johnson, D. (2008). *An assessment of the development needs of teachers in Nigeria: Kwara state case study*. Abuja: ESSPIN.
- Jones, A. and Naylor, R. (2014). The quantitative impact of armed conflict on education: counting the human and financial costs. Doha: PEIC.
- Joseph, R. (1987). *Democracy and Prebendal Politics: The Rise and Fall of the Second Republic*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Joseph, R. (1998). Class, State and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria. In P. Lewis, *Africa: Dilemmas of Development and Change*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 44–63.
- Joseph, R. (2013). Prebendalism and Dysfunctionality in Nigeria. *AfricaPlus*, July 26, 2013. Available <https://africaplus.wordpress.com/2013/07/26/prebendalism-and-dysfunctionality-in-nigeria/>
- Joseph, R. A. (1983). Class, state, and Prebendal politics in Nigeria. *The Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, 21(3), 21–38.
- Joshua, S., Loromeke, E. R. & Olanrewaju, I. P. (2014). Quota system, federal character principle and admission to federal unity schools: Barriers to learning in Nigeria. *Journal of Interdisciplinary and Multidisciplinary Research*, 2 (2), 1-10
- Kantiok, J. and Chiang, L (2007) The Impact of Self-esteem on High School Retention Among Girls in Northern Nigeria. *International Journal of Arts & Sciences*, 2(2), pp 44 - 47

- Kelsall, T. & vom Hau, M. (2020). *Beyond Institutions: Political Settlements Analysis and Development*. Barcelona: Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals (IBEI),
- Kieh, George K. Jr. (2014). The Bush Administration, U.S. Democracy Promotion, and Elections in Africa. *African Social Science: Review*, 6(1), Article 3, 29-41.
- Koehn, P. (1983). The role of public administrators in public policy making: Practice and prospects in Nigeria. *Public Administration and Development*, 3(1), 1–26. doi:10.1002/pad.4230030102
- Kosack, S. (2012). *The Education of Nations: How the Political Organization of the Poor, Not Democracy, Led Governments to Invest in Mass Education*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Lawal, T. and Oluwatoyin, A. (2011). National Development in Nigeria: Issues, Challenges and Prospects. *Journal of Public Administration and Policy Research*, 3(9), 237-241
- Leavy, Z. (2015). Interest-Based Bargainings' Impact on Collective Bargaining Outcomes. Seminar Research Paper Series. Paper 23.
http://digitalcommons.uri.edu/lrc_paper_series/23
http://digitalcommons.uri.edu/lrc_paper_series/23
- Lenshir, N. (2013). Politicization of Education in Nigeria: Implications for National Transformation. *Global Journal of Human Social Science - Political Science*, 13(5), 23-33
- LeVan, A. (2019). The End of a New Beginning: Nigeria's Transition, 1999–2015. In *Contemporary Nigerian Politics: Competition in a Time of Transition and Terror* (pp. 30-66). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781108560467.002
- Levy, B. (2014) *Working with the Grain: Integrating Governance and Growth in Development Strategies*. New York: Oxford University Press
- Lewis, P. (1994). Endgame in Nigeria? The Politics of a Failed Democratic Transition. *African Affairs*, 93(372), 323-340.
- Lewis, P. (1996). From Prebendalism to Predation: The Political Economy of Decline in Nigeria. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 34(1), 79-103.
- Library of Congress (2008). Country Profile: Nigeria, 2008. Library of Congress, Federal Research Division.
- Lindsay, B. (2006). Nigeria: Project Obasanjo in full swing. *New African*, March 26, 56-62
- Longe, R. S. (1982). *Factors Influencing Current Cost of Secondary Education in the Oyo State of Nigeria*. Institute for Educational Planning Research Report. Paris: UNESCO
- Luckham, R. (1971). *The Nigerian Military*. Cambridge University Press.
- Mackintosh, J. (1964). Nigeria since Independence. *The World Today*, 20(8), 328-337.
- Madumere, S. C. & Olisaemeka, B. U. (2011). Democratization of Education as Prerequisite for Social Economic and Cultural Progress in a Multi-cultural Society. *US-China Education Review*, B7, 982-987
- Madunagu, E. (2017, 28 November). 'Ali must go' and the Nigerian Left. *The Guardian*.
<https://guardian.ng/opinion/ali-must-go-and-the-nigerian-left/> (accessed 15 February 2021)
- Maigida, A. Y. (2018). Education and School Administration in the Nigerian History: The Colonial and Post-Colonial Characteristics. *International Journal of Scientific Research and Management*, 6(04), EL-2018. <https://doi.org/10.18535/ijprm/v6i4.el01>
- Mancini, L. 2009. "Comparative Trends in Ethno-regional Inequalities in Ghana and Nigeria: Evidence from Demographic and Health Surveys." CRISE Working Paper, Oxford Department of International Development, University of Oxford.
- Martin, A. (1997). Interest-Based Bargaining: What We're Learning. *Perspectives on Work*, 1(2), 49-53
- Matthews, D. (1984). Nigeria 1984: An Interim Report. CSIS African Notes, No 24, February 29
- Max, E. & Aduma, A. (2016). The Politics of Economic Reforms in Nigeria: A Comparative Analysis of Needs and SAP. *Journal of Policy and Development Studies*, 10(2), 127-143
- Mbah, A. N. (1971). *From the start to surrender the story and records of Nigerian Civil War for unity : including current affairs of the twelve states cabinet*. Onitsha: Appolos Bros Press

- Meagher, K. (2009). The Informalization of Belonging: Igbo Informal Enterprise and National Cohesion from Below. *Africa Development*, 35(1), 31–46
- Ministry of Education Kano State (2008). Education Strategic Plan 2009 – 2018. Kano: Kano State Government
- Mitchell, W. (1961). Politics as the Allocation of Values: A Critique. *Ethics*, 71(2), 79-89
- Mohammed, A.S. (2010). The Masquerade Unmasked: Obasanjo and the Third-Term Debacle. In: Adejumobi S. (eds) *Governance and Politics in Post-Military Nigeria*. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230115453_7
- Moja, T. (2000). *Nigeria Education Sector Analysis: an analytical synthesis of performance and main issues*. New York: World Bank.
- Momoh, A. (1996). The Structural Adjustment Programme and the Transition to Civil Rule in Nigeria (1986-1993). *Africa Development / Afrique Et Développement*, 21(1), 19-37. Muhammad, G. B. & Liman, A. (2018). Military, Politics and Public Administration in Nigeria: What Prospect for Sustainable Development and Democratic Consolidation? *Journal of Political Science and Leadership Research*, 4(1), 38-49
- Moore, M. (2015). Creating efficient, effective, and just educational systems through multi-sector strategies of reform. Research on Improving Systems of Education (RISE) Working Paper 15/004. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.35489/BSG-RISE-WP_2015/004
- Morakinyo, O. (2015). Language Policy in Nigeria: Problems, Prospects and Perspectives. *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science*, 5(9), 154160
- Mudge, G. (1970). Starvation as a Means of Warfare. *The International Lawyer*, 4(2), 228-268.
- Mukaddas, T. (2020). Effect of Foreign Aid on Educational Development in Nigeria. *Quest Journal of Management and Social Sciences*, 1(2), 202-209
- Munck, G. (2001). Game Theory and Comparative Politics: New Perspectives and Old Concerns. *World Politics*, 53(2), 173-204.
- Munoz, L. (1987). Regionalism in Nigeria: The Transformation of Tradition. *Il Politico*, 52(2), 317-341.
- Mustapha, A. R. (2005) 'Ethnic Structure, Inequality and Governance of the Public Sector in Nigeria', CRISE Working Paper 18. Oxford: Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, Department of International Development, University of Oxford
- Muyiwa, S. (2015). Education and Politics: Its Implications for National Transformation in Nigeria. *Public Policy and Administration Research*, 5(8), 40-45
- Nafziger, E. (1972). The Economic Impact of the Nigerian Civil War. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 10(2), 223-245. doi:10.1017/S0022278X00022369
- Nafziger, E. (1972). The Economic Impact of the Nigerian Civil War. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 10(2), 223-245.
- National Bureau of Statistics (2005). *Social Statistics in Nigeria - 2005*. Abuja: Federal Republic of Nigeria
- National Bureau of Statistics (2015). *Nigerian Formal Education Sector Summary Report: 2010- 2012*. Abuja: National Bureau of Statistics
- National Bureau of Statistics (2017) Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2016-17, Survey Findings Report. Abuja, Nigeria: National Bureau of Statistics and United Nations Children's Fund.

- National Bureau of Statistics (2019). WAEC Results Statistics (2016 - 2018). Abuja: National Bureau of Statistics.
- National Population Commission and RTI International (2011). Nigeria DHS Ed Data Survey 2010: education data for decision-making. Washington DC: NPC and RTI International.
- National Population Commission and RTI International (2011). *Nigeria DHS Ed Data Survey 2010: education data for decision-making*. Washington DC: NPC and RTI International.
- Nicol, D. (1961). The realities of Ashby's vision. *Higher Education Quarterly*, 15(4), 373-380
- Nigerian Educational Research Council (NERDC) (1972). *A Philosophy for Nigerian Education*. Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books
- Nnaemeka, O. (1997). Fighting on All Fronts: Gender Spaces, Ethnic Boundaries and Nigerian Civil War. *Dialectical Anthtopology*, 22, 235-263
- Nwagwu, N. (1981). The Impact of Changing Conditions of Service on the Recruitment of Teachers in Nigeria. *Comparative Education*, 17(1), 81-86.
- Nwagwu, N.A. (2000). Management, Structure and Financing of Education. In UNESCO, *State of Education in Nigeria*. Abuja: UNESCO, pp.10-21
- Nwangwu, C. C. (1997). The Environment of Crises in the Nigerian Education System. *Comparative Education*, 33(1), 87–96. doi:10.1080/03050069728659
- Nwangwu, I.O. (2003). *Educational policies in Nigeria: Trends and implementation*. Nsukka: Jobus International Press.
- Nwangwu, R., Fagbulu, A., Aderogba, F., Ayodele, S., Olapeju, O. O., Yusufu, R. and Kalu, K. E. (2005). *Nigeria education sector diagnosis*. Abuja: Education Sector Analysis Unit, Federal Ministry of Education.
- Nwokeocha, S. (2013). *Nigeria: Managing Teacher Education and Practice in the Era of Transformation*. Centurion: AFTRA
- Nwuzor, A. (1983). The Military and Education in Nigeria: An Experiment In Centralization In A Federal Context. *Journal of Educational Administration and History*, 15(1), 50-55, DOI: 10.1080/0022062830150107
- Nzekwe, A. (2007). *Silent Resistance: High School Dropouts among Igbo-Nigerian Children*. Bloomington: Author House
- Obanya, PAI (2008). Reforming Educational Reforms. In Lawal, A. R et. al. (Eds.), *Education Reforms in Nigeria*. Faculty of Education, University of Ilorin, 24-46
- Obanya, PAI (2012). 'Educational Change versus Educational Reform'. In Ivowi, UMO and Akpan, Ben B. (Eds.). *Education in Nigeria: From the Beginning to the Future*. Lagos,: Foremost Educational Services Ltd. 441 – 460
- Obioha, E.E. (2016). Roles of the Military in Democratic Transitions and Successions in Nigeria. *International Journal of Social Sciences and Humanity Studies*, 8(1), 251-268
- Odewale, A. (2019). Local Government and Primary Education in Nigeria: An Overview. *International Journal of Arts and Humanities*, 8(4), 138-146
- Odinkalu, C. A. (2001). The Management of Transition to Civil Rule by the Military in Nigeria (1966-1996). In Amuwo, '., Bach, D. C., & Lebeau, Y. (Eds.), *Nigeria during the Abacha Years (1993-1998): The Domestic and International Politics of Democratization*. IFRA-Nigeria. doi:10.4000/books.ifra.634
- Odoziobodo, S., Alu, K. & Ozigbo, R. (2010). Obasanjo and the verdict of history: an assessment of Obasanjo's administration in Nigeria. 1999-2007. 7th Congress of African Studies, LISBOA 2010, CIEA7 #31,

- Odukoya, J. A. (2012). Formulation and Implementation of Educational Policies in Nigeria. In: Educational Research Network for West and Central Africa [ERNWACA] Colloquium and Strategic Session, December 2012, Bamako Mali
- Ogbaji, U. (2013). Educational Development in Nigeria: A Comparative Analysis of the Military and Civilian Regimes (1966-1983). Available at https://www.academia.edu/4239372/educational_development_in_nigeria
- Ogbonna, C.N. & Ogunnubi, O. (2018). Rethinking the Role of Nigeria's Technical Aid Corps as Soft Power: Rough Diamond or Fools' Gold. *Ubuntu: Journal of Conflict and Social Transformation*, 7(2), 121-141
- Ogunyemi, B. (2010). Curriculum Politics in the Changing Fortunes of Nigerian Social Studies. *International Journal of Education*, 2(2), 1-12
- Ojo, A. (2020). The Impact of Private Secondary Schools on Examination Malpractices in Nigeria. *International Journal of Sociology and Anthropology Research*, 6(2), 67-71,
- Ojukwu, U. (2006). Effective Management of Primary Education in Nigeria: The Challenges Before the Universal Basic Education Commission - (UBEC). *MULTIDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL OF RESEARCH DEVELOPMENT*, 7(1), n.p.
- Okafor, U.C. & Obiora, C. (2015). From Military Rule to Civil Rule: A Political Economy of Gerontocratic Metamorphosis in Nigeria. *International Affairs and Global Strategy*, 38, 45-53
- Okeke, V.O.S & Chukwuka, U. (2013). Nigerian Political Culture: The Saga of Militarism. In M.C.Muo & E. E.Chukiwuemeka, *Review of Public Administration and Management*. Department of Public Administration. Nnamdi Azikiwe University Awka, Nigeria, 98-111
- Okeke, Y. & Ugwu, C. U. (2013). Nigerian political culture: The saga of militarism. *Review of Public Administration and Management*, 1(3), <https://www.longdom.org/open-access/nigerian-political-culture-the-saga-of-militarism-2315-7844-1-124.pdf>
- Okekeocha, C. (2013). A Case Study of Corruption and Public Accountability in Nigeria. Dissertations, Theses and Capstone. Kennesaw State University
- Oko, O. (1981). Partition or Perish: Restoring Social Equilibrium in Nigeria Through Reconfiguration. *Ind. INT'L & COMP. L. REV*, 8(2), 317-379
- Okobiah, O. (2002) The Educational Imbalance Between the Northern and Southern States of Nigeria: A Redirection of Educational Policies. Inaugural Lecture Series, Delta State University, Abraka, 13th March
- Okonofua, B. A. (2013). Who Rules Papa's Land? C. Wright Mills and the Nigerian Power Elite. SAGE Open. <https://doi.org/10.1177/2158244013502494>
- Okoro, D.C.U. (2000). *Basic Education - Emerging Issues, Challenges and Constraints*. In UNESCO, *State of Education in Nigeria*. Abuja: UNESCO, pp.34-51
- Okoroma, S. (2006). Educational policies and problems of implementation in Nigeria. *Australian Journal of Adult Learning*, 46(2), 243-263
- Okoye, D. & Pongou, R. (2014). Historical Missionary Activity, Schooling, and the Reversal of Fortunes: Evidence from Nigeria. Munich Personal RePEc Archive Paper No. 58052. Available at <https://mpira.ub.uni-muenchen.de/58052/>
- Okoye, V. (1999). "Root Causes of Low Male Enrolment in Schools and Solutions to Them", in Ejiofor (ed.) *Fighting A Monster: Declining Males in Schools*. Enugu: Nolix Educational Publications
- Olaniyan, D. & Obadara, O. (2008). A Critical Review of Management of Primary Education in Nigeria. *International Journal of African & African American Studies*, 7(1), 9-20

- Olaniyan, G. O. (2012). Changing Phases of Nigerian Education Policies and Challenges of Functionalism. *Journal of Education and Practice*, 3(14), 152-157
- Olaniyan, O. (2011). The Determinants of Child Schooling in Nigeria. AERC Research Paper 217 African Economic Research Consortium, Nairobi January 2011
- Olaopa, T. (2021). Elite nationalism and the salvation of Nigeria. *The Nation*. May 9, 2021. Available at <https://thenationonline.net/elite-nationalism-and-the-salvation-of-nigeria/>
- Olusola, A., Ayodele, J. and Osiki, P. (2011). Political Leadership and the Development of Education Programme in Nigeria: Lessons for African Nations. *Journal of Education and Practice*, 2(8), 19-27
- Omenka, N. I. (2007). Church-State relations in education: The Catholic experience in Eastern Nigeria, 1900-1975. *Abia Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences*, 4, 26-49.
- Omenka, N. I. (2011). Blaming the gods: Christian religious propaganda in the Nigeria-Biafra war. *Journal of African History*, 51,367-89.
- Oni, J. (2008). Universality Of Primary Education In Nigeria: Trends And Issues. *International Journal of African & African American Studies*, 7 (1): 23-31
- Oniye, A.O. and Alawiye, A.S. (2008). Female Students Perceived Causes of and Solution to Examination Malpractices in Asa Local Government: Implication for Counselling. *Sokoto Educational Review* 10(2), 1-12
- Onuoha, G. (2016). Shared Histories, Divided Memories: Mediating and Navigating the Tensions in Nigeria–Biafra War Discourses. *Africa Today*, 63(1), 3-21. doi:10.2979/africatoday.63.1.0003
- Onuoha, N. K. (1978). Education and National Integration in Africa: A Case Study of Nigeria. *African Studies Review*, 21(2), 67-76. doi:10.2307/523662
- Onwuegbuchulam, M. (2017). Catholic Education in Southeastern Nigeria and National Educational Development, 1885-2017. PhD Thesis. Educational Leadership and Policy Studies and the Graduate Faculty of the University of Kansas
- Orbach, E. (2004). The Capacity of the Nigerian Government to Deliver Basic Education Services. World Bank Africa Region Human Development Working Paper Series, 29084
- Orji, E. (2001). Issues on Ethnicity and Governance in Nigeria: A Universal Human Rights Perspective. *Fordham International Law Journal*, 25(2) Article 4, 431-482
- Ortner, J. (2014). Political Bargaining in a Changing World. Meeting Papers 445, Society for Economic Dynamics
- Osaghae, E. (1995). *Structural Adjustment and Ethnicity in Nigeria*. Nordiska Africainstitutet, Uppsala
- Osei, R. D., Ackah, C., Domfe, G. and Danquah, M. (2015). Political settlements, the deals environment and economic growth: The case of Ghana. ESID Working Paper No. 53. Manchester, UK: University of Manchester
- Osoba, S. O. (1996). Corruption in Nigeria: Historical Perspectives. *Review of African Political Economy*, 23(69), 371-386.
- Osokoya, I. (2010). Teacher Education in Nigeria: Past, Present and Future Challenges. *Academic Leadership: The Online Journal*, 8(4), Article 61. <https://scholars.fhsu.edu/alj/vol8/iss4/61>
- Otobo, D. (1986). Bureaucratic Elites and Public-Sector Wage Bargaining in Nigeria. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 24(1), 101-126.
- Oyedemi, O. (2015). Lapses in Education Policy Formulation Processes in Nigeria: Implications for the Standard of Education. *Journal of Education and Practice*, 6(29), 195-202

- Oyelere, R. (2006). Africa's Education Enigma? The Nigerian story. Selected Paper for presentation at the American Agricultural Economics Association Annual Meeting, Long beach, California, July 23-26,2006.
- Oyeleye, L., & Osisanwo, A. (2013). Expression of ideologies in media accounts of the 2003 and 2007 general elections in Nigeria. *Discourse & Society*, 24(6), 763–773.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0957926513486224>
- Pakata, S.B. (1977). Constraints to Curriculum Development in Kwara State, Nigeria. Special study submitted to the University of Nottingham School of Education for Diploma in Education, July 1977.
- Palmaer, William (1983). A Brief Account of School Inspection in Nigeria. Comparative and International Studies and the Theory and Practice of Education. Proceedings of the Annual Conference of the Australian Comparative and International Education Society (11th, Hamilton, New Zealand, August 21-24, 1983), 349- 359
- Pinkley, R. (1973). The Theory and Practice of Military Government. *Political Studies*, 21, 2 (June 1973), 158.
- Plotnicov, L. (1971). An Early Nigerian Civil Disturbance: The 1945 Hausa-Ibo Riot in Jos. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 9(2), 297-305.
- Premium Times (2013, June 26,) Reprs probe cut-off marks in unity schools. Retrieved from <https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/139694-reprs-probe-cut-off-marks-in-unity-schools.html> (accessed 4 November 2017)
- Pritchard, M. (1975). *Primary School Inspection in Nigeria - The organisation and staffing of the primary school inspectorate:case studies 2*. IIEP research report. UNESCO
- Pritchett, L. (2019). *A Review Essay—The Politics and Governance of Basic Education: A Tale of Two South African Provinces*. RISE Insight. https://doi.org/10.35489/BSG-RISE-RI_2019/010.
- Reay, D. (2012) What would a socially just education system look like?: saving the minnows from the pike. *Journal of Education Policy*, 27(5), 587-599
- Richard, J. (2013). Prebendalism and Dysfunctionality in Nigeria. AfricaPlus, July 26, 2013. Retrieved from <https://africaplus.wordpress.com/2013/07/26/prebendalism-and-dysfunctionality-in-nigeria/> (accessed 23 March 2021)
- Roser, Max and Ortiz-Ospina, Esteban (2013). Primary and Secondary Education". Published online at OurWorldInData.org. Available at <https://ourworldindata.org/primary-and-secondary-education>
- Saliu, H. (1997). A review of debate on Nigeria's economic diplomacy. *Journal of African Research & Development*, 27/28, 318-325.
- Samuel, G. (2018). How Corruption is Affecting Basic Education in Nigeria. International Anti-Corruption Conference. Available at <https://iaccseries.org/blog/how-corruption-is-affecting-basic-education-in-nigeria/>
- Sanderson, L. (1975). Education and Administrative Control in Colonial Sudan and Northern Nigeria. *African Affairs* 74 (October), 427-441
- Sekwat, A. (2002). Civil Service Reform in Post-Independence Nigeria: Issues and Challenges. *Public Administration Quarterly*, 25(4), 498-517.
- Shopeju, J.O. & Ojukwu, C.C. (2013). Patrimonial rule in Olusegun Obasanjo's Nigeria. *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations*, 7(6), 266-273
- Shrestha, U., Williams, T., Al-Samarrai., Geldermalsen, A. & Zaidi, A. (2019). What is the relationship between politics, education reforms, and learning? Evidence from a new database and nine case

- studies. Background Paper for World Development Report World Development Report 2018 LEARNING to Realize Education's Promise.
- Shubik, M. (1973). *Game Theory and Political Science*. Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No 351. Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics
- Sokari-George, E. (1987). Planning in Nigeria: The Agricultural Base 1962—1985. *GeoJournal*, 14(1), 97-108.
- Sokoh, G. (2013). Local Government and the management of the Universal Basic Education Programme: An Historical Assessment. *African Journal of Education and Technology*, 3(1), 46-56
- Stevenson, D., & Baker, D. (1991). State Control of the Curriculum and Classroom Instruction. *Sociology of Education*, 64(1), 1-10. doi:10.2307/2112887
- Suberu, R.T. (2013). Prebendal Politics and Federal Governance in Nigeria. In Adebani W., Obadare E. (eds) *Democracy and Prebendalism in Nigeria*. pp 79-101. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137280770_4
- Tawney, R. H. (1943). The problem of the public schools. *Political Quarterly*, April/ June.
- Teachers Registration Council of Nigeria (2005). *Teachers Handbook* (Revised Edition 2005). Teachers Registration Council of Nigeria
- The Economist (2014, July 26). Education in Northern Nigeria: Mixing the Modern and the Traditional (Trying to Teach Children Not to Be Extremists). Online. Available at: www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21608809-trying-teach-children-not-be-extremists-mixing-modern-and [Accessed 19 April 2015]
- The Nation (2015). Lagos distributes new primary school leavers' certificates. March 5, 2015. Available at <https://thenationonline.net/lagos-distributes-new-primary-school-leavers-certificates/> (retrived on 20 February 2020)
- The New York Times (1986, May 24) Around the World: 4 Nigerian Students Reported Slain at Protest. Section 1, Page 5. Available at <https://www.nytimes.com/1986/05/24/world/around-the-world-4-nigerian-students-reported-slain-at-protest.html>
- The Vanguard (2012). Confusion in Education: 9-3-4, 6-3-3-4, 1-6-3-4, British, America or which curriculum? June 28, 2012. Available at <https://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/06/confusion-in-education-9-3-4-6-3-3-4-1-6-3-4-british-american-or-which-curriculum/>
- ThisDay (2021). Kagara Abduction: SERAP Urges Buhari to Probe, Recover Money Missing from UBEC, SUBEB. February 21, 2021. Available at <https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2021/02/21/kagara-abduction-serap-urges-buhari-to-probe-recover-money-missing-from-ubec-subeb/>
- Thornley, J.F (1966). *The planning of 4 primary education in Northern Nigeria*. UNESCO: International Institute for Educational Planning
- Tyona, S. (2020). Nigeria's Foreign Policy Under Two Military Juntas, 1983-1993: A Reflection of the Buhari and Babangida Regimes. *Covenant University Journal of Politics & Internationall Affair*, 8(1), 65-77
- Uche, C. (2008). Oil, British Interests and the Nigerian Civil War. *The Journal of African History*, 49(1), 111-135
- Udo, R. (1970). Reconstruction in the War-Affected Areas of Nigeria. *Area*, 2(3), 9-12.
- Ugochukwu, K. & Omokhoa, K. (2019). Examination Malpractice Among Secondary School Students: Hindrance To Nigeria National Development In The 21st Century. *International Journal of Innovative Education Research*, 7(2), 163-173

- Ukaegbu, E. (1999). Behold a Cancer Spreading: Address on the Occasion of the Anambra State Summit Conference on Low Male Enrolment in Schools. In P. Ejiofor (ed.) *Fighting A Monster: Declining Males in Schools*. Enugu: Nolix Educational Publications
- Ukeje, B. (1999). "Low male Enrolment of Anambra State Citizens in Educational Institutions in Nigeria: Time Series and Inter-State Comparative Analysis", in P. Ejiofor (ed.) *Fighting A Monster: Declining Males in Schools*. Enugu: Nolix Educational Publications
- Umo, U. (2014). Forms and Sources of Conflict in Nigerian Education System: The Search for Nigerian Psyche. *Global Journal of Education Research*, 13, 101-108
- Unegbu, C. (2010). Igbo Enwela Eze: The Changing Values of Kingship in Post-War Igbo Nation. Paper of 8th International Conference On Igbo Studies, April 9-10, Howard University, Washington, DC
- UNESCO (1981). *Teacher Education and Curriculum Development, Rivers State: Project Findings and Recommendations*. Paris: UNESCO
- UNESCO (2000). State of Education in Nigeria. Abuja: UNESCO
- UNESCO (2006). Nigeria. In World Data on Education. 6th Edition, 2006/07. UNESCO
- UNHCR (2014). More than 10,000 people flee fresh attacks in Nigeria, seek shelter in Cameroon and Niger, 2 September 2014. Available at <http://www.unhcr.org/5405b86d6.html>
- United Nations Population Fund (2019). *State of World Population 2019: Unfinished Business - The Pursuit of Rights and Choices for All*. New York, NY: United Nations Population Fund
- Universal Basic Education Commission (2019). Nigeria Digest Of Education Statistics. Available at <https://education.gov.ng/nigeria-digest-of-education-statistics/>
- Universal Basic Education Commission (2001). UBE programme 2001 national assessment. Abuja: UBEC.
- Universal Basic Education Commission (2001). *UBE programme 2001 national assessment*. Abuja: UBEC.
- Universal Basic Education Commission (2004). *The Compulsory, Free, Universal Basic Education Act, 2004 and other Related Matters*. Abuja: UBEC
- Universal Basic Education Commission (2007). UBE programme 2003 national assessment. Abuja: UBEC.
- Universal Basic Education Commission (2007). *UBE programme 2003 national assessment*. Abuja: UBEC.
- Universal Basic Education Commission (2009). 2006 National Assessment of UBEC programme (NAUPEB) Final Report. Abuja: UBEC.
- Universal Basic Education Commission (2009). *2006 National Assessment of UBEC programme (NAUPEB) Final Report*. Abuja: UBEC.
- Universal Basic Education Commission (2012a). *Guidelines for Quality Assurance in Basic Education in Nigeria*. Universal Basic Education Commission Publication.
- Universal Basic Education Commission (2012b). *National Personnel Audit Report*. UBEC
- Universal Basic Education Commission (2013) Final Report of 2011 National Assessment of Learning Achievements in Basic Education Programme (NALABE). Abuja: UBEC
- Universal Basic Education Commission (2013) Final Report of 2011 National Assessment of Learning Achievements in Basic Education Programme (NALABE). Abuja: UBEC
- Universal Basic Education Commission (2013). *Universal Basic Education Commission 2013 Annual Report*. Abuja: UBEC

- Unterhalter, E., Ezegwu, C., Adedokun, A., Lamido-Dodo, M. and Wadata, D. (2017) Context and criticality: Student teacher engagements with gender in three northern Nigerian states. In Panjwani, F., Revell, L., Gholami, R. and Diboll, M (Eds). *Education and Extremisms: Rethinking liberal pedagogies in the contemporary world*. London: Routledge
- Unterhalter, E., Lynsey, R. and Ibrahim, J. (2018). *Quality and Equalities: a comparative study of public and low-cost private schools in Lagos*. London: Education International
- Unterhalter, E., North, A., Ezegwu, C., and Shercliff, E. (2018). *Teacher Education, Teacher Practice, Approaches to Gender and Girls' Schooling Outcomes: A Study in Five Nigerian states. Final Project Report*: British Council
- Usman, L. (2006). Rural Nomadic Fulbe Boys' Primary Schooling: Assessing Repertoires of Practice in Nigeria. *McGill Journal of Education*, 41(2), 155–174.
- Usman, L. (2008). Assessing the universal basic education primary and Koranic schools' synergy for Almajiri street boys in Nigeria. *International Journal of Educational Management*, 22 (1), 62-73
- Utomi, P. (1985). Legitimacy and Governance: One More Year of Military Rule in Nigeria. *A Journal of Opinion*, 14, 39-42. doi:10.2307/1262537
- Uwakonye, M., Osho, G. & Anucha, H. (2006). The Impact of Oil and Gas Production On The Nigerian Economy: A Rural Sector Econometric Model. *International Business & Economics Research Journal*, 5(2), 61-76
- Wajzer, M. & Cukier-Syguła, M. (2019). An evolutionary game theory approach to cooperation among political elites. *Acta Politologica*, 11(3), 1–12. https://doi.org/10.14712/1803-8220/37_2018
- Wiking, S. (1983). *Military Coups in Sub-aharan Africa: How to justify illegal assumptions of power*. Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala: Uppsala Offsetcenter
- World Bank (1990). Staff Appraisal Report: Federal Republic of Nigeria Primary Education Project. World Bank, November 1990.
- World Bank (1994) Nigeria Structural Adjustment Program Policies, Implementation, and Impact. Western Africa Department Country Operations Division. Report No. 13053-UNI
- World Bank (2021). World Development Indicators. Retrieved from <https://data.worldbank.org/topic/4>
- World Bank. (2003). *Nigeria School Education in Nigeria: Preparing for Universal Basic Education (Human Development III)*. The World Bank, Africa Region
- Yusif, A. & Odeyinka, H.A. (2003). Performance evaluation of the Petroleum Trust Fund Educational and Health Infrastructure Rehabilitation Programme in North Western Nigeria. *Acta Structilia* 2003: 10(I&2), 93-114

Annexes

Annex 1: Secondary Schools Enrolment – 1960 -2003

Year	PRIMARY SCHOOL		SECONDARY SCHOOL	
	Total number of Schools	Total Schools enrolment	Total number of Schools	Total Schools enrolment
1960	NA	2,912,619	NA	135,434

1965	NA	2,911,742	NA	209,015
1970	21,223	3,515,825	1,513	310,054
1975	30,726	6,165,547	1,660	610,652
1980	35,281	13,760,030	5,181	2,342,701
1985	35,432	13,025,287	5,964	2,794,498
1990	38,254	13,607,249	5,959	2,893,918
1995		17,994,620	6,452	5,084,546
2000		24,895,446	8,275	6,359,449
2003		26,292,370	13,333	6,745,186

Sources: Federal Ministry of Education (1996), Akinwumi (2006), UNESCO (2000) and Olaniyan (2011)